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Abstract
BEYOND PROTEST: ETHICS OF
RECONCILIATION IN POST-APARTHEID
SOUTH AFRICAN WHITE WRITING
Sohinee Roy
Beyond Protest: Ethics of Reconciliation in Post-Apartheid South African White
Writing examines the politics and poetics of reconciliation in South Africa by comparing
the defining (or, at least the initiating) document the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission Report (TRC) with the ways in which concepts of “racial harmony” are
presented in the post-apartheid novels of white authors like J.M.Coetzee, Nadine
Gordimer, Antje Krog, and Andre Brink. South Africa’s complex racial history dating
back to the colonial times, the consequent internalization of imposed racial identities
within resistance movements, and the institutionalization of racist practices through state
policies mean that its effort to move beyond racism suffers from a perpetual lag-effect.
The intertwining of race and colonialism also means that eradication of racism must
account for colonial history. Racial reconciliation, under the circumstances, is an openended, dynamic, spatially and temporally sensitive process. By defining reconciliation as
a dynamic process I identify a discrepancy between the celebration of the end of
apartheid as end of racism in South Africa and the sedimentation of past racist practices
in the present social and political structures. My dissertation uses postcolonial and race
theory, primarily Goldberg’s Foucauldian concept of race and Spivakean ethics, to
explore how moving beyond apartheid and the nation’s complex racist colonial past
places signal demands on representation politics. Central to my argument is my claim that
imaginative literature needs to be recognized as vital to reconciliation and to the
reconceptualization of historical process required if reconciliation is to be a successful,
ongoing project.
I explore reconciliation as policy and practice—a policy and practice that
literature, particularly white literature, critiques and supports. For the white authors,
beneficiaries of the persisting white supremacy, reconciliation involves, among other
things, aesthetic strategies used to map the limits of empathy for the non-white other.
Chapter 1 charts the central claims, the theoretical framework, and the historical context
of my project. In Chapter 2 I examine the TRC’s Final Report through the lens of the
theoretical and historical framework of the first chapter to explore ethics as a temporal,
rhetorical, and textual construct, and the TRC as the primary site of that construction. In
Chapter 3 I argue that J. M. Coetzee’s Disgrace presents reconciliation as an irony where
acknowledging the impossibility of understanding the other, especially in relations
marked by historical power imbalance and violence, opens the possibility of ethical
relations. Chapter 4 argues that Andre Brink’s post-apartheid novels use magic realism to
challenge the possibility of recovering an authentic past as the basis of justice. My final
chapter compares Nadine Gordimer’s None to Accompany Me with Antje Krog’s Country
of My Skull to discuss the role of women in patriarchal conceptions of reconciliation. A
brief epilogue explores the more universal currency of my conception of racial
reconciliation.
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1
One morning
My people will hang on a sunrise … we shall stand face to
face with the sun leaving behind us
so many dead
wounded
mad
so many senseless things
We shall have buried apartheid …How shall we shake hands
how shall we hug each other that day? What first words will we utter?
Mongane Wally Serote
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Introduction
The novels written by white South African authors in the eighties, the dying years
of apartheid, represent a dystopian world in its death throes. Described as apocalyptic
novels, they depict the violence and anarchy that accompanied the collapse of law and
order in the final years of apartheid. Despite the destruction of the old order and the
ongoing revolution, the new kingdom remains stubbornly invisible in these novels. For
example, J. M. Coetzee’s Age of Iron presents a world marked by death, disease and civic
anarchy. Mrs. Curren, the old academic, is on her deathbed with cancer, vainly hoping for
a reunion with her expatriate daughter. At the end of the novel she is still waiting, even
though there is little hope that her dying wish for reconciliation with her daughter will be
fulfilled. Similarly, in Nadine Gordimer’s July’s People Maureen Smales, who has been
hiding from the revolution, in the forest, in her former servant’s home, dashes towards
the sound of a helicopter at the end of the novel. But we do not know if the helicopter
belongs to enemies or friends. If Coetzee signals the moribund times through the trope of
sickness and death, then Gordimer signals the end of an order through signs of infertility.
In the apocalyptic fiction of the eighties South Africa is depicted as caught in the
transition between the old and the new: the demise of the old order is certain, but the new
remains mysteriously, almost frighteningly, unknown.
The future that was nebulous and undefined for Mrs. Curren or Maureen in the
novels became a reality for South Africans with the end of apartheid, in 1991, and the
election of the first non-white government, in May 1994. Authors such as Andre Brink
and Njabulo Ndebele hoped that the political change would liberate literature from
political determinism and encourage engagement with and celebration of the ordinary

3
aspects of life. i Despite formal experimentation and movement away from realism, the
post-apartheid texts by white authors continued to be marked by bleak pictures of
contemporary South Africa. In J.M Coetzee, Andre Brink, and Nadine Gordimer’s
fictions, post-apartheid South Africa is very different from apartheid South Africa. They
are characterized by violence and terror, and examples of racial discord, instead of
accord. The pessimistic images of post-apartheid South Africa in their novels raise the
question: Why are white authors such as Gordimer, Brink, Krog, and Coetzee, who have
been active against the apartheid state, unable to imagine a positive post-apartheid age? Is
it a sign of their allegiance to the apartheid? Is it a reflection of the true reality of the
times? Or, is it a sign that true reconciliation is impossible?
The pessimistic picture of contemporary South Africa in post-apartheid white
writing relates to the peculiar nature of the end of apartheid. For South Africa, where
racial discrimination against the indigenous African population was a part of its long
colonial history, the end of apartheid was a step into uncharted waters of desegregated
racial interaction. A further complication was the fact that the ANC’s triumph in the
elections cannot be read as a victory of the non-white faction. Economic bankruptcy and
the breakdown of law and order as a result of the civil war forced the ruling Nationalist
Party (NP) to reconsider its exclusive racial policy and negotiate with the ANC. ii Since
there were no outright victors in this struggle and the end of political power did not mean
the end of white supremacy, there were questions about the possibility, under the
circumstances, of equality and justice, freedom and agency.
These political changes reconfigured the literary landscape from one
characterized by the strategic imperatives of “protest literature” to one defined by the
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nebulous terrain of cross-racial relation. Much of the certainties that defined protest
literature disappeared as suppressed stories of apartheid shattered linear correspondences
of white with evil and good with black. The emergence of suppressed apartheid narratives
revealed complicity and collaboration across racial lines and division along the ethnic
front. Black and white violence was matched by Black-on-Black violence. The apartheid
strategy of sabotaging any potential for a unified Black resistance in the cities by dividing
them along ethnic lines through the creation of Bantustans, exclusive tribal enclaves,
reinforced strong ethnic identities within the Black community. iii The most dominant of
them, the Zulus, resisted attempts by Black organization such as the ANC to unite all
Africans. Similarly, the white community is divided into the Afrikaners, who were of
Dutch descent, and the other Whites including English South Africans. iv The rigid racial
and ethnic identities hinder possibilities of discovering common ground among the
hostile divided subjects. v The end of apartheid and the complex racial and ethnic terrain
of South African society required a shift from protest to exploration of the possibilities of
positive relations that challenge hostility and violence as the only means of interacting
with the other.
Reconciliation as a means of establishing common ground by erasing differences
is impossible in South Africa because ideologies and identity categories from the past
continue in the present. These past ideologies and institutional structures can be traced
back to the colonial period. The rivalry between the two European settler groups: the
Boers and the British settlers, over control of the land led to the violent dispossession of
the indigenous population during the colonial period that set the tone for South Africa’s
racial patterns. The apartheid was a consequence of settler politics and settler rivalry that
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dates back to the colonial times in South Africa. vi The persistence of South Africa’s deep
racial history in the present means that, tempting as it may be, the desire to atone for the
past by identifying with and speaking for the racial other has to give precedence to the
need to recognize differences. If we regard these differences as the foundation for
reconciliation, if acknowledgement of differences can be seen as the basis for discovering
common ground beyond abstract notions of universal humanity, then possibilities of a
newer and more ethical paradigm of interaction between the different groups becomes
imaginable.
In this project I argue that reconciliation is not an event. It is a process, a
dynamic, open-ended and flexible process of renegotiating the relation between the past
and the present, and marking the boundaries between the self and the other through the
flux of history. Politically it means changing the structure and institutions of society to
heal historical inequalities. Ethically it means respecting the threshold to identifying with
the other, the limit to complete understanding created by different experiences of history .
Ethical relations under reconciliation are, thus, based on an essential alienation between
the self and the other. This alienated empathy, this relationship grounded in the history of
animosity between the self and the other, opens up the possibility of a new dynamic that
bypasses the dead end of uncritical fellowship. Implicit in my conception of
reconciliation is the understanding that power imbalances do not disappear, identity
categories formed in response to a history of oppression do not miraculously vanish with
political change, and the past cannot be conveniently wished away. Reconciliation is an
endless striving towards an ever-receding horizon of common ground. It does not offer a
clean slate, a fresh start. In fact, the reality of reconciliation is an endless negotiation
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between the ideal of perfect accord and the practice of living in a messy historical reality.
Efforts at reconciliation are, thus, caught in the double bind of history. Reconciliation is a
double bind because it seeks to transform the existing relation with history, but is
constrained and marked by the parameters of that history. In the end, I see reconciliation
less as erasing of differences, and more as a process of establishing common ground by
recognizing that history is embodied differently in its subjects. vii
I define reconciliation as an ethical process of negotiating the imperfect
understanding between hostile groups because apology, forgiveness, friendship, or
advocacy as the basis of cordial relations place the burden of moving ahead squarely on
the shoulders of the victims. All these actions require and expect the victims, who are
already suffering from injustice, to perform the morally difficult task of forgiving, or
accepting the perpetrator's friendship or being grateful. I am not denying that the victims
have a role, but to expect victims, who have been traumatized by violence and continue
to struggle for survival in the new dispensation, to forget the past is presumptuous.
Moreover, in post-conflict societies like South Africa the victims are so scarred by
violence and discrimination that they have little luxury to feel forgiveness. Reconciliation
as a dynamic process of negotiating difference recognizes that perpetrators have a critical
role to play—a role that involves moving beyond the naïve belief that forgiveness can
magically minimize the effects of a history of violent abuse.
In order to explore the nature of negotiations involved in creating a new social
order in post-conflict societies I focus on the ethics of reconciliation for white South
Africans. Continuation of white supremacy makes their resources and skills necessary for
rebuilding South Africa. In addition, guilt over complicity with racist apartheid
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ideologies and the desire to ingratiate themselves with the new government make the
whites eager to erase differences and identify with the racial other. The desire to atone for
past wrongs to create a new, more acceptable identity opens the possibility of whites
imposing their views on the non-whites and co-opting their new found voice and
authority. As Bishop Tutu pointed out at the height of apartheid, “I … welcome the
participation of all, both Black and white in the struggle for a new South Africa. The
leadership of the struggle must be firmly Black hands. … whites must be willing to
follow (Tutu, qtd in Gordimer, 266-267). To ensure that the need to expiate for the past
does not overlook differences created by a long history of institutionalized racism, white
South Africans need to abandon the active desire to make good. Tutu asks the white
population to play a secondary, more passive, role because their knowledge and
resources, while necessary, are the result of their privileged status in a racist society. By
focusing on the unique position of white South Africans I draw attention to the
importance of letting victims dictate the terms of reconciliation. The victims as the
guiding force reverse the old dynamics and allow new connections to be discovered.
I argue that reconciliation in South Africa is a postcolonial project, as well as a
racial project because the present racist ideologies, institutions and identities date back to
South Africa’s colonial history. Reconciliation as process of marking the threshold to the
other reads what would have been, conventionally, seen as failure in reconciliation as a
positive step. By recognizing the melancholic nature of post-apartheid postcolonial South
Africa as basis of action, reconciliation presents the much lamented postcolonial failure
to reverse power structures as a realistic step to setting up new racial paradigms.
Premised on the recognition that history is embodied differently, reconciliation offers the
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possibility of historically nuanced and ethical social relations that bypass racial
animosity. Reconciliation as a process is not a step into pessimism, but a step towards a
realistic future. Considered along these lines, South Africa’s reconciliation efforts
recognize the importance of settler indigene relations to settler identity. The definition of
settler colonies as “self-governing dominions with tenuous ties with the mother country”
elides the fact that the term “settler” is a euphemism to hide the violence and
dispossession of indigenous people involved in the process of settling (Young,
Postcolonialism 17). viii Anne E Coombes points out that what differentiates settler
colonies/countries such as Australia, South Africa, Canada and New Zealand from each
other are not their relation to the mother country, but their relation with the indigenous
people. ix
Beyond Protest: Ethics of Racial Reconciliation in the Works of Post-apartheid
White Writers compares the works of J. M. Coetzee, Nadine Gordimer, Antjie Krog and
Andre Brink with the Truth And Reconciliation Commission Final Report, to argue that
white authors adopt indirect narrative strategies such as magic realism and irony to
negotiate their complicity with South Africa’s racial history and the consequent problems
of representing the racial other. The authors use indirect and ambiguous modes of
narration to mark their complicity with apartheid and imagine alternate possibilities of
inter-racial relations based on a positive relation with the past. The flamboyant play with
different narrative strategies is a result of the ethical exigencies of post-apartheid South
Africa, rather than an art-for-arts sake free play of aesthetic experimentation. This means
that Brink’s dream of literature free of politics is yet to be realized. Nevertheless, postapartheid literature is free of overdeterminism by politics, free to represent the complex
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relations between races and between the past and the present—connections that the new
era must account for and engage with as it seeks to move behind the debilitating grip of
racism’s long hostile history in South Africa. x
The Post in Post-apartheid and the Post in Postcolonial
The problems with South Africa’s reconciliation—entrenched racial and ethnic
identity, fragmented body politics, continuing inequalities and absence of a common
ground—come to the surface in a recent South African high court ruling reclassifying
Chinese South Africans as “Black”. On June 15th 2008, the Wall Street Journal reported
that a South African High Court had ruled in favor of reclassifying South Africans of
Chinese descent as “Black” so that they could benefit from the affirmative action policies
set in motion to undo the wrongs of apartheid. xi The court ruling was because the
Chinese Association of South Africa sued the government for discriminating against its
members, who were classified as white and, hence, ineligible for affirmative action
benefits. They felt that their community deserved to benefit from affirmative action
because they faced discrimination during apartheid until the 1970s, when a trade treaty
with Taiwan elevated their racial status. The Chinese South African demand for Black
status brings up a number of points about the connection between South Africa’s messy
racial history and reconciliation, namely the shifting nature of race and the consequent
problems with affirmative action.
The shifting racial identity of Chinese South Africans indicates that race has no
transcendental value. The Chinese South African desire for Black status shows how a
negative identity category from the apartheid has acquired coveted status, while the value
of whiteness has declined. The fluctuating relative values of “Blackness” and whiteness
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suggest that race acquires its meaning from its context. Originally classified as
“Colored,” Chinese South Africans began to be treated as whites after a trade treaty with
Taiwan in the 1970s led to Taiwanese South Africans being labeled as “honorary whites.”
While Chinese South Africans never attained full white status like the Japanese, South
Korean or Taiwanese South Africans, they were protected from many of the
discriminatory laws of apartheid since the 1970s. Their latest reclassification comes in
the wake of China’s increased investment in South Africa. The Chinese South African
example suggests that race is based on social, economic, legal and political factors. The
Chinese South Africa case highlights race as a “fluid … historically specific concept
parasitic on theoretic and social discourses for the meaning it assumes at any historic
moment” (Goldberg, Culture 74). Yet, “traces of … past significations” mark the present
contours of race (Goldberg, Culture 81). The paradox of race in South Africa is that it
colonizes discourses to fulfill its agenda, even though it is a “fluid, fragile and more or
less vacuous concept capable of alternate theories” (Goldberg, Culture 81). While law
was used to prevent Chinese South Africans from sharing resources with whites during
apartheid, in post-apartheid South Africa Chinese South Africans effectively use the law
to secure racial identity for themselves. The insinuation of race in legal discourses also
ensures that only those Chinese residing in South Africa either in 2004 or earlier can
benefit from affirmative action. By restricting the beneficiaries of affirmative action law
divides the Chinese South African community. The Chinese South African example
shows that race is not based on biological difference. It is “an imagined grouping” that
“assumes content influenced by established political legal, cultural, scientific and social
factors and relations, but is not reducible to them” (Goldberg Culture 82). The fluidity of
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race implies that though race doesn’t seem to have a fixed form, it succeeds in
perpetuating its agenda through various discourses that define it at a given point in time.
The Chinese South African example makes it clear that race is a reading of the
body inflected with current social, political, religious, economic, and other discourses
circulating in a particular context. As a representation strategy for embodiment, race is an
almost empty signifier, dependant on social and political discourses for definition, even
as it defines social forces. The shiftiness of race, its paradoxical ephemerality and
persistence, is the result of its basis in changing ideology. The absence of an apriori
essence makes Anthony Appiah claim that race is fiction since it based on biological
claims that are spurious, while Paul Gilroy defines race as “imaginary” blackness in
Against Race (270). But, as the Chinese South African demand for redress for past
wrongs shows, this imagined system has very real consequences, consequences related to
the distribution of and access to resources, quality of life, and opportunities for
development. These consequences cannot be wiped away with a change in name. Indeed,
the rising cache of Black identity vis a vis white identity in South Africa has not been
accompanied by a corresponding improvement in the circumstances of a majority of the
nonwhites. The gap between the value of racial categories and the lived circumstances of
actual members of a particular racial group is the result of structural inequalities created
by the nation’s long racist history that continue in the present. Race thus has a duality: it
is an ideologically-motivated representation strategy and it is lived experience. Changing
the representation, under the circumstances, does not create a corresponding change in
the lived experience of the other.
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The Chinese South Africans dependence on law to secure justice for its past
suffering is ironic because law is embroiled in racial politics and informs racial meaning.
The paradox of law is that it pretends to dispense justice on the basis of rights distributed
evenly among its subjects, yet it protects and acts for special parties. In short, law’s
claims of being based on universal humanity are fiction. The principle of equivalence
within which law theoretically operates makes the newly reclassified Chinese South
Africans equal to other consistently Blacks groups such as the Africans and Indians. But
it ignores the fact that Chinese South Africans, who were exempt from the worst effects
of apartheid since 1970, had a very different experience of apartheid from that of other
“Black” groups like Africans, Indians, etc. In the transformation of racial reconciliation
into a battle of rights, in the reduction of a historically loaded racial term to an empty
category of rights, the traumatic history of the African community is foreclosed. The
Chinese South African case reveals how the universal premises of law actually serve
private interests. One of the consequences of dependence of law as a means to
reconciliation, according to Jean Comaroff, is that “in the pursuit of legal rights, as in the
politics of special interest, history is in danger of being made into a commodity, into
evidence of entitlement, a charter for stakeholders” (134). xii Comaroff cautions that
litigation encourages “assertion of even less tolerant sectarian differences, of an
incorrigible plurality irreducible to common social denominators or collective narratives,
indeed , irreducible even to a common argument save through such ‘universalizing media
as law or money’” (134). xiii Affirmative action, which defines equality in terms of
opportunity i.e. equal “opportunity to compete” and “equal treatment before the law,”
instead of equal opportunity of development, misses the connection between equality and
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fairness (Goldberg Culture 20). Fairness refers to the distribution of resources so that
everyone can have equal access to them to develop their talents. Equality of opportunity,
on the other hand, is a matter of “opportunity,” not “outcomes” (Goldberg State 252).
Without opportunities for development affirmative action ends up in perpetuating the
systemic inequalities of a historical context..
The example of Chinese South Africans illustrates the challenges of reconciliation
in South Africa. It brings into focus the different issues at stake if reconciliation in South
Africa is to succeed. The changing racial identity of Chinese South Africans and the
concomitant access to resources highlight the shifting and deceptive nature of race, its
intangible presence and its very tangible effects. This duality of race—race as
representation and race as lived experience—makes reconciliation challenging. Yet this
duality needs to be accounted for in reconciliation efforts. After all, if race is regarded
only as representation based on spurious ideology it is possible to dismiss it and imagine
common humanity as a way to move beyond race as Gilroy does. Gilroy’s concept of
“planetary humanism” is a “new way of being at home in the world through an active
hostility towards national solidarity and national culture and their privileging one over
other more open affiliations” (Gilroy, Melancholia 68). However, as the experience of
Chinese South Africans prove, race as lived experience means that the entrenched
identities cannot be discarded for more open connections very easily. Thus reconciliation
must account for both these aspects of race. Law and affirmative action fail because they
only address the representative nature of race, ignoring its structural element.
In order to conceive of reconciliation as a process that accounts for the duality of
race I draw on David Goldberg’s theory of race as discourse. By race as discourse
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Goldberg means that it includes “descriptive representation of others” and “a set of
hypothetical premises about humankind … and about the differences between them”
(Goldberg, Culture 47). The premises, which include ethical choices, institutional
policies and rules of interaction, are “manifestations of power relations vested in between
historically located subjects” (Goldberg, Racist 48). Race is thus a “socio-discursive
praxis in determinate historical circumstances” that is integral to subject formation
(Goldberg, Culture 59). The two aspects of race as discourse suggests that changing
representation will not change the premises and practices that inform race. Thus changing
the racial identity will not improve the lived experience of Chinese South Africans. The
fluid nature of race, its dependence on other factors and its own goals mean that the
practice of race perpetuates and changes its meaning. When race is used for the
“exclusion of people in virtue of their being deemed members of different racial groups”
it is institutionalized (Goldberg, Culture 98) Thus the practices and fictions of race are
sustained and perpetuated by the discursive practices of racism, which is a “product of
economies of power, reflected in the interrelation of bodies produced and refined in
practice” (Goldberg, Culture 2). However, once initiated, “they pass onto the practicoinert, ready to be passed on, inherited, reproduced and reformed” (Goldberg, Culture 57).
These exclusions include “actual or intended, effects or affects of racial and racialized
discourse” (Goldberg Culture 2). The discursive nature of racism implies that there is no
transcendental racism. As an instrument of social formation and naturalization of group
relations, race itself is not violent (even though it is not ethical). It becomes violent when
it is used by the agents, in particular historical contexts, to violent ends.
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Since race includes representation of subjects and social practices, and is the
conceptual basis of racism, racism can be eliminated by attacking its racial foundation.
Changes in racial patterns can be effected through “changes within a discourse and
changes of a discourse” (Goldberg Racist 10). The former involves “local changes in
some constitutive feature or element of the discourse,” while the latter refers to “shifts
from one discursive formation to another” that involve “changes in whole ways of world
making” (Goldberg Culture 10). This means that changes in one strand sets off a chain
reaction of changes in other strands that, ultimately, reconfigure and reorder racist
expression. Thus there is no way of transcending race. But it is, however, possible to
create opportunities for new positive dynamics between groups through change in
practices. In short, reconciliation seeks to end racism, not race.
To put it in another way, South Africa’s reconciliation efforts need to aim for an
anti-racist society, rather than an anti-racial society; a post-racist state, rather than a postracial state. xiv By “anti-racist” Goldberg means the acceptance of multiple formations of
racism and adopting strategies to root them out individually. Antiracism actually roots
out racist culture, not race. It is not based on assimilation or integration, which are both
controlling, but on incorporation. xv It is not looking at simplistically replacing white rule
with black, but at creating a society where whites and blacks are treated with humanity.
As Goldberg puts it, the problem is not with eradicating race, but with the way it is used
to define the body politic. If racism used race to perpetuate a culture of violence and
terror then anti-racism uses it to perpetuate harmony. Because there are many different
racisms and each kind of racism is tied to the specific context there is no fixed formulae
for anti-racist practices. Harmony here is not static, but contingent, provisional and
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always fragile. Goldberg’s strategy of tackling the shifting nature of racism is useful
because it highlights the need for reconciliation to be fluid and flexible, guided by
context, rather than a universal theory.
As much as I draw on Goldberg’s analysis of race as discourse, its main drawback
for reconciliation is that it focuses on resisting racism. However, reconciliation is not
limited to resisting racism. Reconciliation also builds new connections to rupture existing
patterns. Since racism is informed by power relations, the role of the different parties
involved in preventing racism and building positive relations differ according to their
position in the power structure. By focusing on the role of white South Africans I point
out the need for the beneficiaries of power to relinquish control, however wellintentioned, and allow themselves to be directed by the wishes of the victims of racism.
In short, the white South Africans need to be guided by respect for differences and
understanding of history, instead of their ability or power.
Given the deep significance of the spurious claims of race in modern life, and the
entanglement of racism in the practices and institutions of modern society, developing
newer patterns of racial interaction need to move beyond established prescriptions of
interaction, beyond preexisting norms. Transforming old patterns of interaction in a way
that focuses on the racial other requires recognizing the singularity of the other. It
involves moving beyond the realm of knowledge and active control to a world of
reflective recognition and affective understanding, according to Emmanuel Levinas.
Levinas describes this process of recognizing the other as alterity as a move from politics
to ethics. For Levinas, the encounter with the other forces the self out of its solipsism into
a relation and a rupture, for it forces the self into acknowledging the other. This
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acknowledgement results in a “responsibility for the other,” which is “love beyond
concupiscence” (Levinas 103). It is, thus, a movement from the quest for knowledge
about the other to a desire to understand the other. Responsibility, for Levinas, rests on
the premise that “being is not accomplished in the triumph of man over his condition, but
in the very tension in which that condition is assumed” (Levinas 2). Instead of realizing
the self by moving outside of the self to know the external world, the Levinasian self
seeks to understand. Knowing or acquiring knowledge is a form of control, as colonial
history has proved more that once. Understanding, on the other hand, attempts “not to
define … but to be in an affective state …. to be engaged, merged with what we think,
launched—the dramatic event of being-in-the world” (Levinas 3). Levinas is not talking
about negating oneself by identifying with the other, because he observes that
responsibility for the other, born of face-to-face encounter with alterity, is asymmetrical
and egoistic. Recognition, for Levinas, is followed by the need to connect and bridge the
gap. In order to connect with the other Levinas recommends turning to language, instead
of political measures such as law and government, because through language one
“overlooks the universal being” that the other incarnates to focus on “the particular being
that he is” (7).
But Levinas’s substitution of language for law as the means to capture the
singularity of the other is not a viable option for South Africa because of its fractured
body politic as well as the post-structuralist gap between language and reality. By using
language to connect to the other one is attempting to describe an “allegedly uncommon
‘situation’” through a medium “whose generality takes on a value that is in some ways
structural, universal” (Derrida Monolingualism 20). South Africa’s complex racial and
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ethnic situation complicates the postmodern gap between language and reality because
there is no universal language in South Africa. During apartheid Afrikaans, the official
language, divided the Afrikaners from the English South Africans, who spoke English.
One of the points of alienation between the Coloreds and the Africans, who had their
tribal languages, was that the former only spoke Afrikaans, the language of the whites.
The absence of a common language is the result of a long and violent racial history. xvi
The absence of a common medium of communication with the singular other in
South Africa does not mean that reconciliation is impossible. It simply means that
reconciliation should be based on the acceptance of irreconcilable differences as the
foundation for an ethical relation with the racial other. Instead of wishing away
differences through the rhetoric of shared humanity, reconciliation should negotiate
through these differences, which are testimony to the way history is experienced and
embodied differently across time. The irrevocable differences that are the basis of
reconciliation resemble the “abiding alienation” between language and reality that is
“constitutive” (Derrida Monolingualism 25). Derrida observes that this “inalienable
alienation is not only the origin of our responsibility, it also structures the peculiarity and
property of language” (Monolingualism 22). As a result, there is “some objectification in
progress” in transcribing reality into language (Derrida, Monolingualism 22). The
paradoxical relation between language and reality corresponds to the double bind of
reconciliation and history. Language is alienated from reality because language cannot
cover the complex heterogeneity of the real, the field of the signified. By extending
Derrida’s concept of the gap between language and reality to reconciliation we can say
that history is the alienated sign of reconciliation. To put it differently, the idea of

19
reconciliation seeks to deviate from the past, but the underlying premises of that history
(identity categories, ideologies behind colonial and apartheid racism etc) constrain its
expression. Reconciliation cannot be understood without acknowledging history: it seeks
to alienate/differentiate itself from that history, yet that history marks the limits of
reconciliation.
The challenge for white South Africans is to find a way to offer assistance that
honors the differences, that never assumes an identity between the white self and the nonwhite other it seeks to represent. As Alfred Noyes astutely observes, reconciliation needs
to abandon the illusory quest for a perfect correspondence of the speaking
subject and the spoken object. What must be retained is the difference
embedded in case, the difference between the nominative subjectifying
case (who) and the accusative, objectifying case (whom). It is the question
of how to speak against the hegemonic force of a universalizing theory
while at the same time sustaining a theory in a way that enables not only a
politics of reconciliation, but also of redistribution (275).
The goal of reconciliation, according to Noyes, is the vexing problem of discovering a
way to offer redress that does not trivialize history under the rhetoric of universality.
Reconciliation as abdication of agency does not mean that it is unrealistic or
impossible. Instead, the seemingly passive task of relinquishing control and letting the
other dictate the terms of reconciliation allows for hitherto unexamined connections to
emerge. These connections may fall short of perfect accord, but they are grounded on a
reality that makes such accord illusory. Reconciliation based on a notion of agency that
relinquishes active control heeds Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s caution against idealistic
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conceptions of agency in the real world, where justice is forever differed and deferred.
Instead of speaking for the native, or projecting our desires onto them, Spivak advocates
understanding that the “desire to help the colonial has a threshold” (Spivak Postcolonial
292). This “experience of the impossible,” which she describes as the position where the
“historical and national elite does not abdicate responsibility upon the easy road of call to
arms by way of vanguardism that must of course never be acknowledged,” avoids the
trap of cultural relativism or pluralism in the name of humanism (Spivak, Postcolonial
292). Respecting the threshold to the other reveals a “commitment not only to narrative
or counter narrative, but also to the rendering impossible of another narrative” (Spivak,
Postcolonial 292). She describes this as a process of “active marginalization,” a self
conscious acknowledgement of the limitations of one’s position, while accepting that the
boundaries are porous and the end is inclusive (Postcolonial 292). Spivak’s politics of
limitation provides a sense of agency that acknowledges the conditions of its creation
even as it criticizes it. xvii As a model for possible action amidst deep global imbalances of
power, Spivak’s concept of the “experience of the impossible” offers white South African
a model for interaction with the racial other that bypasses romantic notions of agency. In
acknowledging the “threshold” to understanding the other white South Africans
highlight the narrative that is not to be—complete understanding between the two hostile
groups. Reconciliation as a process of building an imperfect relation with the other is “a
… relationship without relationship, with one guarding itself from the other, in the
waiting without horizon for a language that only knows how to keep people waiting”
(Derrida Monolingualism 71).
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Spivak’s materialist deconstructivist postcolonialism and Goldberg’s Foucauldian
concept of race present reconciliation as a dynamic and fluid process of negotiating
history by marking the limits to knowledge of the other and the ability to speak for the
other. The combination draws attention to the correspondence between the “post” in
postcolonial and the “post” in post apartheid. Moving beyond race, like moving beyond
colonialism, is a constant process of negotiating the relation between the past, present and
future, instead of temporal closure. xviii It also reminds us that for South Africa the
postcolonial situation did not just mean negotiation between Europe and the white
settlers, but also between the white settlers and the African majority that they
disenfranchised in the attempt to gain control over South Africa’s land.
My exploration of the ethics of reconciliation in a settler colony like South Africa
makes the case for the importance of reconciliation as a strategy for negotiating the
legacies of colonialism, despite the skepticism of many postcolonialists regarding
reconciliation. Postcolonial theorists such as Simon During and Benita Parry, among
others, identify the postcolonial agenda with utopian projects like freedom for the
disenfranchised, and justice as reversal of past wrongs. They are, therefore, critical of
reconciliation, which is associated with compromise, as a postcolonial practice. For
instance, in his essay “Postcolonialism and Globalization: A Dialectical Relation After
All?” During writes that postcolonialism’s embrace of concepts of cultural negotiation
such as ambivalence, hybridity, etc., have turned the field “reconciliatory rather than
critically anti-colonialist” (31). For Benita Parry reconciliation is a strategy to serve the
perpetrators, rather than victims. Despite my emphasis on the possibility of reconciliation
and the critical role of white South Africans in the process, I do not regard reconciliation
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as a strategy to maintain the status quo. My definition of reconciliation as a reflexive and
ethical concept can be described as critical reconciliation. I use the term “critical” in the
same spirit that Rebecca Walkowicz uses the term in her concept of “critical
cosmopolitanism.” Walkowicz defines critical as “critique of critique” and “reflection
about reflection” (3). It involves demystification of the neutral categories and
investigation of objective concepts alongside the critique of conditions that make critique
possible (3). It is thus about persistent self-reflection, and the “self-reflexive position of
the self” vis a vis the other (2-3). Reconciliation as a critical and dynamic process of
interracial relation is important for South Africa because, given the entangled racial
structures and the complex negotiations involved in dissolving apartheid, South Africa
can neither discard its settler population, nor disregard the need for their wealth and
expertise in rebuilding the nation. In such a complicated historical context, as a process of
reflecting on the assumptions of reconciliation and its methods, critical reconciliation lays
the foundation for a more just society.
As a dynamic process of negotiating the difference between the self and the other
to develop positive relations with the other, that are grounded in history, my conception
of reconciliation challenges the assumptions of the melancholic school of
postcolonialism. Despite its entrenched position as an academic discipline in the West,
postcolonialism is apologetic about its failure to recover the subaltern or reverse the
injustices of the past so that progress becomes possible. Its lack of triumphalism can be
attributed to the gap between the messy and complicated reality of postcoloniality and the
utopian projects it aligns itself with. Postcolonial theorists often regard these values as
theoretical endpoints. Even as postcolonial theorists acknowledge strategies to tackle
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messy historical reality, they continue to remain nostalgic about the ideal. A case in point
is Spivak’s essay “Can the Subaltern Speak.” In this essay Spivak argues that the
subaltern cannot speak because class divisions prevent the subaltern’s voice from being
recorded in history. It, therefore, remains out of reach of the critic and historian. Spivak’s
strategy to circumvent the inaccessibility of the subaltern is to emphasize the importance
of critical reading. The task of the critic is to mark the absence of the subaltern, rather
than attempt to create or recover her. But, through careful and critical reading the critic
can, at best, mark the absence of the subaltern. Spivak’s nuanced understanding of the
subaltern and the impossibility of recovering the subaltern is a perfect example of
postcolonialism as an “ironic project,” where one mourns the loss and marks its absence
(Seshadri 66). xix While Spivak’s strategy does not recover the subaltern, it, at least, offers
a way of recognizing the existence of the position of the subaltern, which would
otherwise have remained unnoticed. Yet, despite Spivak’s strategy to tackle the
impossibility of recovering the voice of the subaltern in historical discourse there is a
persistent melancholic tone in her essay. This is evident in her insistence that the
subaltern cannot speak, since readers can only retroactively identify the position of the
subaltern, in all her revisions of the essay. Spivak’s essay is marked by a sense of loss
because, despite its recuperative strategy, she continues to regard justice as a theoretical
endpoint, rather than a process of negotiating a positive relation between the past and the
present.
I regard the ironic reality of reconciliation, of creating common ground through
acknowledgement of differences, of accepting that history is embodied differently in its
subjects, as the beginning of a possible and realistic future. While this notion of
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reconciliation is not a return to triumphalism, it, nevertheless, offers a more positive
reading of the historical reality of postcoloniality. I argue that the complexity and
paradoxes, the gaps and silences, and the imbalances and residues of earlier power
relations that characterize postcoloniality should be the starting points for dreams of
justice, freedom, and reconciliation, instead of utopian concepts. Reconciliation, as I
imagine it, perceives South Africa’s post-apartheid and postcolonial state as a process of
negotiating historical power imbalances through time. Implicit in the concept of
reconciliation as process is the awareness that negotiations are the site where power
dynamics shift through time, rather than steps to an end goal.
Literature
What is the role of literature in this racial system, a system which is the cause and
the consequence of a network of all discourses of modern life? Since “the formidable
manifestations of history continue to define various and interconnected cultural,
economic and political landscapes” (Ernest 474), “the inscription of the Black voice”
preserves “those very cultural differences to be repeated, imitated and revised in a
separate Western literary tradition, a tradition of black difference” (Gates 12). xx If the
discursive nature of race means that there can be only different expressions of race, then
literature cannot escape from race. The objective of literature, therefore, is not to
“demystify race itself, but to develop counter-projects that destabilize the link between
representations of racial difference and the structure of the racial state” (Germana 3).
Thus literature offers a counter-discourse to the institutional measures. Literature as a
counter-discourse does not offer a way out of race, nor can it give voice to the other.
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Instead, literary counter-projects must factor in the author’s racial identity and the
resultant limit of identification.
Beyond Protest: Ethics of Reconciliation in Post-apartheid White Writing
suggests that white authors experiment with postmodern self reflexive strategies such as
open endings, irony, magic realism, and narrative tropes like archiving, metacommentary on narratives, and fragmented narratives, to signal their critique of and
complicity with South Africa’s post-racial present. The shift from realism to postmodern
narrative modes is ethical because the latter prevents the formation of narrative empathy
through identification with characters or narrators. These narrative strategies used by
white writers indicate that literature is “not the bridging of gaps through the creation of
empathy, but the articulation and keeping alive of intractable ethical questions about the
asymmetrical relation between the self and the other” (Travis 232). Travis’s comment
alerts us to the fact that creating identification with the other through narrative gives rise
to multicultural ethics that seeks to transcend differences. Indirect representation
strategies, which inhibit readerly empathy, as intrinsic to the ethics of reconciliation
dissociate ethics from empathy in literature. xxi In Disgrace irony decenters the
protagonist Lurie, while the absence of an authoritative narrator prevents concrete
representation of the racial and gendered other. In Country of My Skull Antjie Krog’s
invention of an extramarital affair discounts her narrative authority to show the limits of
empathy. The narrative ethics of reconciliation as a process thus demonstrates the limits
of empathy. In the process it suggests that literature intervenes in discourses by forcing
the reader to confront the aporias of imaginative empathy.
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I focus in the rhetorical aspects of reconciliation, which Walkowicz calls
“postures,” such as irony, magic realism, fragmented narrative, and withheld
autobiography, rather than different experiences of reconciliation (29). That way I draw
attention to the critical models writers use to present and understand reconciliation, even
as I acknowledge the way experience of reconciliation influences writing. The strategies
used to present reconciliation in the text reflect this duality: they describe the specific
practices of reconciliation such as the refusal of legal redress, respect for differences
between the self and the other; at the same time, they demonstrate how limits to
understanding the other prompt narrative strategies that confront readers with the
boundaries of their imaginative empathy. These rhetorical strategies differentiate postapartheid literature from apartheid literature. For authors like Coetzee, who evaded the
realistic discourses of protest literature, indirect representation is a continuation of their
anti-apartheid practices. For others like Andre Brink there is a shift in strategy and theme
from their apartheid novels. Brink switches over to magic realism from realism. For
others such as Antjie Krog, the new era compels experimentation with a new genre and in
a new language: non-fiction, instead of poetry, and English in addition to her native
Afrikaans.
Recognizing reconciliation as a narrative practice and lived experience draws
attention to the social nature of reading and writing. If creative writing, according to
Derek Attridge, is inspired by the writer’s encounter with the other that challenges
established conventions, then reading forces the reader to encounter possibilities elided
by politics and other discourses. I seek to explore how the imagined world of literature
“furthers our commitment to the other and allows us to look to the future” in a way that
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other discourses fail to do (McGonegal 9). In the post-apartheid milieu, which encourages
grand conclusive visions of reconciliation, literature outlines the problems and the
promise inherent in its historical context. Peter Halliard, in Absolutely Postcolonial,
points out that literature offers new ways of seeing because it can “step back from
representation, suspend its natural flow and pay artificial attention to ‘how it
works’”(335). Thus literature can involve us in scrutinizing ideas. Spivak rightly
describes literature as “our teacher as well as our object of investigation” (Spivak, Death
28).
I analyze the possibilities of literature as a counterdiscourse by comparing literary
texts with the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Hearings and Final Report. The
political and fictional texts challenge the idea of reconciliation as closure, or recuperation
of power. These texts imagine and invent alternate ways of conceiving justice, history
and, consequently, reconciliation. Instead of regarding justice as impossible, these texts
dedicate themselves to exploring the possibilities of reconciliation, even as they
acknowledge the difficulties of translating this vision into practice.
I examine the paradoxes of racial reconciliation by, first, analyzing the
foundational event for racial reconciliation in South Africa, the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission. The TRC sets the tone for reconciliation as a dynamic ethical project
through its conception of narrative truth, restorative justice and its open public hearings.
These conceptions of truth and justice enable narratives that reveal apartheid to be a
period of complicity and resistance that challenge easy associations of Black and white
with goodness and evil respectively. The open hearings forced the victims and
perpetrators to enact new identities: the whites were forced to listen, while the hitherto
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silenced populations, the non-whites, presented their experience of the horrors of
apartheid. It gave both groups the scope to inhabit their new identities. The performative
aspect of the TRC hearings emphasizes reconciliation as a process that has to continue
beyond the venue of the TRC hearings. It is, however, ironic that an institution that
highlighted the need for narratives to understand the past and move beyond the
destructive grip of history remained silent on the role of literature in reconciliation. In
addition, the limited time span under its review neglects the deep roots of South Africa’s
racial problems. Viewing the TRC in this way prepares me for the significantly more
complex cultural reflections and ethical meditations presented in the literary texts I
examine in subsequent chapters.
Discussion of the importance of narratives in a political document sets the stage
for a discussion on how narratives participate in and complicate reconciliation. J. M.
Coetzee’s Disgrace challenges readings of South Africa’s racial problem as the result of
only the apartheid. The novel has been panned by South African critics for the presence
of negative stereotypes of the non-whites and a protagonist who rapes a Colored woman.
I focus on the way novel uses irony and multiple narrative threads to criticize of South
Africa’s post-racial politics, which cover the deep roots of the country’s racism and
enable racial amnesia. The novel’s subtle and sophisticated use of irony, I argue,
undercuts its racist protagonist and his stereotypical representation of the other. In the end
the novel suggests that racial reconciliation is achieved by acknowledging the
impossibility of completely understanding the other, especially in relations marked by
power imbalance and violence.
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Since the past inflects present identity, the ethics of reconciliation is concerned
with creating a positive relation between the past and the present. Reconciliation must not
only acknowledge the past, but it must also abandon the desire to search for an authentic
past or valorize counter histories. Andre Brink’s shift to epistemic magic realism to
represent the imagining of history, as opposed to his earlier efforts to recover history,
attends to the critical role of history in reconciliation. In Chapter 3, I examine the ethical
imperatives of Brink’s magic realism to argue that magic realism mocks the desire to
recover an essential past by presenting historical accounts as ideological constructs.
Exploring the ideological subtext of the different accounts of the past allows Brink to
present South Africa’s racial history as a chaotic system. The chaotic structures of race
and its shifting, yet lingering, effects cannot be addressed through legal measures alone.
It requires us to envision reconciliation as a process of active engagement with the past.
For the protagonists of Brink’s post-apartheid novels reconciliation becomes an endless
process of attempting to connect to the other.
Closely connected to reconciliation is the desire for forgiveness. Forgiveness
offers white South Africans an opportunity to be integrated into the new nation space,
where they are no longer in a privileged position. Forgiveness by the racial other also
reaffirms their new self. But, not only is the demand for forgiveness from the non-whites
egoistical, it does not address the structural basis of racism in South Africa. The
uncertainty of forgiveness from the racial other poses a problem in white
autobiographies, where the formation of a new self depends on affirmation from the
racial other. In order to examine the relation between forgiveness and reconciliation, in
my final chapter, I examine how autobiography, the most egoistical of genres, negotiates
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between the focus on the self, the responsibilities of being a witness to the other’s
narrative and the need for the racial other as an empathetic listener. I compare Nadine
Gordimer’s None to Accompany Me with Antjie Krog’s memoir Country of My Skull to
argue that Spivak’s notion of “withheld autobiography” offers a model for autobiography
that privileges the listener, even as it narrates the white autobiographer’s transformation.
Gordimer’s novel, which incorporates the structure of an autobiographical address in the
interaction between characters, and Krog’s memoir, which includes a fictitious extramarital affair to create the space for her experiences, erases differences between fiction
and non-fiction in autobiographies.
In a brief epilogue I consider how reconciliation as a dynamic process forces us to
reconfigure conventional ideas of hope, justice and friendship. Magic realism, withheld
autobiography, and irony envision the possibilities of reconciliation as well as its
problems in South Africa. In the process, literature transforms our ideas of forgiveness,
hope, history and advocacy to show how critical reconciliation, based on an
acknowledgement of unbridgeable differences, does not negate possibilities of justice,
harmony and change, all values integral to the postcolonial project.
Ultimately, the following chapters will show that literature is a place where the
thorny issues of South Africa’s reconciliation are thrashed out and represented. By
exploring the way racial reconciliation influences literary conventions I seek to affirm
that literature is a site where the negotiations of reconciliation are enacted. The reflexive
strategies of white authors are an attempt to negotiate between their privileged positions
as white South Africans and the need to respect the singularity of the racial other. The
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negotiations require that visions of historically nuanced relations must be matched by
narrative strategies that identify and demonstrate differences in experience of history.
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Chapter 1
Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa: An
Event that Launched a Process
In 1976, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, then the Anglican Dean of Johannesburg,
wrote an open letter to Prime Minister John Vorster with several grievances against
apartheid policies. He ended the letter with the fear that injustices against Africans were
making them desperate and would result in a “point of no return when events will
generate a momentum of their own” leading to a “bloody denouement” (qtd in Bell 86).
The “bloody denouement” Tutu feared was averted by a miraculously bloodless transfer
of power through universal suffrage that put Nelson Mandela’s ANC into power in 1994.
Despite the peaceful transition of power, post-apartheid South Africa continues to be
marred by racial violence. The murder of Eugene Terreblanche, the white Supremacist
leader, by his non-white farm workers, on April 12th 2010, is one of the most recent
instances of continuing violence. Attempts by Terreblanche’s group to appeal to the UN
for a separate white homeland and fears of racial violence raised by his murder suggest
that reconciliation remains a pipe dream more than a dozen years after the end of
apartheid. xxii The continuation of violence is not surprising because interracial relations
in post-apartheid South Africa are still inflected by structural inequalities surviving from
apartheid. Face to face interracial encounters in the post-apartheid era thus risk remaining
embroiled in the discursive patterns of the past.
The continuation of racial violence in the post-apartheid era raises questions about
the success of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (henceforth referred to as the
TRC or the commission) in achieving reconciliation. The TRC was formed for the
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express purpose of helping to realize the Postamble to the Constitution’s vision of a new
South Africa committed to the “recognition of human rights, democracy and peaceful
coexistence and development opportunities for all South Africans irrespective of race,
class, belief or sex” (qtd in TRC 6: 3). The Commission’s task was the “pursuit of
national unity, the well being of South African citizens and … reconciliation between the
people of South Africa and the reconstruction of society” (qtd in TRC 6: 3). The sociopolitical realities as well as the constitutional mandate defined the TRC’s conception of
reconciliation as requiring “understanding but not vengeance … reparation but not …
retaliation, ubuntu but not … victimization” (qtd in TRC 6: 3). xxiii The need to move
beyond violence implies that reconciliation needs to be grounded in an understanding of
the past. In other words, as the TRC put it, reconciliation has to be premised on truth.
In order to find a true picture of apartheid it is necessary to give space to the
stories suppressed by the state-sponsored apartheid history. The Human Rights Hearings
were developed to allow the victims to present their account of the past. However,
utopian dreams of correcting the prejudiced apartheid history through these hearings need
to be revised in the light of the fact that memorial reconstructions of the past are affected
by failures of memory as a result of trauma and fear, resulting in contradictory accounts
of events by victims and perpetrators. These contesting accounts reveal their different
experiences of history. The hearings thus reveal truth to be an equivocal, and shifting
(sometimes shifty) process of reinventing individual and national identity.
Critics have pounced on the ambiguous nature of truth that emerged from the
hearings as a sign of the TRC’s failure to correct history and deliver justice. For example,
Geoffrey Robertson describes the TRC “less as truth substituting for justice than a form
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of plea bargaining in which truth is traded for leniency” (247). Richard Wilson feels that
the TRC subordinated rights and law to the expedients of nation-building. As a
consequence, he fears justice became the first casualty. Mehmood Mamdani has pointed
out that the Commission’s focus on extraordinary acts made apartheid seem like a rogue
regime, foreclosing everyday injustices of the system. xxiv Benita Parry points out that “no
government or leader or officially constituted commission has the moral authority to
grant a people’s acquittal of their erstwhile oppressors, since in this situation the consent
and co-operation of neither party has been solicited or procured” (183). Amy Gutman and
Dennis Thompson claim “a post-apartheid state that forgave these crimes could not
credibly claim to be committed to the most basic democratic principles” (32). The critics
seem insistent on the need to unearth the full story of the past and deliver retributive
justice because they feel that discovering the truth will permit them to undo the past
through punishment and reparations. Their criticism is based on two premises: 1. that the
past can be put to rest, and 2. that retributive justice is justice par excellence. But,
reconstruction of the past from memory is complicated by the position of the person
remembering and psychological issues like trauma, paranoia, fear etc. Punitive justice can
neither reverse the loss suffered by the victims, nor undo apartheid or the racism
persisting from the colonial times. The impossibility of reaching the past means justice is
always deferred. xxv
In this chapter I present a counter thesis to the previous readings of the TRC. I
argue that the lacuna in truth that emerged through the hearings do not signal a
breakdown in the TRC’s reconciliation efforts or a failure to unearth history. Instead, the
factual inconsistencies reveal the blind spots around which narratives construct
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themselves. The hearings reveal reconciliation to be a process of negotiating a relation
with the past that moves beyond pathologies of amnesia and monumentalization to
acknowledge the impossibility of transcending the past. It, thus, suggests that relation
with the other needs to be open to the opacity of the other, to differences. Reconciliation
as a process reveals South Africa’s dream of a democracy free of racism to be in a state
of constant realization.
Conventionally “process” implies action in progress, action directed towards a
definite goal. The presence of a telos binds process to a time frame. This view of process
is possible only in an ahistorical context. In reality, no goal is static because every goal is
located in history, where it is subject to pressure of events and forces around it. Under
these circumstances, process doesn’t lead to a goal, but is an endless cycle of upholding a
principle amidst the flux of history. Even if the goal remains the same, under the
pressures of history, it will be realized differently in different contexts. In the real world,
process as a dialogue between history and ideals is itself a goal. I therefore regard the
TRC as an intrinsic part, but not the end, of the reconciliation process. It marks a shift in
the racial dynamic of South Africa and opens up possibilities just as it forecloses others.
This shift involves negotiations that took place before it and the actions taken by the state
and individuals thereafter. Reconciliation as a process is akin to Jacques Derrida’s notion
of “democracy to come.” xxvi In democracy to come Derrida describes democracy as a
promise and injunction to equality, rather than a fait accompli in any historical context.
xxvii

Like Derrida’s view of democracy, my definition of reconciliation as a process

includes the promise and injunction of future respect for the singularity of the other,
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justice and harmony. Like “democracy–to-come,” reconciliation is an “endless process of
improvement and perfectibility” (McGonagal 8).
Attending to this understanding of process, I shall examine the historical
background to the TRC to show that it was a part of the evolving racial dynamic of South
Africa. Its specific historical context determines the TRC’s unique format and accounts
for its most innovative feature: the public hearings. The hearings, which explode the
monolithic racial and historical discourse on apartheid, serve as a model for interracial
interaction that moves beyond revenge and friendship to open up possibilities for
recognizing the unique humanity of the racial other. However, the limited life-span and
power of the commission mean that the onus on responding to the possibilities it opens
up depends on the state and the citizens of South Africa. In short, I read reconciliation as
a top-down approach, where the state plays a mediatory role in promoting and fostering
reconciliation.
Reconciliation as Political Compromise
The most remarkable aspect about South Africa’s journey from apartheid to
democracy, according to Martin Murray, was not the demise of apartheid. The demise
was expected, but the bloodless transition to democracy, given the violence that
characterized apartheid and its resistance movements, surprised everyone. Signs of the
end of apartheid had been evident from the eighties, when its exclusive policies and the
international boycott brought the economy to near bankruptcy. An attempt to diffuse the
black militant movement by devolving authority to the Black middle class saw violence
spiral into a civil war, where unrestrained black militancy devoured itself as ethnic
identities complicated the linear black/white racial dynamic. The emergency declared by
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President Botha in 1985 failed to curb the civil war. Under the circumstances, according
to Murray, it was surprising “that the sudden denouement of the once invincible apartheid
system was not accompanied by the kind of violent civil war pitting Black revolutionaries
against an entrenched white establishment” that happened in neighboring Zimbabwe (1).
The non-violent transition of power was the result of circumstances. Apartheid’s
inability to protect the economic interest of the whites, and the rising militancy of the
MK, the militant wing of the ANC and the Azanian People’s Liberation Army (APLA),
the militant wing of PAC, split the NP into conservative and reformist factions. The
reformist faction gained voice when F.W. de Klerk took over. De Klerk granted more
power to the Blacks at the local level. Consequently, the local Afrikaner councilors were
replaced by Black councilors, who started their own corrupt regime in the townships to
line their pockets. But leading non-white parties like the ANC and PAC rejected reforms.
They wanted democracy and their militant wings launched guerilla warfare against the
white establishment, targeting security forces and paramilitary forces that terrorized
townships. Since the ANC was banned and operated from abroad, it had no control over
its young cadres, who went on an unrestrained rampage, attacking not just white power,
but non-whites of other ideologies. Black councilors, members of rival non-white
political organizations and members from other townships and classes became targets of
their wrath. At the same time, tribal chiefs in the various homelands set up vigilant forces
to bring the Blacks in their territory under their control and fight the APLA and MK.
Simon Skosana organized private armies for the independence of Kwa Ndebele, while
Buthelezi, the Zulu chief, distanced himself from the ANC, in an attempt to portray
himself as a moderate black. The fractured black identities meant that there was no
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cohesive non-white opposition. It comes as no surprise that the non-white resistance was
unable to overcome the white establishment.
At this juncture—when the Afrikaner-majority party National Party (henceforth
NP) government was brought to its knees by international boycott and collapse of law
and order, but the resistance was not strong enough to capitalize on the moment—
negotiations were in order. The NP originally planned to share power, securing minority
rights and veto power over major decisions for the Afrikaners. The process of
negotiations, initiated in the eighties through a series of secret meetings between the
ANC and the ruling white NP, was carried out through the Groot Schmur Minutes (May
1990) and the Pretoria Minutes (August 1990). The result was the unbanning of the ANC
and the release of Nelson Mandela. As exiles returned and many political prisoners
gained freedom, there was backlash against the whites. The National Peace Accord was
formed at the encouragement of the national human rights movement and the South
African Council of Churches with the triple aim of (a) eliminating violence, (b)
promoting democratization, and (c) reconstruction and development. Side by side, the
Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA), the first multi-party meet to
discuss South Africa, was formed. Nineteen parties participated. CODESA1 and
CODESA2 failed in the face of unabated violence. In fact, the ANC withdrew from
CODESA2 because of the Boipotang killings. From this point of no return negotiations
began anew. The NP was forced to agree to a democratic election, while the ANC agreed
to an amnesty policy that would provide indemnity from civil or criminal prosecution in
return for disclosure of crimes. Finally, in 1994 the elections were held.
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The historical events preceding the end of apartheid suggest that the postapartheid era did not end white supremacy. The non-white ANC government functions in
a situation where, even though it has political power, the economic power remained
under white control. This meant that the whites would want to maintain status quo, while
the non-whites would prefer redistribution of resources. Nor could the ANC count on the
support of the entire black community since they inherited a fractured community, where
racial and class divisions were complicated by ethnic identities reinforced through the
creation of Homelands. The ensuing divisions imply that ethnic and racial identities are
so deeply imprinted that they continue after the end of apartheid. One example of the
problem created by ethnic ties cutting across racial ties is evident in Zulu chief Buthelezi
identification of Zulus as “Zulu South Africans.” He further claims that “The State of
Kwa Zulu Natal is a sovereign member of the Federal Republic of South Africa. It
recognizes its obligations towards the Federal Republic … in so far as they do not
infringe upon the rights, powers and liberties guaranteed by this constitution” (qtd in
Barber 75). xxviii The Zulus, along with other tribes, forged an alliance called the Freedom
Front that practices secessionist politics by demanding separate tribal enclaves. South
Africa’s polity resembles Ernest Gellner’s “eastern nationalism,” where, in the absence of
“an already existing well defined and codified high culture which had as it were already
marked out and linguistically pre-conceived its own territory,” competing cultures
struggled for power “in ferocious rivalry with similar competitors, over a chaotic
ethnographic map of many dialects, with ambiguous historical or linguo-genetic
allegiances, and populations which had begun to identify with these emergent national
high cultures” (100). In the light of South Africa’s complex ethnic and racial divisions,
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the movement from apartheid racism to post-apartheid democracy was not linear, but
complex.
The brief history of the events leading to the TRC reveals that it was a
compromise born out of a political impasse. As a political strategy the TRC sought to
establish reconciliation so that the different groups could work in harmony. According to
Rajeev Bhargava, political reconciliation ensures the “cessation of hostilities” so that “a
minimally decent society” can be set in place. Political reconciliation is different from
personal forgiveness or personal reconciliation, both of which need “profound change in
… identities” of victims and perpetrators (Bhargava 61). Nevertheless, political
reconciliation creates the groundwork for a “radical restructuring of those economic,
social, political and cultural circumstances which would render the wrongs of the past as
properly transcended” so that “recall of ancestral and recent adversity may be
contemplated if not in tranquility, then, perhaps with pain but without rage” because
“only then can … the descendants of the injured extinguish their urge to retribution”
(Parry 183). Therefore, like all interim organs of justice, the TRC had a finite lifespan: it
covers the time from 1960-1994. But as an organization responsible for building the
foundation of a democratic society, the TRC sought to change the discourses and create a
more open society, rather than magically transform the society.
Truth as Narrative and Justice as Restoration
The TRC drew upon the models of earlier organs of transitional justice ranging
from the Nuremburg Trials to the Argentinean and other Latin American Truth
Commissions. However, it was different from these models in its recognition of the
complexity of truth and the importance of narrative truth in healing a fractured
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community. The TRC identifies four kinds of truth: factual or forensic truth, personal or
narrative truth, social truth and restorative truth. Forensic truth refers to “factual
corroborated evidence” obtained through “reliable (impartial, objective) procedures”
(TRC 1: 111). Narrative truth, on the other hand, “keeping in mind the value attached to
the ‘oral tradition’ in South Africa,” refers to the stories told to the TRC. These stories
were not presented as “claims to a court or arguments” but provide “unique insights into
the pain of South Africa’s past”(TRC 1: 111). It validated the “individual subjective
experiences of the people who had previously been silenced or voiceless”(TRC 1: 112).
Social truth is “truth of experience that is established through interaction, discussion and
debate” in order to understand the “complex motives and perspectives of those involved
(TRC 1: 113). The final truth category highlights the importance of acquiring truth in a
manner that acknowledges and affirms the pain of others. The different kinds of truths
emphasize the singularity of each experience and present truth as a multi-faceted
phenomenon that emerges through dialogue and openness to difference. The value of
narrative truth lies in its ability to include narratives from the excluded groups and open
the monolithic discourses of history to the unacknowledged voices. In the process,
narrative truth challenges our understanding of apartheid as merely a racist regime to
draw attention to the fractured body politic and the gender violence across race. xxix
The importance of transparency and dialogue in the TRC’s conception of truth
draws attention to the role of the listener in allowing narratives to exist. Jean Francois
Lyotard points out that a narrative involves a listener, a narrator and a subject. Its
meaning is, therefore, not “limited to the moment of enunciation,” that is in the authority
of the speaker, because “speech acts relevant to this form of knowledge [narrative
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knowledge] are performed not only by the speaker but also by the listener” and involves
“know-how, knowing-how to speak-and knowing-how-to-listen” (Lyotard 21). The threeway circuit involved in narrative communication creates and affirms social bonds. The
presence of a listener implies that the effects of narrative are not restricted to the moment
of enunciation. The impact of narratives cannot, thus, be predicated and is not always
immediate. The importance given to narratives draws attention to reconciliation as a long
and fragile process that places signal demands on the listener. Thus, narrative truth raises
questions about the ethics of listening or being witness.
In the TRC hearings, where the structure of the law court was adapted to enable
narratives and privilege the victims, the listener was not just the perpetrator, who was
invited to be present, and the general public, who could hear and watch the hearings
being aired, but also the TRC, which was proxy for the new state. In order to ensure that
these disclosures did not result in more bitterness the TRC set itself as a buffer between
victims and perpetrators. The victim’s lawyers or the victims themselves addressed their
questions for the perpetrators to the three judges presiding over the hearings. The judges
repeated the questions to the perpetrators. The perpetrators directed their replies to the
judges as well as to the victims’ lawyers. This ensured that the animosity between the
groups was regulated. The TRC as mediator sets itself up as a virtual perpetrator
according to Sanders. As a virtual perpetrator in the human rights hearings, the TRC
opens itself to the testimony of the victims without questioning their veracity. By acting
as the buffer between the victim and the perpetrators, the TRC mediated between hostile
parties, still locked in the Manichean apartheid discourses, to offer an alternative mode of
voicing difference. Since the ultimate perpetrator during apartheid was the state, the TRC
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as virtual perpetrator stands in for the erstwhile apartheid state and assumes its
responsibility for reparation. The TRC as a virtual perpetrator reminds us that listeners do
not just enable narratives; they have a responsibility to respond to the affective call of the
narratives as well. The complex role of the TRC in the hearings highlights the critical role
of the listeners in narratives.
TRC’s narrative truth is based on the principle of restorative justice, which is a
“victim-centered vision of justice,” which “affirms that in societies emerging from a
period of repression justice requires an inclusive remembering of painful truths about the
past and a commitment to allow victims to tell their stories,” so that their experiences are
acknowledged and their dignity restored (Kiss 73). Restorative justice enables the state in
transition to bury the past “as seeds, rather than as corpses … not dead and forgotten, but
something from which the future can grow” (Phelps 128). Retributive justice, where the
perpetrators of human rights abuses are punished in a court of law, in contrast, is based
on “the Enlightenment principle that human rights accrue to individuals”(Barkan xix).
However, Elizaar Barkan argues that group identities are crucial to identity formation and
rights that accrue to individuals also accrue to groups. By failing to account for group
identity retributive justice cannot always restore the victims’ dignity or validate their
experience.
The pragmatic goal of restorative justice views responsibility as a two-way
process, even if the burden is greater for one group. Restorative justice “doesn’t need
each victim to forgive each perpetrator. It needs a shared understanding of the terrible
things that happened … of how it happened and what the context was” (Sachs 96-97).
Restorative justice places severe ethical demands on the perpetrators as well as the
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victims. For the perpetrators it involves “acknowledging, however haltingly, in whatever
limited way, at least something of what they did” (Sachs 97). The victims, on their part,
had to eschew revenge. This doesn’t guarantee forgiveness in the ethical sense, but it
creates the seeds of a civil order that allows for the transformation of both parties.
It might appear that narrative truth veers away from the empirical basis of law.
However Sanders points out that narrative truth manipulates the ambiguity between law
and narrative to challenge facile equations of law with facts and literature with fiction.
The ambiguity in law refers to the fact that “while the words of the witnesses can
themselves be ambiguous in meaning and effect, any such ambiguity is underwritten by
an ambiguity in the law itself that comes into play when it solicits and elicits testimony”
(Sanders 5). According to Sanders, when the court “elicits evidence through questioning,
it calls forth a story. The questioner may think that he or she knows the answer in
advance, but, since nobody knows what the witness will say, he or she is structurally in a
position of ignorance” (Sanders 6).Consequently, law often ends up “facilitating both a
narrative and counternarrative” (Sanders 9). Even though law depends on the verification
of evidence, testimony cannot be verified at the moment of articulation. Law is, thus,
forced to become host and hostage to its other. The statement that is accepted without
verification is described as fiction by Sanders because it is neither false nor true, but
“unverifiable” (Sanders 6). By being open to the unverifiability that lurks at the core of
all testimony law exists as “the differance between fiction and truth” (Sanders 6) The
doubling in the testimony, which makes law open to the unverifiable, often forces the
TRC to revise its goals and expectations as we shall see in the case of the women’s
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hearings later in this chapter (Sanders 8). This structural ambiguity in law makes truth
less a matter of verifiable fact, than a fractal phenomenon.
Performance and the Enactment of Reconciliation in the Amnesty Hearings
The TRC hearings were structured to maximize reconciliation. The hearings were
of two kinds: amnesty hearings and the human rights hearings. The amnesty hearings,
held behind closed doors, allowed perpetrators to appeal for amnesty. The human rights
hearings were formed to balance the perpetrator-focused amnesty hearings. The human
rights hearings gave victims space to narrate their terrible experiences under apartheid.
The human rights hearings, which brought hostile groups into contact with each other,
marked a new era of interaction that was a clear departure from the segregation, terror
and violence of apartheid. In the hearings after the victims finished telling their stories
the judges stood up to commend them. This gesture ceremoniously distinguishes the
TRC’s ethos from that of apartheid. As a legal step that marks the new beginning, the
TRC can thus be classified as an operative act, which refers to ceremonial actions that
bring about a change in existing patterns and relationships, because it seeks to symbolize
the new era. xxx But an operative act presumes on a community, on a set of beliefs that is
common to the population it addresses. Since racial interaction in South Africa has no
prior state of harmony to fall back on, the TRC is not bringing about re-conciliation as
much as conciliation. It is attempting to build a fragile community on untried soil. Thus,
unlike other operative acts, it cannot presume on the sense of community that gives
meaning to ceremonial actions. Since the TRC is not a “part and parcel of the regular
institutional arrangement of ‘normal’ democracies,” but “part of historical founding
projects” like “constitutional authorities, which are interim organizations that launch a
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new era,” it had to enact the values it represents (du Toit 124-125). It thus has to state its
values as a performative utterance. xxxi Through its gestures, the TRC figuratively gives
birth to a community, to that recognition of the other that will pave the way for a
future. xxxii
The performative element of the human rights hearings has invited criticism.
Richard Wilson argues that the hearings were a “theatricalization of the power of the new
state, which compelled representatives of the former order to confess when they would
rather have maintained their silence” (20). Wilson’s theatre metaphor equates
performance with play acting. But his analysis ignores the fact that the arena for
exhibition of state power was simultaneously a site for the enactment of a new racial
drama—one where the two racial groups come face to face under the aegis of the TRC. In
this context, it is necessary to distinguish between performance and acting. Acting in a
theatre is different from performance because the actors remain conscious of the
difference between their identity and that of the characters they are portraying.
Performance, however, refers to action defined by prescribed norms that express
identity. xxxiii Through performance one is projecting one’s desires and identity to the
outside. It implies involvement and commitment and is individual as well as communal.
In the process of enacting desires performance realizes historical possibilities.
That is why it is regarded as crucial to identity politics. In Cities of the Dead, Joseph
Roach identifies performance as an expression or actualization of desire, as well as an
attempt to restore. He further elaborates: “performance offers a substitute for something
else that pre-exists it. Performance in other words stands in for an elusive entity that it is
not, but that it must vainly aspire both to embody and to replace”(Roach, 3). Judith Butler
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emphasizes the element of absence in performance by describing performance as
constituting identity through “stylized repetition of acts” that is often “internally
discontinuous”(92). This suggests that identity is unstable. Merleau Ponty adds that body
performances enact “cultural and historical possibilities” (qtd in Butler 902). Hence,
performance is way of “dramatizing and reproducing a historical situation” (Butler, 902).
Performance assumes that identity is without an apriori essence and defined by the
context in which it is taking place and the possibilities inherent in that context.
By defining the individual, performance also adds to collective identity. Victor
Turner describes social action as requiring “performance that is repetitive.” The absence
of stable essence and the dialogic nature of identity, whether it is individual or collective,
make performance a form of substitution. As substitution, performance has to be repeated
i.e. carried on beyond the site of performance and individually replicated in order to
represent the community and self. The importance of performance in national identity is
reiterated by Homi Bhabha in “DessemiNation,” where he identifies two axes that
constitute national identity—pedagogical and the performative. The former is the ideal of
a nation built around myths and symbols; the latter is the enactment of those ideals in
everyday life. These two may not coalesce as the performative often does not embody the
pedagogical. In South Africa, the pedagogical, in terms of ideals rooted in symbols of
collective identification, is absent. So, the performative becomes crucial in embodying
the nation. The TRC uses performance to create identity in two ways. First, the hearings
embody in its structure and performance a different ethos from apartheid. Second the
TRC’s use of mass-media to broadcast the hearings creates an imagined community of
“horizontal” solidarity through temporal “simultaneity” that is “traverse, cross-time,
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marked not by prefiguring and fulfillment, but by temporal coincidence, and measured by
clock or calendar”(Anderson 24). However, the fragility of performance and the realities
of truth finding make both truth and community ambiguous terms.
Theatricality has been an intrinsic part of racial relations in South Africa. xxxiv
Under the colonial regime and apartheid South Africa resembled a theatre of racial
discrimination, where conventions and strict laws scripted the movement and interaction
between racialized subjects and determined the architecture of the nation space.
Interaction in this theatre was marked by oppression, violence, secrecy and distrust. Since
the theatre of racial segregation created polarized racial, ethnic as well as class identities
in South Africa, one way to break the deadlock is to change the theatre. Transforming the
theatre means changing the content of the theater as well as its form. So the closed and
secretive apartheid theatre was replaced by the transparent and egalitarian theatre of the
TRC hearings, which were public and broadcast by the media. The hearings created a
theatre in which the state, citizens and courts were participants in the reconciliation
process. In the TRC hearings the victims could tell their story and the perpetrators
confess their crimes in front of a panel of three judges, and a public audience, which
often included the victims or his/her kin, and the mass media. Despite being victimcentered, the victim’s story was not the last word. Perpetrators were given a chance of
rebuttal. At the same time, if the victims did not agree with the decision of the TRC they
could take recourse to law as Steve Biko’s family did. The hearing allowed free
expression of emotions and respected individual choice. The TRC theatre introduced a
new mode of interaction that respected conflict, instead of suppressing it. Commenting on
the functioning of the TRC, Patricia Valdez writes, “permitting the dynamics of conflict
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to evolve and the actors of civil society and democratic institutions to express themselves
freely is one of the best ways of preventing all types of authoritarianism, thereby building
a truly democratic political culture” (57). Alex Boraine reiterates this when he defines
reconciliation as “exchange of ideas in a climate of mutual respect and peaceful
coexistence” (77).
This new theatre created opportunities for enacting new identities. Teresa Phelps
has described the hearings as carnivalesque. Drawing on Bakhtin’s definition of the
carnival, she points out that in carnivals, unlike official feasts, where the power of the
state was reinforced, restraints of the everyday world are lifted. Moreover, the carnival is
also a space which brings together diverse groups of people together. In the hearings, for
the first time, apartheid rules of racial interaction were lifted as victims and perpetrators
confronted each other with their roles reversed. The victims were given a voice and the
perpetrators were forced to listen. The hearings thus forced victims and perpetrators to
enact roles discordant with their historical identities. Enacting a different script, in a
different theatre, enables them to imagine the possibility of a different relation with the
other than the one they are used to. It is hoped that acting out ethical choices will, in time,
lead victims to forgive the perpetrator or create remorse in the perpetrator. While it is true
that the perpetrators were generally known in many cases, the public confession implied
acceptance of their responsibility in the violence and recognition of the singularity of
their victims. At the same time, victims suppressed by the apartheid state got to narrate
their story. The act of narrating their loss and suffering in a public forum validates the
victims’ experience and restores their dignity because, according to Phelps, apartheid
silenced the victims and denied them language, thus conveying a sense of negative self-
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worth. Because narratives have an immediacy and poignancy that facts lack, the act of
narration transforms victims to individuals, while perpetrators morph from embodiments
of evil to flawed human beings. Through narratives that remember the past, society was
“re-membered” according to Phelps (71).
The public confessions set up a model of conduct and worked to create a
community that didn’t exist through recognition of the singularity of the racial and/or
gendered other. It brought together hostile camps, whether it is the opposing Black
groups like ANC and IFP, or the Whites and Blacks in a same place and forced them into
an act of remembering and articulation. The audience and the performers were given the
scope to look beyond the determinism of race to engage in mourning the loss of
humanism, life etc. Through the process of interacting, remembering and reliving, a
community was being built. The fragile community that emerges through performance at
the TRC is similar to Saidiya Hartman identification of spontaneous community that
formed during the communal dancing sessions of the African American slaves at the
command of their masters, in Scenes of Subjection. Hartman points out that in the
absence of an “apriori community” communal bonds were created through
“interaction”(60). Hartman notes that communities formed this way were not seamless,
despite the shared sufferings. Instead, community created through the dancing sessions
was brought into existence through performances and was marked by antagonism and
betrayals. Hartman’s observation indicates that the formation of community in the
absence of an apriori core is unstable and fluid, and needs to be reiterated constantly
through repetition. Since the South African polity, like the slave communities of USA, is
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a fractured and fragile set up, any community created during the hearings has to be
realized in the real world through performance.
Despite the carefully considered structure, the TRC’s textbook model of
reconciliation and truth-finding was often jeopardized by memory lapses, differences in
the account of the victims and perpetrators, rejection of the TRC’s mediating role, or its
inability to be hospitable to the victims. The hearing of the five former Umkhonto
weSizwe(MK) cadres and the police chief Jeffrey Benzien reveals many of the problems
to community building that arose in the hearings. In the 1980s Benzien, a member of the
Anti-terrorist unit of the Security Branch of Cape Town, had arrested Tony Yengeni,
Ashley Forbes, Gary Krusner, Peter Jacobs and Bongani Jonas and tortured them.
Benzien’s account was marked by lapses in memory, memories that would have helped
implicate higher officials who had not applied for amnesty. Benzien’s seemingly strategic
loss of memory and breakdown at the hearing has been open to radically different
interpretations. Some see it as sincere apology, while others read Benzien’s lapses in
memory as a result of post traumatic stress disorder. xxxv Ria Kotze, a psychiatrist,
diagnosed Benzien with post traumatic stress disorder, marked by symptoms of auditory
hallucinations and memory loss. His trauma was brought about by the fact that during his
time with the Security Branch he was “torn by his belief that he was saving the lives of
the public … and the disgust that he felt in the measures he had to take” (qtd in Graham
26). The traumatic effects of violent regimes such as apartheid on both perpetrators and
victims, so effectively exposed by the Benzien case, compromise truth-finding and
present truth as indeterminate and ambivalent.
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The Benzien hearing was also marked by the victims’ request to the judges to
question Benzien themselves. It was a departure from the ordinary proceedings because
usually, in the hearings, the judges mediated between the victims and the perpetrators.
When the victims decided to question the perpetrator directly the mediating function of
the TRC was removed, and the victims and perpetrators confronted each other again. This
confrontation creates the chance for a new violation according to Sanders. Sanders points
out that the tone of Benzien’s victims, as they began questioning him, revealed that they
wanted to extract from him more than a confession: they expected him to “submit to
them”(Sanders 105). That did not happen as Benzien effectively turned the table on them,
repeating the original moment of torture. The Benzien hearing shows how traumatic
experiences frustrate reconciliation and the recovery of the true past.
The special hearings for women reveal that the community envisioned by the
TRC was gendered. Women occupy a particularly vulnerable position in South Africa.
Not only were the indigenous women victims of the racist apartheid policies, but they
were marginalized within the patriarchal structures of their community. In the hearings it
was observed that, while women came to testify for their family members, they rarely
spoke about their own experience of discrimination. The commission realized that even
though it was not a part of their agenda, the women needed a forum to be able to speak
freely of the injustices they had suffered. Therefore, special hearings were held for the
women. In the hearings a lot of the women mentioned the abuses suffered in the
liberation camps. However, none of them identified their perpetrators or the political
organizations. The TRC, surprisingly, made no move to commiserate with the women as
they shared their experiences of the abuses at the liberation camps. The TRC’s failure to
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be host to the gendered other reveals the subordinate position of women in the postapartheid patriarchal order. The position of the women exposes the continuing
connections between apartheid and post-apartheid South Africa.
The significance of the women being denied hospitality by the TRC lies in the
complicated relation between customs and law in South Africa. In South Africa there
have been two kinds of legal systems since the colonial times: the customary laws that
were dispensed to the non-whites by the tribal chiefs, who were proxy for the colonials
and modern justice, which was dispensed among the whites by the whites. The customary
laws were, therefore, not really customary, but a part of indirect rule. The customary laws
were codified as Natal Code in 1878. Even after the end of apartheid those customary
laws remained, though they are subordinate to the national laws. So when the Bill of
Rights included, in addition to the equality clause, the right to “use the language and to
participate in the cultural life of their choice, but no one exercising these rights may do so
in a manner inconsistent with any provision of the bill of rights,” it brought the customary
into the fold of the legal system and the non-whites into the nation space (qtd Sanders
71). For women inclusion of the customary into the legal system, however, did not
automatically ensure inclusion into the nation-space. In fact, the Rural Woman’s
Movement tried in vain to include the clause that “not only should equality apply to all
groups but it should trump claims to culture and custom that justified discrimination
against women”(qtd in Sanders 71). Since women occupied a subordinate position under
the patriarchal system, the failure to include women in the constitution left them in a
position no different from the one they occupied from the colonial times or under the rule
of the chiefs. In fact, the women make it evident that end of racism needs to be
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accompanied by democratization in the rural areas and homelands so that they become
privy to the same rights as men.
While the promises of community offered by the hearings were often thwarted by
things beyond the control of the TRC, the use of mass media like radio, television and
print to broadcast the hearings helped create a community despite the racial, ethnic and
economic inequalities. Unlike the hearings, which built community through encounter
with singularity and affective bonds, the broadcasts create bonds through sense of
synchronous time. In order to explain this point Benedict Anderson’s concept of the
nation as an imagined community is important. According to Anderson the nation is an
imagined community built on the notion of “deep horizontal comradeship”(7). This
horizontal comradeship developed after the demise of monarchy and the theocentric
universe in Europe. Temporal simultaneity was made possible in earlier times through
religion or monarchy, both of which connect the past, present and future in messianic
time. In the secular era, after the disappearance of religion or monarchy as cohesive
forces, temporal simultaneity moved from messianic time to “temporal coincidence” that
is “measured by clock and calendar”(Anderson 24). This sense of simultaneity, this
awareness of other strangers inhabiting the same geographical space in time, is created
through the novel and newspaper according to Anderson.
South Africa’s entry into the imagined community of modern nationhood plays
out dramatically in the shift from the apartheid concept of national community and to the
post-apartheid concept of national community. The main difference between apartheid
and post-apartheid ideas of imagined community is that during apartheid the nation was
conceived in terms of allegiance to apartheid racial ideologies. The dream of a racially
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pure nation united the community across space. In the new nation, where there are 11
national languages and many ethnicities, community is imagined in terms of temporal
simultaneity, rather than ideological or linguistic allegiance. The sense of simultaneity is
replicated in South Africa by the various media broadcasting the hearings. The South
African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) transmitted the hearings and had special
programs every Sunday, summarizing the plans of the commission and the schedule for
the week ahead. The radio transmissions were in all the eleven official languages. The
broadcasts conjure up a space occupied by a number of individuals who, despite being
unconnected to each other, are engaged in listening to the radio or television broadcast.
In that sense the broadcasts effectively help to “invent” community amidst deep
inequalities (Anderson 6). xxxvi
Creating community through the broadcast has been ambiguous process because
the media seized on certain images of the hearings as emblematic of the past. Graham
points out that Benzien’s demonstration of the wet-bag technique and his breakdown at
the hearing, the cry of Nomonde Calata, and Lucas Skewepere declaring that telling his
story to the commission made him feel like he got back his sight were seized upon by the
TRC and the media as signs of reconciliation. Tony Yengeni’s protest against Benzien’s
accounts in the hearings as well the decision of the Biko family to file charges against
Biko’s murderers suggest that the paradoxes of truth resulted in monumentalizing the
past, and a certain version of the past. In the process the everyday abuses and connection
between apartheid and colonialism was lost.
Reparations as Imperfect Gesture
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The women’s hearings, the Benzien case, and the dependence on horizontal
solidarity to form community reveal reconciliation and truth-finding to be marked by
deep-seated ambiguities and indeterminacies. While the victims are so traumatized that
they remember an incident vividly, the equally traumatized perpetrators were often
unable to remember the incident or remembered it differently from the victims as the
Benzien case shows. The indeterminacy of the past made the TRC refer to its task in the
final report as a “story of South Africa”. By describing itself as a story, as opposed to a
history, the final report offers itself as “a roadmap” for those “who wish to travel to the
past” and “critique this [the commission’s] perspective” and not the “whole truth” as
Tutu puts it in the Foreword of the Final Report (TRC 1: 2). Therefore judging the TRC’s
story of South Africa in terms of history brings it into the realm of facts, truth and lies.
Sanders points out that, while it is necessary to avoid falling into the trap of rejecting
facts for narrative truth, we should be aware that “facts and the subsequent division
between truth and lies, depend on originating, instituting ‘lies’ to which we give names
such as ‘telling’”(167). In the politics of fact and fiction, the emphasis on facts that can
be empirically verified can result in rejection of testimonies that do not corroborate with
“instituting lies” (167). Tutu’s invitation to debate draws attention to the multivalent
nature of South Africa’s past. By inviting responses it encourages a new relation with the
past: one that moves beyond the pathologies of amnesia and fetishization to engage with
the past in a matter that does not paralyze progress. xxxvii The TRC, at best, initiates the
process of recovering suppressed histories.
The main means of redressal available to the TRC was reparations. The
Committee of Reparation and Rehabilitation observes that “the work of the commission
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would be unbalanced” if the “exposure and exploration of past experiences” was not
accompanied by “reparation and rehabilitation-related services and the meeting of
financial and other needs” (TRC 1: 96). Reparations took the form of symbolic gestures
to commemorate the victims in public and private memory such as exhumation of
missing bodies, construction of memorials, renaming streets and boulevards, and issuing
death certificates and rehabilitative measures. Rehabilitation includes measures to
improve conditions in Black townships, resettle the displaced, and offer medical and
psychiatric care for those affected by the violence. Special attention was given to
psychological assistance for victims because “the mental health of many victims of
apartheid … depends on the ability of the new government to work towards provision of
adequate services” (TRC 5: 371). The TRC also suggested monetary reparations to the
victims identified during the hearings. It recommended that the state force businesses that
benefited from apartheid policies to make reparations in terms of taxations.
When the past is so contested, so frustratingly ambiguous, reparations as the
means of addressing past wrongs are inadequate. Reparations as the sole means of
undoing the past are problematic because they are symbolic gestures. Just as the
connection between a sign and its referent is not logical in a symbol, the relation between
reparation and the wrongs it seeks to atone for is, also, arbitrary. According to Sanders,
this is because reparations are retrospective actions that seek to restore what has been
damaged or destroyed. But the attempt to restore originary wholeness is fraught with
problems because it is hard to identify origins. The wholeness that reparation seeks to
restore is, therefore, often “a retrospective construction of an aristocratic and magisterial
past” that has been lost (Sanders 129). Since the basis of reparations is a phantasy of
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wholeness its motivations are egotistic. The object of reparation is not in the picture
except as a beneficiary or recipient of the reparations. Moreover, as Sanders argues, in
South Africa, where relations are marked by violence and memories are distorted by
trauma, the perpetrator’s perception of suffering will not match the victim’s perception of
the loss. The symbolic nature of reparations means that they are always incomplete, and
always inadequate. In the case of TRC there is the added complication of the TRC as a
phantasmagoric perpetrator. However, without any power of execution the TRC cannot
do more than recommend reparations.
Reparations are an act of double inscription. On one hand gestures of reparation
for past crimes symbolize the end of the past and a new beginning. But reparation also
draws attention to the incommensurable gap between suffering and compensation, law
and loss. In the process, the act of making reparations reinscribes the history it
unsuccessfully seeks to address. Reparations remind us that for the victims of historical
crimes justice is fugitive as Stephen Best and Saidiya Hartman point out. Although
Hartman and Best use the term in relation to the African American hope for justice
during slavery, “fugitive justice” offers a nuanced understanding of the politics of
redressal. Fugitive justice recognizes the difference between “grievance and grief” in “the
necessity of legal remedy and the impossibility of redress”( Best and Hartman 3). It
recognizes that “justice is beyond the scope of law, and redress necessarily
inadequate”(Best and Hartman 1). For terrible crimes and events such as slavery “forms
of legal and social compensation available are less a matter of wiping the slate clean than
of embracing the limited scope of the possible in face of the irreparable, and calling
attention to the incommensurability between pain and compensation” (Best and Hartman

59
1-2). If justice is fugitive, the past cannot be erased. Yet, efforts for compensation have to
be made even though words cannot capture the sufferings of the victims, and money is a
poor substitute for historical wrongs. Reparation as failure to recover the past, rewrite
history and repair historical wrongs ultimately doubles back to reinscribe the history it
seeks to erase, a history beyond means of redressal.
According to Best and Hartman’s concept of fugitive justice, reparations by the
TRC underscore the insurmountable gap between state gestures based on the rhetoric of
human rights and liberal discourses of freedom, and the psychological effects of
apartheid that exist beyond any strategy for remedy or reversal. The TRC, which
embodies fugitive justice, does not reverse or redress the crimes of apartheid, but signals
the death knell of apartheid. The TRC presents the beginning of democracy and the end
of apartheid as a moment of political interval between “the no-longer and the not yet,
between the destruction of the old world and the awaited hour of deliverance” (Best and
Hartman 3). It speaks for a pragmatic politics of working through the injuries of the past
within the limited scope of the possible, rather than reversing a right, restoring the past or
returning what was taken. By taking on the responsibilities of absentee perpetrators,
which includes individuals and the erstwhile apartheid state, the TRC acknowledges and
commemorates the violent history it cannot reverse. As a measure it is more successful in
marking the past than other measures such as land rights. The former doesn’t reject
history while the latter gives the impression that land rights reverse the past wrongs.
Reparations are pragmatic measures that seek to build a new relation with the
past. Building new relations with the past involves, among other things, transforming the
signs of the past. The TRC made recommendations for infrastructural changes to remove
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the deleterious material effects of apartheid so that the past would not distort the present.
Without the recommendations for compensation, truth would aggravate divisions and
foster bitterness and violence. The recommendations imply that the commission is a part
of a process of negotiating a healthier relation with the past, rather than a solution for past
injustices.
In this new relation with the past, a past that remains elusive despite the openness
of the TRC’s process, the state and citizens have to be equal participants. The report’s
claim that “the commission has done its share to promote national unity and
reconciliation” and its “achievement is up to each one of us” draws attention to the role of
citizens in the process (TRC1: 23). Sharing responsibility with other entities presents the
TRC as working in tandem with “organs of civil society –such as faith communities, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), community based organizations (CBOs) and
ordinary citizens” who “will need to continue to work towards unity and reconciliation
long after the closure of the commission” (TRC1: 49). The Final Report makes it clear
that reconciliation is a shared task that extends beyond the timespan of any organization.
By deferring action to other institutions the TRC undercuts any closure to locate itself as
part of a larger process and recognizes reconciliation as a personal choice of the state, the
citizens and the leaders. The report reminds us that the TRC is an evanescent moment of
unity among victims and perpetrators in what is a long ethical process.
Despite offering a historically nuanced idea of hope in moments of transitions, the
TRC’s representation of the post-apartheid moment as marked by indeterminacy of truth
and deference of justice give an elegiac tone to the Final Report. This elegiac feeling does
not indicate weaknesses in the structure and goals of the TRC as much as it exposes a
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lack of clear divisions between apartheid and post-apartheid era. The post-apartheid
moment that comes out in the document is melancholic, rather than ecstatically
optimistic. The TRC’s larger processes bring home the fact that South Africa’s dreams of
the future remain firmly tethered to its past. The criticism that has greeted the TRC for
failing to accomplish reconciliation is a result of this contrast between the new beginning
it promised and the melancholia it exposed. This melancholia, resulting from the
breakdown of the illusion of newness of the post-apartheid era, tempers hope and
transforms reconciliation into a dynamic and pragmatic process. Instead of unambiguous
assertion of healed ties, the TRC reveals fleeting possibilities of community that cannot
ensconce themselves in the society.
TRC and Literature
Despite its lofty goals, the TRC’s hearings prove that finding the truth is a
frustrating process that belies the enthusiasm and hope that marks its inception. The result
is the postponement of justice and monumentalization of the past. Instead of reading the
TRC’s inability to find the truth about apartheid as a symptom of its failure, it is possible
to read the larger processes of the TRC, particularly the hearings, as pointing to the blind
spots and contradictions that accompany rewriting history. The ambiguities of truth that
emerge from the hearings point to the paradoxes that make the past unnarratable. At the
same time, strategies of remembrance adopted in the hearings offer imaginative and
productive ways to engage with the past (Graham 28). I am suggesting that what was said
and what was not is less important than probing and understanding the visible gaps in the
narrative as signs of the historical situation that perpetuated such trauma in both victims
and perpetrators. The TRC is a call to move beyond holding these narratives to the
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category of facts and understand them as a process of individual and collective reshaping
of identity in a new context.
The need to represent the unnarratable and the inaccessible confronts the TRC
with the same issues that literature has to contend with. Graham claims that the TRC
proves that “some truth cannot be spoken, only pointed to ambiguously”(34). It is,
therefore, necessary to bear witness and represent “without sensationalizing it, fixing it,
foreclosing its meanings, monumentalizing it or consigning it to the archive of oblivion”
(Graham 34). Literature addresses these problems by moving away from dependence on
factual reasoning to an imaginative reconstruction. In inviting alternate histories and
counter narratives the TRC provides a space for literature because only literature can
imaginatively mark the silences and dramatize the paradoxes and predicaments of truthfinding, bypassing simplistic dreams of closure. The TRC has underlined the importance
of narratives and indirectly alluded to the need for storytellers and stories to recover
counter narratives and imaginatively construct both the past as well as the future. The
TRC’s dependence on narrative truth and its recognition of the indeterminacy of truth
point to the centrality of narrative in its process. Yet, the TRC remains silent on the
importance of literature in representing the ambivalence of the post-apartheid moment.
Sanders points out that the TRC’s failure to elaborate on the importance of storytelling
implies a devaluation of the role of literature in the post-apartheid context. xxxviii The
silence on storytelling is unfortunate because, even as the state fails to fulfill its
injunctions, literature, through its formal innovations and imaginative vision, offers ways
to reach out to the other without nullifying differences. The versatility of post-apartheid
literature, as it moves beyond the determinisms of reportage and realism, offers visions of
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reconciliation that account for the messiness of history and encompasses the difference
between the self and the other. In the following chapters I shall examine how prominent
white South African writers like J. M Coetzee, Andre Brink, Nadine Gordimer and Antjie
Krog respond to the challenges of representing the other to envision racial reconciliation.
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Chapter 2
Speaking With a Forked Tongue: Disgrace and the Irony of
Reconciliation in Post-apartheid South Africa
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa’s (TRC) open and
public hearings and inclusion of both the victims’ and perpetrators’ perspectives on the
apartheid set up a model of representation that is open, inclusive and eager to embrace the
heterogeneity of South Africa. The TRC thus represents the other as complex and
singular historical beings, intersected by and differentiated into race, gender, ethnicity,
sexuality, class and religion, existing beyond the racist and exclusive stereotypes
circulating during the apartheid. The unique aspect of the TRC’s representation is that it
did not exclude other groups, not even the perpetrators, in the effort to give voice to the
racially disenfranchised. Excluding the perpetrators would have repeated the same
violence that it sought to end. But how might this ideal be extended into literature, given
that literature must account not simply for an imagined historical turn but for a complex
historical process? How is one to represent the other as an embodied being in history,
when the long and messy history of racism precludes identification with and
understanding of the other in South Africa? More importantly, how does one ethically
represent the racial other without excluding or simply demonizing the perpetrators?
In South African literature, in recent times, the question of ethical representation
of the other has centered on the debate about the viability of literary realism, deployed by
resistance and dissident writers, over the anti-realist mode. As a way of representing the
horrors of the apartheid, realism was regarded as an ethical imperative by some of its
practitioners such as Alan Paton, and Nadine Gordimer in her pre-The Conservationist
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novels. Realism was seen as replacing the compromised historical documentation
controlled by the apartheid state. The problem with realism in South African writing is
that in the effort to present a
true picture of the apartheid it often objectified the other into a spectacle. xxxix Anti-realist
literature, on the other hand, was criticized for its attention to formal experimentation,
instead of the moral exigencies of the apartheid. But as the nation entered the postapartheid phase, realism lost its status as an ethical imperative; accordingly, the move
from apartheid to post-apartheid literature was seen as a leap from the bondage of realism
to the freedom of literary experimentation. xl Just as descriptions of South Africa’s
political transition from apartheid to democracy as a smooth and linear movement from
racism to freedom ignores, what Dorothy Driver calls, the “stealthy survival of apartheid
discourses” and the continuation of white supremacy in the post-apartheid era, the
movement from realism to anti-realism does not present a true picture of South African
literature, nor does it account for the demands of South African history. xli Continuation of
racially asymmetrical social structures means that neither the urgency nor the need to
speak for the other has ended. But how does one represent such realities without falling
into spectacular objectifications of the other?
Such questions highlight the importance of J. M. Coetzee’s work. As Derek
Attridge has argued, Coetzee’s anti-realist mode of narration demonstrates that formal
innovation is more than apolitical aesthetic play. xlii Formal experimentation, Attridge
clarifies, is the result of an author’s attempts to recreate the experience of an encounter
with the other that challenges existing representational paradigms. In his apartheid-era
novels Coetzee avoided both the objectifications associated with realism and the
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apolitical shortcomings of anti-realism. Coetzee’s metafictional strategies in the novels
subvert and critique conventional genres to suggest that the violence involved in the
discursive construction of self through narratives like fiction, travelogues, and historical
documentaries is similar to colonialism and the apartheid. xliii For example, in Foe
Coetzee juxtaposes different genres, like travelogue, feminist fiction, and realist fiction,
to show that the organization of events into narratives privileges a particular discourse or
perspective by excluding others. xliv In Dusklands placing Eugene Dawn’s documentary
about Vietnam War before the account of 17th century Dutch explorer Jacobus Coetzee’s
travels reminds readers that the violence of historical accounts lies, beyond the text, in the
marginalization involved in crafting a self within a discourse. Coetzee thus gestures
towards a more complex understanding of what might be understood as realism in South
Africa, an understanding of an absurd social world that could be documented only by
extending beyond the boundaries of literary realism.
To examine the possibilities of this approach, then, it is useful to look at
Coetzee’s first post-apartheid novel Disgrace, in which he confronted the challenge of
representing post-apartheid realities. In this chapter, I argue that Disgrace grapples with
and raises questions about the ethics of representing the other through a narrative that
insets a 50-year-old Afrikaner’s struggles to write an opera about Lord Byron and his last
great love Teresa Guicolli within the larger narrative problem of representing the racial
other in post-apartheid South Africa. Coetzee’s subtly crafted and nuanced use of irony
reveals the contradictions of ethical representation to be rooted in the historic
contradictions of racial interaction in South Africa. In effect, the novel argues that in
South Africa ethical representation can be successfully achieved through irony because
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the other can only be addressed indirectly. It therefore speaks, I argue, with a forked
tongue, a deliberate avoidance of the priorities of literary realism by which Coetzee
suggests that reticence about the other--and acknowledgement of the failure to capture the
other as a complex being in time and space--is more ethical than realistic portrayal. The
novel’s deliberate and reflexive refusal to present the other as a concrete entity,
ironically, points to the other’s presence as a being in history. Irony in South Africa, the
novel implies, is not just a rhetorical concept but the existential and philosophical
condition of its racial history. xlv Irony’s forked tongue enables Coetzee to decenter the
novel’s racist protagonist as well as explore the complex historical roots of the
protagonist’s racist perspective. Irony, then, empowers Coetzee to critique contemporary
racial politics and their effects on reconciliation, and extend the inclusive politics of the
TRC in the process.
Critical Reception of Disgrace
J.M. Coetzee, twice Booker Prize winner and 2003 Nobel laureate, is a
controversial literary figure in South Africa. It is easy to understand why. During the
apartheid, when realism and overt opposition to state racism was considered the
responsibility of art, he insisted that literature “operates in terms of its own procedures
and issues its own conclusions” and is a rival to “history, not a supplement” (Coetzee 23). Rejection of political determinism during the apartheid may have allowed Coetzee to
produce some of the most formally innovative novels of his time that cemented his
international reputation as one of the best novelists of the later twentieth century. But,
the same formal experimentation made him unpopular at home because his works resisted
appropriation by any political agenda. When Disgrace was published, in 1998, one
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expected his work to finally find appreciation in South Africa. After all, the apartheid was
finally over. With it, one hoped, the need for literature to take a political stand through
realistic depiction of violence had disappeared as well. This meant that literature, at least
in theory, was finally free of political determinism and could, according to Andre Brink,
not simply … escape from the inhibitions of apartheid, but … construct
and deconstruct new possibilities; … activate the imagination in its
exploration of those silences previously inaccessible; … play with the
future on that needlepoint where it meets past and present; … be able to
risk everything in the leaping flame of word as it turns into world (27).
In the new era, Coetzee could follow his “allegiances … with the discourse of novels and
not the discourse of politics” without apology (qtd in Penner xiv). He need no longer feel
coerced into becoming a “South African Novelist,” someone obligated to “produce works
that can be adapted to political uses”(qtd in Penner xiv).
Disgrace, one of Coetzee’s rare realistic novels, won 2 international awards: the
Booker Prize and the Commonwealth Writer’s Prize. Declaring Disgrace the winner of
the Booker Prize 1999, the British Labour MP Gerald Kaufman praised it as “an allegory
about what is happening to the human race in the post-colonial era” (qtd in McDonald
321). Announcing it the winner of the Commonwealth Writer’s Prize, in 1999, Shashi
Deshpande described it as “a complex story” that “embraces with remarkable skill the
politics of a new nation” (qtd in McDonald 321). But for a novel that won 2 international
awards, its reception in South Africa has been largely negative. The novel owes its
notoriety to ANC’s trenchant criticism of its depiction of non-white characters. In an oral
report to the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC), the ANC reported that
Disgrace enabled the persistence of racism among white South Africans because it
portrayed the Black as a “faithless, immoral, uneducated, incapacitated primitive child”
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(qtd McDonald, 323). The ANC’s criticism was echoed by others like Aggrey Klaaste,
who wrote, in the Sowetan, that the novel was the perspective of a “disgruntled
Afrikaner” and that the story of “black men raping white women” was “offensive” (qtd in
McDonald 325). Jakes Gerwel, professor and Director General of the President’s office
under Nelson Mandela, in the Afrikaans weekly Rapport, in February 13, 2000, was
dismayed by the novel’s “almost barbaric post colonial claims of black Africans,” its
representation of “mixed race characters as whores, seducers, complainers, conceited
accusers,” and its “exclusion of the possibility of civilized reconciliation” (qtd in
McDonald 325). The common point between the very different responses is that they
regard the novel as a direct and transparent signifier of reality. The international awards,
which praise the novel for its verisimilitude to South Africa’s contemporary racial
situation, distance themselves from the nation’s complex problems by reading them as
historical indicators. xlvi On the other hand, the criticism from South African reviewers is
premised on the belief that literature needs to reflect the political aspirations of the state.
In both case, the assessment focuses on the narrative surface of the novel.
If we examine the novel in terms of its realistic narrative surface it will appear
that the truculent critics have reason to protest this time. The narrative revolves around
two rapes: David Lurie’s rape of his colored student Melanie and the gang-rape of Lurie’s
daughter Lucy by a crowd of black men. The violent storyline is complicated by the fact
that the narrative perspective is on Lurie, a 50-year old Afrikaner and university
professor, who is responsible for the racist utterances in the novel. The racist stereotypes
uttered by Lurie become a problem because there is no authoritative third-person narrator
as witness and judge of Lurie. Without an authoritative narrator to provide a concrete
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moral compass, the novel appears to endorse Lurie’s racist views. The absence of an
authoritative moral focus in the novel means that the other never acquires a concrete
shape, either as a character or a source of knowledge in the novel. The narrative focus on
the racist protagonist, the absence of an authoritative moral voice, and the other as an
absent presence has contributed to the novel being labeled as racist.
But the narrative surface, however realistic, is never a reliable indicator of
Coetzee’s intentions. The absence of a moral compass is a common theme in Coetzee’s
novels. For example, in Foe there are competing narratives without the privileging of any
one. In Dusklands the juxtaposition of two novellas in reverse chronological order—
Eugene de Klerk’s account of the Vietnam Project and the eighteenth-century explorer
Jacobus Coetzee’s account of colonial polices in South Africa –forces readers to draw
their own conclusions about the connection between contemporary practices and
colonialism. Rosemary Jolly points out that the absence of a judging centre enables
Coetzee “to represent the acts of violence that constitute a recurring subject in his
fictions, without participating in the process of violation these acts exhibit.”(Jolly 110). It
also helps Coetzee to “counter history as a prison, one in which we are doomed to repeat
without difference the contours of a violent past” (Jolly 110).
If we take into account the ironic relation between the two strands of narrative as
well as the play with narrative perspective, it becomes clear that in Disgrace the language
of racist discourses is ironically mediated and turned against itself so that the other can be
recuperated as an embedded, material presence in history, instead of an object of racist
discourses. Through misreadings prompted by the presence of a larger-than-life racist
Afrikaner and the lack of moral focus, the novel effectively confronts readers with the
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limits of their interpretive authority and biases. Coetzee’s play on racist discourses in the
novel recognizes that literature’s participation and intervention in racist discourses differs
from that of political manifestos and historical chronicles. On the basis of Coetzee’s
earlier works, the absence of a moral center and the other as a spectral presence can be
read as a deliberate parody of various discourses to highlight the violence of discursive
representation and expose the limits of the reader’s knowledge of the other within the
present discursive set-up. I begin by examining Coetzee’s representation of the new
South Africa to analyze the changes that separate it from the past. The novel’s context is
important because it sets the ground for the racial representations that the characters
engage in. The relation between contemporary racial discourse in South Africa and the
racist past gives rise to two specific modes of representing the other: stereotypes, and the
law based on a philosophical commitment to universal human rights. In the final section,
by comparing Coetzee’s ironic representation of the other as an absent-presence with
Lurie’s stereotypical representation of the non-whites, I argue that Coetzee offers an
alternative mode of representation that can bypass the ideological impasse created by the
nation’s racist ideology that still continues in the post apartheid era.
Post Racial Politics and Private Racism
Disgrace proclaims its post-apartheid context from the opening paragraph, where
the protagonist Lurie proclaims that his Thursday visits to the prostitute Soraya has
“solved the problem of sex” rather well (Coetzee, Disgrace 1). The seemingly
unremarkable statement by a twice divorced, lonely 52-year old man, glad to find an
outlet for his flagging desires with a prostitute, is extraordinary in South Africa because
Soraya is non-white. In South Africa, where inter-racial sexual relations were strictly
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monitored under the apartheid, sex with a non-white prostitute is novel. The statement
makes it clear that in this new South Africa the Immorality Act (1950-1985) and the
Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act (1949) are no longer in force. Therefore, Lurie, who
would have been labeled a blood mixer and imprisoned during the apartheid for having
sex with non-whites, now visits Soraya without fear. xlvii I do not mean that miscegenation
began in South Africa with the end of apartheid. Miscegenation was an important part of
racial and colonial politics and the presence of the sizeable Colored population is
testimony to that. Apartheid legislation sought to end that to maintain purity of the
Afrikaners. This meant that in the post-apartheid era, after a long time, people could
choose their sexual partner across race and without fear of legal action.
What is even more remarkable in the new South Africa is the absence of racial
reference. The racial identity of the non-white characters is indicated through references
to ethnicity, history and skin-tone. Soraya’s non-white identity is revealed through
references to her religion and her “honey-brown body, unmarked by the sun” (1). xlviii The
escort agency, Discreet Escorts, eschews race as an identifier and lists non-white sexworkers as “Exotics,” identifying them by their ethnicity: Thai, Chinese, Asian etc. Since
ethnicity has been used by the apartheid to fracture non-white resistance, it serves as a
synonym for race. Melanie’s race is signified by her Kaaps accent, Lurie renaming her as
“Melani-the dark one,” and references to darkness and non-European ethnicity in her
description (Coetzee, Disgrace 18). xlix For instance she has “close-cropped black hair,
wide almost Chinese cheekbones”( Coetzee, Disgrace 11). l We know that Petrus is an
African through Lurie’s reference to their relationship as “baas en Klass” (Coetzee,
Disgrace 116). Lurie’s reference to himself by the old Afrikaner title of “master” marks
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Petrus as non-white. Petrus also speaks in Xhosa at home. Despite the lack of racial
reference for the rapists, their non-white identity is evident through Lurie and Lucy’s
constant reference to the history they are trying to correct. Even though Lurie’s own
racial identity is not explicitly identified, we know he is white from his attitude to Petrus.
His nostalgia for the “old days”, when as a white man he “could have had it out to the
extent of … sending him [Petrus] packing and hiring someone else,” reveals his racial
identity (Disgrace 116). His ethnic affiliation as Afrikaner is revealed through his
reference to his relation with Petrus in terms of the Afrikaner master-slave relations:
“baas-en-Klass”, as well as his description of his daughter Lucy as a “frontier farmer of a
new breed” (116, 62). Coetzee’s description of Lucy as “frontier farmer” connects her to
Afrikaner history, when the Boers moved to the interior and set up their farms, to escape
the rising power of the British colonials, who controlled the mines. The indirect reference
to racial identity is a result of the trend of replacing race with ethnicity and other
signifiers.
The racial silence in Disgrace identifies the racial ideology and practice of “new
South Africa” with David Goldberg’s concept of the post-racial. Since “racial” refers to
“the various designations of group differentiation invoked in the name of race,” “post
racial” implies the absence of race as a criterion of group identification (Goldberg,
Culture 2). The post-apartheid fear of racial reference is a consequence of the use of race
as a divisive tool to secure white privilege and fracture non-white resistance during the
apartheid. The desire to erase racial reference and forge a community to prevent the
country from splintering into numerous ethnic enclaves is, thus, understandable. Fear of
ethnic nationalism, often a consequence of resistance movements based on racial identity,
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motivates Paul Gilroy to recommend moving beyond race. But Gilroy’s alternative of
“planetary humanism” is unrealistic in South Africa, where “in the wake of long and
vicious racist histories the present cannot simply be a raceless state” (Goldberg, State
248). The internalization of racist practices “by their routine repetition” that “hints at
their presumed naturalization” has resulted in their being “taken as given and therefore
coterminously unalterable” (Goldberg, State 116). As a result, racial subjects continue to
be created despite the end of racist regime.
Nonracialism as a mode of racial reconciliation thus poses serious problems.
Goldberg points out that “nonracialism in South Africa,” which is comparable to
“colorblindness in the USA” or “racial democracy in Brazil,” results in, first, the
relative silencing of public analysis or serious discussion of everyday
racism in the respective societies. Second it has made it more or less
impossible to connect historical configurations to contemporary racial
formations. And third, each instance of racelessness has displaced the
tensions of contemporary racially charged relations to the relative
invisibility of private spheres, seemingly out of reach of public policy
intervention. (Goldberg, State 217).

Instead of ending racial classification, the imposed silence on racial reference “erase[s]
the exclusionary experiences of racialised subjectivities, the effects of racist patterns of
discipline and deprivation, and the marginalizations and periphraxes insinuated into the
racial ambiguities of social practices” (Goldberg, Culture 207-208). The enforced silence
on race in a country with a violent racial history turns “racially marked social orders into
racially erased ones” (Goldberg, State 222). According to Goldberg, racelessness is “not
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a politics of recognition, but of reconciliation and defensiveness, tolerance and dismissal
(personal and positional) at the middle and upper end of the social scale, and of desperate
survival and reconstruction, but also sometimes of resentment at the lower class ends”
(Goldberg, State 233). Racelessness or nonracialism is, therefore, “as much a refusal to
address, let alone redress, deeply etched historical inequalities, racially fashioned, as it is
an expressed embrace of principles of race-ignoring fairness and equal
opportunity”(Goldberg, State 213). li In essence, racelessness reduces race to an empty
category, which is “nowhere and everywhere at once, useable and discardable to
whatever productive purposes those in command of production and circulation of
signification can sustain”(Goldberg, State 236).
The erasure of racial reference in South Africa encourages nostalgic recreations of
the colonial period. It characterizes the apartheid as an extreme and aberrant inhumanism
and effectively stymies public discussion about it as a metamorphosis of earlier practices,
resulting in nostalgia among the white community. The result is an ebullient celebration
of some aspect of the past that is not associated with it. Lurie’s reading of the colonial
practice of miscegenation as symbol of freedom is one instance of such nostalgia. Lurie
identifies the sexual freedom of the post-apartheid period with the phantasy of
miscegenation during the colonial period. He claims he has “solved the problem of sex
rather well” because he can now engage in sex with non-whites (Coetzee, Disgrace 1).
The sex industry transforms the phantasy of miscegenation into a money-spinning
enterprise. The racial history of South Africa warns against idealization of colonial
practices without caution.
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My reading of the revival of the colonial past amidst the white South Africans as
nostalgic celebration of the past is aligned with Gilroy’s concept of “post imperial
melancholia”. lii According to Gilroy, England’s loss of her colonies and her global
preeminence after WWII, coupled with the swelling number of immigrants, who were a
constant reminder of her loss of power, precipitate an identity crisis. The liberal discourse
current in England erased racial references from public discourses and represented the
colonial period as reprehensible in an attempt to forget England’s role in colonialism. The
white Britishers were, thus, denied the scope to mourn their loss of global eminence and
turned to the WWII era as a model for emulation. WWII England, unlike colonialism,
where Britain’s conduct was neither victorious nor exemplary, is associated with
Churchill’s inspiring patriotism, British military prowess and victory, and is untainted by
the negative connotations of colonialism, even though England was still a powerful
imperial presence. The nostalgic identification with WWII thus gives Englishmen an
illusion of power. According to Gilroy, one reason behind this nostalgia was that it
provided an escape route from the bewildering and serious demands of an increasingly
heterogeneous Britain.
Even though South Africa is not an imperial nation, there are parallels between its
post-apartheid state and late 20th-century Britain. In South Africa, the postcolonial whitesettler-indigene dynamic acquired imperial undertones as the apartheid polices sought to
wrest land from the indigenous population through land laws and reduce them to second
class citizens. Therefore, the end of apartheid and the imposition of liberal post-racial
policies precipitated a similar identity crisis among white South Africans, particularly
Afrikaners, which manifested itself in melancholic idealization of colonial practices as a
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result of being denied articulation in the post-racial milieu. For the white South Africans,
particularly the Afrikaners, who lost their preeminent position in the state along with
special privileges, aligning with the colonial period, an earlier period of white glory in
South Africa, which is less obviously racist than the apartheid, creates the illusion of
importance. liii Just as in Britain, nostalgia for the colonial period among the whites in
South Africa is a misrepresentation, motivated by rising sense of loss and insecurity. It is
a strategy that prevents the white community from facing up to the demands of the postapartheid context. For instance, Lurie can visualize happy domesticity with Melanie, yet
he is unable to apologize to her. He can imagine a cozy intimacy between himself and
Soraya, but is unable to picture Petrus beyond the stereotype of a wily peasant.
This nostalgia for miscegenation is a misreading of the colonial past. Mark
Sanders notes that the decimation of local population in settler colonies was followed by
repopulation by the settlers. In South Africa, however, repopulation took place “not only
through increase among the settlers and their descendents. It also took place between
settlers and remnants of decimated subject populations of the Cape of Good Hope, and
between settlers and slaves and servants” (Sanders 174). The commodification of
miscegenation by the sex industry, with their special category of “Exotic” sex workers,
repeats the racist colonial phantasy of miscegenation. The apartheid, which tried to
suppress miscegenation to preserve the purity of Afrikaner blood, thus is an extreme
configuration of colonial racism. The complex history behind sexual dynamics in South
Africa connects its post-racial present, the long colonial history and the apartheid in
complex loops. Consequently, the temporal movement from apartheid to post-apartheid is
not linear and progressive; it is complex and chaotic. By locating the presence of earlier
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racist practices in the post-apartheid present the novel does not imply that the colonial
racist patterns are replicated in the present. Instead, it draws attention to the fact that
present racial patterns of representation are, in part, based upon earlier patterns that
remain sedimented in the social structures and inform present perceptions. But repetition
of these patterns in the post-apartheid era can jeopardize the new country’s tentative steps
towards reconciliation. Racelessness, which makes it difficult, if not impossible, to detect
these patterns, does not aid the cause of inter-racial ethics.
The complex connection between race and sex in South Africa presents the postracial celebration of freedom from apartheid’s sexual laws in a new light. The sexual
problem in South Africa is not a matter of mere intercourse, as Lurie thinks; instead, it is
deeply political. The intersections of race, sex and gender in South Africa’s long colonial
history ensures that in South Africa sex is never a personal matter or a physical impulse.
Consequently, a sexual act, particularly rape, cannot be glossed over as an act by the
“servant of Eros” (Coetzee, Disgrace 52). Nor can miscegenation be commodified by the
sex industry in blithe disregard of the dark and violent history of the Colored population.
“Eros” is loaded with historical significance in South Africa, where desire is connected to
white phantasy and Black revenge. To ignore this history and rape a woman is to commit
a crime more serious than a sin of desire; just as rape of a white woman by a Black man
is more complex than simple rape. Given this history, Lurie’s belief that his visits to a
Colored prostitute solves the problem of sex is ironic because it perpetuates the use of sex
to assert power in a country whose long and bitter racial history is intertwined with
sexual exploitation. This violent history that racelessness erases, resulting in the
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insensitive commercialization of the non-white women by the sex industry, is embodied
in the child Lucy conceives after being gang-raped by Africans
The complicated relation between the post-racial present, colonial history and
apartheid gives Lurie a more complex identity than that of an old racist Afrikaner stuck
on older values. Lurie claims “His temperament is not going to change, he is too old for
that”(Coetzee, Disgrace 2). He identifies himself with the old apartheid order and rejects
the post-apartheid present. But, the roots of apartheid in colonial history and the
reiteration of that history in post-apartheid South Africa, through practices such as
miscegenation, locates Lurie at the juncture of a far more complex history than that of the
apartheid. His adherence to the apartheid ties him to the long colonial history and the
presence of colonial racist practices in the post-apartheid, post-racial times makes him as
much a child of the post-racial present as that of the apartheid. This deep and messy
history of the post-apartheid context, in the end, identifies Lurie’s acts as racist because
the value of any practice is not so much in its apparent intention, but in “what sort of ends
we would achieve by our social practices, in what sort of values we have committed
ourselves to in understating the practices themselves” (Goldberg Culture 213). By
sleeping with Soraya and raping Melanie, Lurie is unconsciously repeating the patterns
resonant in South Africa’s colonial history of gender and racial exploitation. By
participating in the commodification of racial and ethnic difference, Lurie is engaging in
racist behavior.
Just as nostalgic revival of the WWII as the best period of British glory has
resulted in attacks on immigrant communities by skinheads in Britain, revival of the
colonial practice of miscegenation also results in violence on the gendered racial other,
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whose most terrible consequences are Lurie’s rape of Melanie and Lucy’s gang-rape by
Africans. For Lurie, raping Melanie is not so much abuse of power as it is an act of
animal impulse; for the Africans rape is a calculated act of revenge. In the post-racial
state, justice for the victims of this kind of racial violence can only be attained through
human rights based law. Law, which represents individuals as rights based citizens,
irrespective of gender, sexuality, race and religion, erases differences to create uniform
subjects. The problems with the uniformity imposed by law in South Africa are evident in
the university enquiry to investigate Melanie’s accusation of rape against Lurie and
determine possible disciplinary action. When Lurie’s lawyer learns Lurie is guilty of rape
he advises him to admit his guilt and negotiate some form of counseling as punishment in
lieu of losing his job. Manas Mathabene, the chairman of the enquiry, asks Lurie if he is
willing to commit to counseling. The enquiry’s insistence on a confession and public
apology in return for pardon and job security tries to create a narrative of guilt,
confession, apology and reformation. The attempts to pressure Lurie into counseling
represent Lurie’s rape of Melanie, a Colored student, as individual pathology that can be
cured. By making a scapegoat out of Lurie and establishing themselves as reforming
agents, the law and the new nation-state establish their legitimacy. This narrative of
racism as pathology presents time as linear and progressive and ties in with the
representation of the transition from apartheid to post-apartheid post-racial ideology as
clean break from the inhumane past.
The enquiry’s efforts seem to be directed towards reaching a compromise rather
than determining the reasons behind Lurie’s action and finding a way to dispense justice.
Lurie pleads guilty at the start of the enquiry, but refuses to accept their terms. Yet, the
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members valiantly try to cajole him into accepting their terms so that he can keep his job.
The desperate efforts to prevent Lurie from losing his job and to negotiate a punishment
suggest that law seeks to restore status quo rather than serve justice. In order to restore
status quo law carries out a series of quantitative substitutions between legal processes
and internal transformation, between contrition and confession, apology and repentance,
and between Lurie’s punishment in the form of a brief suspension and the emotional and
psychological effects of rape Melanie suffers. All of these equivalences are premised on
and perpetuate the axiom that Lurie, a 50-year old white Afrikaner man, is equal to a 20year old Coloured woman, who is also his student. However, the history of sexual
exploitation of and discrimination against women by both whites and Blacks and the
connection between race and sex in South Africa’s racial history of does not support such
a premise. Status quo can only be restored by law through willful erasure of the
historically specific subject. As Lurie reminds Mathabane, chair of the enquiry,
“repentance belongs to another order of discourse” (Coetzee, Digrace 55).
The enquiry finds Lurie guilty and fires him because he refused to participate in
the narrative it sought to elicit from him and sanction. He refuses to accede to a public
confession and apology. Against their narrative of pathology Lurie presents his narrative
of desire when he claims that he was a “servant of Eros” (52). Lurie’s narrative of desire
illustrates how a rights based legal system creates more conflict than it resolves because
“one person’s liberty may conflict with another’s and one’s liberty or claim with one’s
entitlement and power” (Goldberg, Culture 37). Lurie presents the rights of desire as
timeless and beyond law. However, he forgets that rights of desire are not simple matters
in South Africa. The problem with Lurie’s narrative of the rights of desire and the
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enquiry’s narrative of deviance is that, while they present competing interpretations of
the same event, both their interpretations are ahistorical. The rights-based legal system
equates Lurie and Melanie without considering their differences in gender and race and
its history in South Africa; Lurie’s reading of his action as Eros dismisses the interracial
sexual politics of South Africa’s history.
It is not that the university enquiry remains silent about history. . Protesting
against Lurie’s elision of history, Farodia Rasool exclaims “all of a sudden it is not the
abuse of a young woman he is confessing to, just an impulse he could not resist, with no
mention of the pain he has caused, no mention of the long history of exploitation of
which this is a part” (53). Desmond Swarts, another member of the enquiry committee,
alludes to this history when he explains that for “good of the whole we have to deny
ourselves certain gratifications” and feels that there should be “a ban on mixing power
relations with sexual relations” (52-53). However, these allusions are not explored in the
enquiry, which quickly gets mired in negotiations. At the enquiry, as grief is turned into
grievance, deep equality was bypassed for civility, and liberty for litigation. In the
ensuing process, justice became a battle of contesting rights and the opportunity for
turning a messy event into social change was missed.
Historical amnesia of the legal system destroys Lurie’s daughter Lucy’s faith in
the law. She refuses to report being raped by a group of Africans because she feels that
her rape is “a purely private matter. In another time and in another place it might be held
to be a public matter. But in this place at this time it is not. It is my business, mine alone”
(112). She clarifies “this place” as “Africa” (112). By declaring her rape as a private
matter she rejects nonracialism, which transforms the long history of racism behind the
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Black violence on whites, particularly white women, into deviance. Without taking into
account the history of racial relations in South Africa, Lucy’s rape in the hands of a group
of African strangers is liable to be read as personal dispute, a one-off incident by deviant
men or a settling of personal score, just as Melanie’s rape was reduced to a case of
ordinary sexual harassment. But the racial history of South Africa makes settling personal
scores a historical one because the inter-racial power struggle uses women as the ground
for asserting control over the racial other. Prosecution of the rapists will not change the
underlying premises that support racism in South Africa; instead, it creates a sense of
entitlement and guilt in the whites and desire for revenge in the non-whites. Nor will it
address the basic gender premises in South Africa, where women are a currency in the
interracial battle for power between men in nationalist, religious and patriarchal
discourses. Until there is a metamorphosis in the governing principles of racial and
gender relations in South Africa the position of the racial and gendered other will not
change. Racial erasure and dependence of law as the means of solving the historical
problem of race in the post-racial state “delimits the gap between those represented and
those representing, to efface, diminish or overlay it with representable subjects (through
education and cultural socialization) into political representatives” (Goldberg, State 250251). liv The emphasis on law enables the non-white government to avoid responsibility
for the complex structural changes necessary to transform the condition of the nonwhites.
The ahistoricism of rights-based law is reflected in the cavalier use of history.
History is reduced to a narrative strategy. Lurie claims that in the creation of his
daughter, whose attitude to race is different from his, “history had a larger share”
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(Coetzee Disgrace 61). He tries to explain to Lucy why the gang of Black men raped her
by pointing out that “it is history working through them, a history of wrong” when
attempting to explain the motivations of her rapists (Coetzee, Disgrace 156). Yet, when
Lucy tells him that being raped was a price she had to pay for her history as a white
Afrikaner, he dismisses it, saying, “I am sure they tell themselves many things. It is in
their interest to make up stories to justify them.” (Coetzee, Disgrace 158). His comment
reduces history to a narrative strategy. The commodification of history turns it into an
empty signifier, there but not there, capable of being used whenever needed by those in
power.
The post-racial milieu, which denies the complex connections between the past
and the present, and enforces a silence on race even as racial practices continue to persist,
splits discourse at the moment of enunciation. The post-racial era forces Lurie, who
identifies with the apartheid, to conceal his racist views, resulting in guilt. Sanders writes
that the novel’s suppression of race and its long history presents “racism … in terms of
the projection and acting out of guilt ridden phantasies of violence” (144). The enforced
“taking up of any one position, within a specific discursive form, in a particular
conjuncture is … the site of fixity and fantasy” that results in stereotypes (Bhabha 77).
The ambivalence produced by the post-racial state is similar to the splitting in colonial
discourse that Homi Bhabha identifies as the source of the creation, enunciation and
perpetuation of stereotypes. In “The Other Question” Bhabha argues that stereotypes are
a result of the colonial economy that seeks to construct the colonial as a “population of
degenerate types on the basis of racial origin in order to justify conquest and to establish
a system of administration and instruction” (70). The goal of the colonial economy is a
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contradictory one, based on display of power and aggressiveness and a desire for
similarity, because the colonial space is a “space of disruption and threat from
heterogeneity of other positions” (Bhabha 77). Confronted with this heterogeneity, the
colonial power was forced to engage in the politics of “recognition and disavowal”
(Bhabha 70) that indicate “the desire for origins which is threatened by differences of
race, sex and class” (Bhabha 75). In short, stereotypes are a ”strategic maneuver,” in the
Foucauldian sense, to avert the threat posed by heterogeneity to the goal of gaining power
by establishing western culture in the colonies. Thus, in colonial situations, both
colonizer and the colonized, are “constructed with an apparatus of power which contains
… a knowledge that is arrested and fetishistic and circulated through colonial discourses
as that limited form of knowledge of otherness … called stereotypes”(Bhabha 77-78).
The “arrested and fixated form of representation” of a stereotype “constitutes a problem
for psychic and social relations”(Bhabha 75).
The arrested representation that marks stereotypes is most dramatic in Lurie’s
response to Petrus, the Black tenant farmer on Lucy’s farm who has become a landlord
after buying some land from her. Petrus is simultaneously “[a] man of patience, energy
and resilience. A peasant, a payasan, a man of the country. A plotter, a schemer and no
doubt a liar too like peasants everywhere. Honest toil and honest cunning” according to
Lurie (Coetzee, Disgrace 117). Later, when Lurie helps Petrus with the plumbing, he
reveals a similar inconsistency: “Petrus is a good work man…it is Petrus himself he has
begun to dislike” (Coetzee, Disgrace 137). In these insights into Lurie’s mind, we
discover that Petrus is an object of both desire and derision. Confronted with a Black
peasant, whose presence defies the conventional representation of Blacks, Lurie seeks to
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dissolve his anxiety by trying to transform Petrus into something familiar. This limited
economy of knowledge within which racist discourses function creates a flat and
menacing representation of Petrus. Stilted representation is also evident in Lurie’s
characterization of Melanie as either a Madonna or a whore. When he first encounters
Melanie, she is a sly siren with an “evasive and perhaps coquettish smile” (Coetzee,
Disgrace 12). After she accuses him of rape Melanie morphs into a helpless girl coerced
by her father, cousin, and boyfriend into charging him. “Melanie would not have taken
such a step by herself … she is too innocent for that, too ignorant of her own power….
They must have talked her into it,” he reasons (Coetzee, Disgrace 39). For a woman who
destroys his life, Melanie remains bafflingly silent. In Lurie’s attempts to construct
Melanie, Melanie the living individual, who can think and act on her own, is foreclosed.
The post-apartheid context of Disgrace maps out the conditions imposed on South
Africa’s racial reconciliation efforts by its post-racial politics. It underscores the fact that
individual acts of racism cannot be dismissed as pathology or deviance from the social
norms, particularly when past racist structures persist in society. The post-racial politics
in post-apartheid South Africa enable us to locate the root of continuing racist practices in
current social polices. By placing Lurie’s actions in the post-racial context it is possible
to see how his racist actions locate him at the intersection of private racist practices and
public rhetoric of racial equality. As a result, Lurie is represented as a far more complex
character than a one dimensional racist Afrikaner. At the same time, the novel does not
excuse Lurie’s private racism as a consequence of social malaise. The narrative’s
ultimate discrediting of Lurie’s perspective ensures that we do not read the role of the
social context as an excuse for the protagonist’s racist practices.
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Stereotypes and Problems of Reparations.
The stereotypical representation of the other that results from guilt, ultimately,
sabotages possibilities of ethical relations because guilt creates “ambiguous and confused
impulses to make good” (Sanders 169). The desire to repair or restore is an act “to undo
in retrospect” (129). Sanders elaborates that reparations are based on a phantasm of a
wholeness that the act of guilt tries to repair. Reparation is, thus, based on a sense of
“phantasized omnipotence,” a belief that one has the power to restore and repair the
object of phantasy (134). Sanders’ analysis of reparations reveals two things. First, he
points out that phantasy serves an “agent of reparation without doing anything for the
object”(133). It signals the limit of responsibility and its “setting to work”(Sanders 133).
In short, reparations motivated by guilt are essentially egoistic: the object remains outside
the egoistical circuit of the self. Second, Sanders indicates that, since reparations involve
phantasy, the task of restoring also involves the act of “making”(Sanders ). lv He therefore
connects reparation to restoration as well as to creative acts. He claims reparation “takes
manifold forms ranging from Coitus to the production of works of art and the intellect”
(Sanders 134-135). In Disgrace Lurie resorts to art as well as restoration to undo past
wrongs
Lurie’s initial guilt about being a bad role model for his daughter escalates when
Lucy is raped by a crowd of Africans while he is visiting her. Overcome with guilt at
being unable to protect Lucy, Lurie confesses, “I did nothing to save you” (Coetzee,
Disgrace 157). In this instance, paternal guilt for failing to protect his child is coupled
with guilt at being complicit in a racist system through his historical position and actions.
His first attempt to alleviate this guilt is to identify with her. However, both Bev and
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Lucy remind him that he was not in the room when Lucy was raped; therefore, he cannot
imagine her experience. Lurie’s failed attempts to identify with Lucy are followed by
attempts to make reparations to her. He makes plans to send her to her relatives in the
Netherlands and even engages Petrus to work as farm manager without Lucy’s consent.
But his solutions do not respect Lucy’s belief that escaping from the farm will be a
defeat. The gap between father and daughter is evident in Lucy’s refusal to report the
rape. He reads her refusal to report the rape and leave South Africa as an attempt to
“humble” herself “before history” to atone for the role of the whites in South Africa’s
racist past (160). In frustration, Lucy points out that his actions make her a “part of the
story” of his life, where he is the “main character” and she is a “minor character” (198).
However, in her life she is “the one who makes the decisions” (198). Lurie seems unable
to go beyond the expectations of him as a white man and a father to address Lucy the
individual.
Lurie’s reading of Lucy as a passive woman, who seeks to atone for the past by
accepting rape as a price for historical wrongs against the Africans, reads her within the
historical expectations defined by racist discourse in South Africa. The portrayal of a
white Afrikaner woman as a passive suffering figure has a history in Afrikaner history,
according to Anne McClintock. In her essay “No Longer a Future Heaven,” McClintock
points out that the concept of Volksmoeder is memorialized in the statue of the
Vrouemonument as homage to the female victims of the war. McClintock observes that
the monument of the Afrikaner woman as suffering mother with a baby in her arms
removes the “militant potential” of Afrikaner women and “enshrines Afrikaner
womanhood …as suffering, stoic and self sacrificing” (McClintock 105). The white
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woman as a “weeping victim of African menace” elides the woman’s own complicity in
racial history and can overlook the “mighty embarrassment of male military defeat”
(McClintock 105). Reading Lucy as a woman who passively sacrifices herself to history
places her in the tradition of the suffering Afrikaner woman and enables Lurie to
overlook his failure to protect her from the non-white rapists. Lucy, however, is hardly
passive. She has followed her dream of farming, and despite being abandoned by her
friends, who fled the country, she stayed on.
Parallels between Lurie’s rape of Melanie and Lucy’s rape reveal complex
interracial connections. The Black rapists display the same indifference towards Lucy,
the object of their lust, as Lurie when he claims that his rape of Melanie was an act of
instinct. When Melanie and Lucy are raped, they are reduced to mere appendages of the
rapists. Describing her rape, Lucy observes that it was “so personal. It was done with so
much personal hatred. … But, why did they hate me so?”(156).Within the generalized
discourse of race in South Africa, Lucy represents the white woman, a symbol of colonial
and apartheid history. Race binds Lucy and her rapists in a sick familiarity that elides the
other as a singular being, beyond racial discourse. Similarly, when Lurie rapes Melanie
he is inadvertently repeating a history where it was acceptable for a white man to
sexually use a non-white woman without her consent. As an object of Lurie’s desire,
Melanie is stripped of her singularity and racial history. Despite his ignorance of its
historical precedence, Lurie’s act is as historically loaded as the African men’s deliberate
rape of Lucy. The parallel between the two rapes reveals the complex racial history of
South Africa, where the end of apartheid does not free the country from the deeper
history of racism, of which the apartheid was an extreme form. Lucy’s question to Lurie--
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“you are a man, you ought to know …when you have sex with someone strange, when
you trap her … put your weight on her… doesn’t it feel like murder?”( Coetzee, Disgrace
156)—makes Lurie realize that “he can if he concentrates … be the men”. (Coetzee,
Disgrace 158).The recognition of the parallel makes him question: “are she and he on the
same side?” (Coetzee, Disgrace 157). In the complex cross currents of race and gender in
South Africa, Lurie has more in common with the racial other than with his own
daughter. Lucy has more on common with Melanie, than with her father.
The inadequacy of guilt-driven reparations is also evident in Lurie’s hilarious
attempt to apologize to Melanie’s parents. This apology has been read as a sign of his
internal transformation. Mike Marais points out that it leads Lurie to sympathize with the
Issacs since, like them, he is now a father whose daughter has been raped. However,
Marais forgets that Lurie visits the Isaacs at George soon after his conversation with Lucy
leads him to recognize the connection between his act of rape and that of Lucy’s rapists.
The egoistical basis of his action is evident from the fact that he arrives at dinner with his
preferred wine when the Issacs are teetotalers. This action belies the sincerity of his
extravagantly staged apology. Since his action is based on guilt and a desire to separate
himself from the rapists, rather than remorse or concern for the Isaac family, his actions
receive lukewarm response. Not surprisingly, his apology doesn’t restore the others, nor
does it cancel his guilt. Therefore, in response to Mr. Isaac’s questions—“what lessons
have we learned? … what are we going to do now that we are sorry”—Lurie says he is
being “punished and punished. …I live in disgrace” (Coetzee, Disgrace 172). To live in
disgrace is to live “like a dog,” without dignity (204). As long as his efforts to reach out
are rooted in the egoistic fears of the other, there is no end to his state of disgrace.
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Lurie’s interpretation the phrase “like a dog”contrasts with his daughter’s take on
it. Lucy’s rape and her sense of insecurity make her seriously contemplate marriage to
Petrus and handing over her land to him in lieu of security. It is a sad end to her dream of
living on the land she loves and making a living from its bounty. Yet, she sees being “like
a dog” with nothing, “No cards, no weapons, no property, no rights, no dignity” as “a
good point to start from again” (Coetzee, Disgrace 205). Lurie and Lucy’s vision
represent two extremes of the dilemma of post-colonialism, which careens between the
risk of a new beginning and the “collapse of civil societies”(Spivak, “Ethics” 22). The
difference between Lurie’s and Lucy’s response to the loss of privileges in the new era
suggests that stereotypes circulating in a particular culture may be enabled by certain
aspects of that culture, but they are, in the end, created by individuals. Individuals, the
novel implies, are not just products of a time and place, but agents operating within a
context. Disgrace highlights the role of the singular subject in enacting and resisting the
potentials of a given space. lvi
The lack of a correspondence between Lurie’s efforts to make good and the
expectation of others doesn’t mean that ethical reparations require the wishes of the
victim and the actions of the perpetrator to match. Lurie’s relation with animals reveals
how reparations can be open to the other despite being rooted in the self. Unlike his
interaction with Lucy or Petrus, where Lurie assumes his actions coincide with their
wishes, he recognizes that saving animals would require tremendous resources that the
nation is unable to spare at present for animal care. Nor is it possible to transform the
human-animal hierarchy that informs the basis of a society where killing animals once
they become too many is humane. So, instead of the “quick-fix frenzy of doing good
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with an implicit assumption of cultural superiority which is legitimized by unexamined
romanticization,” Lurie seeks to ensure that, within the constraints, he is able to provide
the animals with dignity and love (Spivak, Reader 293). Consequently, when Bev inserts
the lethal injection into the dogs, Lurie holds their paws and soothes them so that their
last moments are happy. Even though he doesn’t need to, he goes one step further: he
bags the corpses for the incinerator and, instead of just dropping them off to be dumped
in the incinerator, takes them home, brings them back the next day, and carries them into
the incinerator himself. He makes all this effort because if the corpses are left overnight
rigor mortis sets in and the attendants have to break the bones by beating the corpses so
that they can fit them inside the incinerator. As Lurie puts it, he “may not be their savior,
the one for whom they are not too many, but he is prepared to take care of them once they
are unable. Utterly unable to take care of themselves, once even Bev Shaw has washed
her hands off them” (Coetzee Disgrace 146). His actions ensure that the dead dogs are
treated with the dignity that is denied to them in life. In doing so, Lurie resists the
discursive structures of the human world. His action, however, remains local and
interventionary, rather than revolutionary.
The motivation behind Lurie’s action is narcissistic. He confesses that he takes
care of the corpses because in his world “men do not use shovels to beat corpses into
convenient shape for processing.”(Coetzee, Disgrace146). By locating the motivation for
action in himself Lurie admits his failure to account for the consciousness of the dog and
draws attention to the position of the dog as a being outside human discourses. The dog
here exists as a trace. A trace, according to Spivak, is at once a sign of the position of the
other vis a vis discourses, as well as the threshold to knowledge about the other. A trace
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of the other is more ethical than a full-bodied realistic description of the other if we
consider Spivak’s notion of the subaltern. The other in the extreme sense is the subaltern,
who lies beyond dominant discourses. According to Spivak, “Finding the subaltern is not
so hard, but actually entering into a responsibility structure with the subaltern, … is the
hard part” (Spivak, Reader 293). The subaltern is difficult to represent because his
consciousness is “the place of difference rather than identity” (Spivak, Reader 213).
Since it is “subject to the cathexis of the elite, … it is never fully recoverable, … it is
always askew from its received signifiers, … it is effaced even as it is disclosed, … it is
irreducibly discursive. (Spivak, Reader 212). The real subaltern is always an absence and
recognizing him involves recognizing the subject position retroactively, as an absence.
While I am not suggesting that the racial other is a subaltern, I draw attention to Spivak’s
concept of the subaltern because it helps explain how Lurie’s silence about the other
transcends romantic notions of altruism. By self-reflexively indicating the egoistic basis
of his altruism Lurie draws attention to the dog as a living being, beyond the lop-sided
human-animal discourse.
Lurie’s interaction with the animals is a departure from his reparative efforts with
Melanie and Lucy. His motives for both actions are egoistical: he apologizes to Melanie’s
parents to expatiate his guilt and he physically dumps the dog corpses onto the incinerator
because he believes even dead dogs should be respected. The difference is that, in the
first instance he assumes that his acts to make good coincides with Melanie’s parents’
expectation of him. That is, he does not acknowledge that there is a gap between himself
and Melanie or Lucy. With the dogs, however, he remains pointedly conscious that his
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views have nothing to do with what the dog wants. In acknowledging this difference he
marks the position of the dog, a spectral presence, beyond anthropocentric values.
The aesthetic possibilities offered by representing the other as an absent presence
is outlined in the secondary narrative that centers around Lurie’s efforts to compose an
opera about Lord Byron and his last great love affair. To escape from his sense of failure
as a father Lurie focuses on his opera about Byron and his last mistress, the Italian
Countess Teresa Guicolli. When his car, with the research material on Byron in the trunk,
is stolen he is forced to imagine Byron and Teresa, based on the letters exchanged
between the couple, Byron’s letters to his friends in England and numerous Byron
biographies. The recognition of the complex connection between him and Lucy’s rapists
compounded by the disappearance of his materials on Byron transform the opera about
Byron and his last love into an opera about the act of imagining the other. Lurie
represents Teresa and Byron at a point where they disappear from history. His Teresa is a
middle aged widow, looking after her aged parent; Byron is dead. Teresa’s efforts to
imaginatively reach out to the dead Byron parallels Lurie’s attempts to capture the
historical Teresa, hidden in the cracks of patriarchal representations of her as an amorous
coquettish adulteress. His intimation of Teresa is faint and vague, rather than full-bodied;
just as her intimation of Byron is faint. The attempt to imagine Byron to life is futile
because Byron remains beyond the human realm, just as Lurie’s attempt to represent
Teresa is doomed because imagination and language can only represent the shadow of the
actual person. The failure to capture the embodied other through imagination is
symbolized by Byron’s daughter Allegra’s futile cry for her neglectful and dead father.
Byron’s ghost cannot answer her call because Byron is dead. Byron’s resistance to
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Allegra’s call and Teresa’s imperfect attempts to reach Byron reveal that the other
remains resistant to discourses. The opera thus enacts a failure of imagination. This
failure is not an indictment of Lurie’s imaginative abilities; it reveals the disjunction
between the other as an embedded and heterogeneous presence in time and the other as
representation in art. lvii
The metatextual implications of a novel staging Lurie’s opera about
imagination’s limits to envisioning the other, through the trope of a woman trying
unsuccessfully to give voice to the dead lover, indicates that ethical representation of the
other is possible. The opera, which draws attention to itself as an imaginative
representation of Teresa, does not claim the authenticity that is attached to the historical
documentation of Teresa. By presenting itself as artifice, the opera draws attention to the
absence of the real Teresa and points to her as a presence beyond language. The opera
thus demonstrates Attridge’s observation that the act of inventive writing involves an
encounter with the other that challenges the writer’s world view and, by extension, the
prevalent discourses through which the world is expressed. lviii It demands that the writer
manipulate existing discursive codes to express the singularity of an experience. Thus,
Lurie’s opera, which began as a traditional opera involving lush music and a young
Byron and Teresa, in the end becomes a very streamlined text about a middle-aged
woman and a ghost against the monotone of a banjo. The secondary narrative thread
indicates that the central issue for an ethical representation of the other in art
encompasses being open to the singular presence of the other, rather than realism. If the
other remains resistant to appropriation by discourses, no representation, however
realistic, can capture its embedded complex being.
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The transformation in Lurie’s creative vision and his newfound empathy for
animals has been read as an indication of his transformation. Sanders claims that the
novel suggests that we can relate to the other outside language, in the wordless medium
of music. He consequently reads Lurie’s ability to envision the gendered other in the
subplots as an indication of his ability to envision the other. While I agree that the novel
questions the ability of language to read the other, I do not think that moving from the
linguistic medium to another medium of representation, music in this case, allows for a
better representation of and interaction with the other. In fact, Lurie’s opera shows how
representation is incapable of capturing the other. It is also presumptive to read Lurie’s
attitude towards animals and his opera as signs of his transformation. If we compare the
events in the last chapter of the novel we realize that Lurie’s awareness of the limits of
representation in art do not translate into an ethical relation with the racial other.
In the final section of the novel, Lurie decides to sell his apartment in the city and
move into the country. Soon after he moves to Grahamstown, Lurie hears that the boy
accompanying the rapists is staying with Petrus, next to Lucy’s property. When he learns
that the boy’s name is Pollux, he remarks sarcastically, “Not Mncedisi? Not
Nqabayakhe? Nothing unpronounceable, just Pollux!” (200). He calls Pollux “a jackal…
mentally deficient. Morally deficient” (208). The connection between mental and moral
deficiency echoes the colonial racist terms for Africans. His animosity towards Petrus
and Pollux leads him to physically attack Pollux when he catches him peeping into
Lucy’s room. This section is followed by the final episode in the novel, where Lurie
gives up his favorite dog in the shelter to be euthanized. This juxtaposition of his
treatment of the Pollux with his treatment of the animals creates a glaring contrast,
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suggesting that Lurie is unable to extend his compassion for animals to his non-white
countrymen. The diegetic gap between the main narrative and the secondary narrative
testifies to the gap created by racist history and denies a transformative or prescriptive
role to art. lix
Irony as Mode of Representation, Representation as Irony
Coetzee’s exploration of the post-apartheid situation in Disgrace reveals that the
novel’s post-racial politics enables stereotypes, impairs reparation, and, ultimately,
results in a ridiculous situation where the protagonist can empathize with a dead dog, but
is unable to show compassion for a living African man. The consequent narrative gap
poses a problem because it identifies Lurie as a static character. The narrative focalization
on a static racist character, at a time when the nation is trying to move beyond apartheid,
gives the impression that the novel endorses Lurie’s stereotypical representation of the
other. lx However, the association of stereotypes with a particular context and
consciousness—Lurie in post-racial South Africa— and framing of Lurie through the
optics of irony ensure that the novel is open to the “utterance of the other” (Sanders 148).
The manipulation of narrative perspective is more effective in disrupting the circulation
of stereotypes than positive images of the other because the problem with stereotypes is
“not so much the bald concern with the racial reference and invocation, but the purpose to
which race is invoked” (Goldberg, State 244). The novel’s narrative strategy challenges
the reader to move beyond identification of racial references and focus on the
complicated mode of representation at work. The indirect and often ambiguous address of
irony in the novel is a response to and a demonstration of the deceptive and entangled
terrain of racial relations in the post-apartheid context.
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The almost relentless narrative focalization on Lurie counterintuitively locates the
stereotypes in the novel in a particular context and consciousness. Lurie as the focalizer
and his relation to the post-racial context reveals that the stereotypes in the novel are “not
the setting up of a false image which becomes the scapegoat of discriminatory
practices”(Bhabha 81). Instead, they are a “much more ambivalent text of projection,
introjection, metaphoric and metonymic strategies, displacement and determination,
guilty aggressivity, the masking and splitting of ‘official’ and phantasmic knowledge to
construct the positionalities and oppositionalitites of racist discourse” (Bhabha 81-82).
Therefore, to judge a stereotype on the basis of prior political normativity is to “dismiss
it, not to displace it” (Bhabha 67). Coetzee’s location of stereotypes in Lurie’s mind
effectively exposes how post-racial politics breed and keep stereotypes in circulation in
the post-apartheid context.
The identification of post-apartheid politics and post-racial ideologies as the
source of stereotypes in the novel goes against the conventional wisdom of tackling
negative stereotypes through substitution. Apart from the fact that the postmodern subject
is interpellated by multiple, internally discontinuous discourses, and therefore exceeds
representation, the substitution method is ineffectual because it does not move beyond the
discursive paradigms governing production and circulation of stereotypes. Goldberg
analyzes three distinct elements of stereotypes: (1) the “objects to which the discursive
representations refer;” (2) “the styles of reference to be found in figures of speech, and
metaphors as well as in categories and expression;” and (3) “the underlying …
preconceptual plane or set of primitives”(Goldberg, Culture 46). Changing stereotypes
only changes the expression and brings about a change in the terms, rather than in the
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foundational principles. Moreover, replacing a negative stereotype with its positive
substitute raises ethical questions. It presumes an identification with and knowledge of
the other that negates differences between the self and the other. The act of replacing a
stereotype with a positive one also “assumes that the other is homogenous and unable to
speak for himself” (Spivak, Critique 256). In addition, it raises the danger of imposing
one’s own voice on the other. Representing the other in such instances becomes an act of
appropriation. The possibilities of representation across racial lines become limited and
community is unimaginable if we turn the other into the self. If literature cannot imagine
the possibility of a community in which differences in identity and history are respected,
then, chances of historical representation along political lines become remote. Without
the ability to recognize the singularity of the other, or identify others outside ourselves
advocacy cannot take place. To disable stereotypes literature needs to expose the politics
that enable racist stereotypes in particular historical moments.
Coetzee’s strategy of disabling stereotypes by using Lurie as focalizer enables
him to reveal the effects of post-racial discourse on individuals. By looking beyond the
representative surface and into the underlying premises of stereotypes Coetzee presents
stereotypes as symptoms of deeper social problems. His strategy is a literary
demonstration of Homi Bhabha’s suggestion that in disabling stereotypes the “point of
intervention should shift from the ready recognition of images as positive and negative to
an understanding of the processes of subjectification made possible and plausible through
stereotypical discourses” so that one can engage “with its effectivity, with the repertoire
of power and resistance, domination and dependence that constructs colonial
identification subject” (Bhabha 67). Instead of asking if a stereotype is positive or

100
negative, Bhabha suggests that the question be about “the mode of representation of
otherness” (Bhabha 68). By emphasizing the politics behind stereotypes, instead of their
truth value, Bhabha’s strategy breaks the signifying chain that keeps stereotypes alive to
offer an alternative mode of representation.
Since the narrative focalization on Lurie raises questions about the novel’s values,
Coetzee dissociates the novel from Lurie’s perspective by framing it with a third-person
narrator. The difference between Lurie and the narrator is made explicit from the first
sentence, where we are informed that “For a man of his age, fifty two, divorced, he has to
his mind solved the problem of sex rather well” (Coetzee, Disgrace 1). The phrase “to his
mind” indicates the disjunction between Lurie’s perception and reality and that between
the narrator and Lurie. This free indirect discourse makes it clear that later sentences like
“To some degree he believes his affection is reciprocated” reveal Lurie’s perspective,
rather than the actual state of affairs (Coetzee, Disgrace 2). Lurie’s unreliability as a
narrator is manifest in the diminished role of the father figure. As a father he is unable to
understand his daughter and her goals. He also fails to protect her from being raped.
Lucy’s refusal to file a police report after being raped brings their estrangement to a head,
resulting in Lucy asking him to stop “being a father.” His place is supplanted by other
protector figures in Lucy’s life, like Bev and her husband Dave, Ettinger and Petrus. The
failure to be a father is repeated in his failure as a father-surrogate in the novel. Like a
father he renames Melanie, “Melani: the dark one,” yet he violates his role as her teacher
and protector by raping her (Coetzee, Disgrace 18). lxi
While the narrator discredits Lurie, his views are never grounded in concrete
assertions or positions that qualify Lurie by providing a counter meaning. Marais points
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out that our awareness of Lucy does not arise from more information about Lucy as much
as our awareness of Lurie’s inconsistencies. He notes that we do not know if Petrus is
really devious because he is presented through Lurie’s eyes. The narrator does not tell us
what Petrus is either. Petrus exists between Lurie’s racist stereotypes and the narrator’s
implicit criticism of Lurie. Without an authoritative narrator Lucy or Petrus cannot
become concrete presences that provide a counter-perspective to Lurie: they exist in
between the said and the unsaid, their meaning endlessly deferred. The absence of
concrete representations of both these characters underlines the distance between Coetzee
and the other. In the process, it pays homage to the history behind that distance.
Coetzee’s refusal to represent the racial and gendered others is a deliberate strategy that
draws attention to the novel as a representation of the other, rather than a “representation”. lxii
Discrepancy between the third person narrator and Lurie creates a structural irony
because it informs the reader of the true state of affairs, while Lurie remains ignorant.
The entente between the narrator and reader that can arise out of this conceit is, however,
nicked because the dual poles of the irony are not resolved. The reader is, thus, left
without a clear idea of the other, who remains a spectral presence framed between Lurie’s
racist perspective and the narrator’s implied knowledge. By leading the reader to the
brink of knowledge about the other, only to deny that possibility, the novel confronts the
reader with the threshold to understanding the other, the ridiculous situation, created by a
messy and complex history, where reconciliation involves interacting with the other with
a haunting awareness of difference. In short, the novel’s irony does not resolve the
divided poles of the narrative through rhetoric; instead, it reveals a “higher actuality”
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(Kierkegaard 323). Irony in the novel emphasizes representation as an experience of the
impossible, split between the said and the unsaid, between the positive and negative, a
presence and an absence, an absent presence. As a consequence, reconciliation is
fractured and doubled between connection and difference, an act of bonding and a failure
of identification.
In the novel irony is more complex than rhetorical legerdemain. The novel’s
structural irony points to deeper paradoxes in the post-apartheid context. Irony in the
novel therefore refers to an existential condition. Such irony, where the dualities of irony
don’t synchronize—so that the twin perspectives aren’t merely juxtaposed, but are in a
relation of antagonism, or at the very least disharmony—is described as “irony of irony”
by Friedrich Schelegel and “‘irony sense eminentiori’” by Soren Kierkegaard (254). lxiii
Both philosophers refer to this irony as a philosophical “position,” rather than a mode of
expression. Philosophical irony or second order irony locates the instability of meaning in
the gap between the finite and infinite, according to Schlegel, and is a result of the
difference between phenomenon and essence, according to Kierkegaard. As a result, this
irony is not directed “against this or that entity but against the entire given actuality at a
given time and under certain conditions” (Kierkegaard 254). Kierkegaard therefore
claims that philosophical irony is “not the truth but the way” to truth (327). lxiv Since
higher order irony does not create a new entity, but only reveals what is already present,
Kierkegaard describes irony “as the negative” and Jahan Ramazani calls it “subtractive”
(104). The goal of secondary irony is different from rhetorical irony, which engages in
“hiding what is actually the case; not however, in order to deceive, but to achieve special
rhetorical or artistic effects” (Abrams 142). The existential negativity associated with

103
philosophical irony results in an infinite regress into greater ironies in a text. The
consequent textual anarchy made Schlegel exclaim in despair, “What gods will be able to
rescue us from all these ironies?” (369). Instead of looking to the divine for an answer,
Kierkegaard locates the answer in the text. He points out that, since irony is
“omnipresent” in a poem, “the irony visible in the poem is in turn ironically controlled”
(Kierkegaard 324). Kierkegaard’s observations suggest that philosophical irony is selfreferential and doubles on itself to cancel its negativity.
In Disgrace irony appears to present post-apartheid South Africa as a dark world,
with little scope for congenial inter-racial relations. This pessimistic picture is, however,
reversed by the similarities between Coetzee’s narrative strategy and Lurie’s
representation strategy in the secondary narratives. As a strategy, Coetzee’s refusal to
provide a concrete counterpoint to Lurie resembles Lurie’s own nuanced representation
of Teresa and the dogs. Coetzee’s deliberate refusal to depict the other ironically registers
the other as an embodied being outside discourses. Lurie may be unable to bring that
insight in his interaction with Petrus, but by recuperating that same strategy for the
representation of the other in the novel Coetzee establishes his mastery over the novel’s
protagonist. Coetzee’s use of the third person narrator thus decenters Lurie’s point of
view to identify him as a function of the novel’s deceptively realistic narrative strategy.
Coetzee’s recovery of Lurie’s representation strategy from the secondary
narrative to represent Petrus and Lucy in the main narrative provides a model for
advocacy that is fastidiously aware of the limits of a white male author’s subject
position. lxv At the same time, Lurie’s inability to offer a nuanced representation of Petrus
and Coetzee’s use of the third person narrator to discredit Lurie forecloses equating Lurie
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with Coetzee. Irony in the novel thus doubles back on itself to reveal a “textual agency
capable at once of reflecting on and dictating the terms in which it is read” (Roy 121). lxvi
By being alert to the rhetorical cues we find that the novel performs a different story from
the one it professes. Disgrace professes that racial discourses make relation with the
other impossible; it performs the grounding of the ethical in reading and writing to make
a limited relation possible. The novel’s silence on Lucy and Petrus, the focus on a racist
Afrikaner, and the gap between the two narrative threads are, in the end, part of its
rhetorical web, rather than a narrative failing.
The ability of higher irony to rescind its own negative energy and reassert
authorial control is only possible with a skilled ironist. This ironic control, according to
Kierkegaard, “yields truth, actuality and content,” and can be seen in the works of
Shakespeare and Goethe (Kierkegaard 326). Skillfully used, second order irony enables
the author to direct the reader and protect his text from being appropriated to fit the
reader’s expectation. But the author’s textual control doesn’t imply superiority outside
the ironic field. Kierkegaard points out that “just because a poet manages to be master
over the irony at the time of writing” does not mean that “he is master over it in the
actuality to which he himself belongs” (324). Instead, it suggests that the author’s control
over the irony in a text is a contrast to his lack of control over the existential and
historical context he writes about. He is thus “related ironically to what he writes”
(Kierkegaard 324). The fact that the author is embedded in the context he exposes offers
the scope for “complicitious critique” that “works from within a power field but still
contests it”(Hutcheon, Downspout 154). This is significant for the white writer in South
Africa because s/he is complicit in the racist politics and cannot, by virtue of that history,
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understand the racial other. By this statement I do not imply that there was no common
history between the whites and the non-whites in South Africa. The irony of South
Africa’s history is that racial discrimination ensures that history was experienced
differently by the different groups. This differential experience of a common history
makes identification with the other impossible. Coetzee’s refusal to present concrete
images of the other mocks at the ironist’s power, even as it signals his complicity in
South Africa’s history.
Disgrace creates an intensely affective experience that repeatedly frustrates
readers’ expectations to dramatize the limits of discursive paradigms in representing the
other. The novel thus engages in the “staging of referentiality” to draw attention to itself
“as event” (Attridge ,Singularity 96). As an event, Spivak points out, “literary reading
teaches us how to play the game,” whereas other discourses “describe the game” (Spivak,
“Ethics” 22). Literature as an event creates an “experience of the discontinuities that
remain in place in ‘real life’”(Spivak, “Ethics” 18). However, Spivak cautions that as “an
event literature is —an ‘indeterminate sharing’ between writer and reader, where the
effort of reading is to taste the impossible status of being figured as an object in the web
of the other. Reading in this special sense is sacred”(Spivak, “Ethics” 18). The active
process of engaging with the form of the text makes the reader participate in the writer’s
act of resisting the conventions to represent his intimations of the other. Thus, through the
experience of literature, the reader enters into the singularity of a text and is “constituted
as a subject by the event of the performance” (Attridge Singularity 98). Attridge’s and
Spivak’s emphasis on the active connection between meaning and reading assigns a
transformative power to literature.
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Literature’s ability to transform the reader through reading is tested by irony as a
narrative device. Irony’s ability to travel incognito makes its detection a power play
between the author and his audience. Linda Hutcheon, however, denies such power play
at work in postmodern irony because she claims irony does not bring a community into
being as much as its existence signals the presence of a community of likeminded
people. lxvii Her notion is based on the postmodern notion of the subject as a
heterogeneous entity, a particular inflection of discourses, circulating in a particular
culture, rather than a “free floating signifier.” According to Hutcheon, the inability to
detect irony therefore does not indicate the reader’s naiveté as much as a different
ideological leaning. By the same token, being able to read irony doesn’t indicate
intelligence as much as shared discourses between the reader and the author. The ability
to read the linguistic and rhetorical codes of Disgrace makes one participate in the
novel’s resistance to post-racial conceptions of reconciliation in South Africa. Failure to
read the rhetorical codes reveals the reader’s allegiance to other discourses. The fact that
the novel won international awards for non-literary reasons reveals the expectations of
those award committees from literature. Similarly, the ANC’s criticism of the novel
because of the presence of African stereotypes reveals its allegiance to post-racial
agenda.
While irony in Disgrace helps identify a preexisting community, it also tests
Hutcheon’s notion of postmodern irony because it does not eliminate power play between
the reader and the author completely. In the novel irony is multidimensional. It is both a
structural device as well as an existential condition. It is double edged because it is
critical of the apartheid as well as the post-racial post-apartheid discourses. In the novel
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“irony’s edge,” as Hutcheon puts it, cuts both ways all the time. The novel makes a subtle
political stand by using presenting Lurie through the lenses of irony. By identifying its
protagonist as racist and dissociating the novel’s ethos from the protagonist Disgrace
criticizes post-racial values. Readers who are unable to decipher the complex levels of
irony align themselves with the post-racial discourses the novel criticizes. It may not
indicate their naiveté, but they are, nevertheless, the target of irony’s edge.
Coetzee’s identification of the text’s irony with its context ridicules the
expectation that literature can provide an easy answer to complex historical situations.
This is not to say that literature is apolitical. Irony may not resolve the narrative gaps;
nevertheless, it offers restrained hope. By this I mean that it does not encourage false
optimism by claiming that the rhetorical resolution of the ambiguities of irony in a text
resolves the complexity of its context. This may not allow for ebullient optimism, but the
sobering enlightenment clears space for a realistic appraisal of the situation. Kierkegaard
aptly explains that through irony “we are not uplifted by the destruction of the great but
are reconciled to its destruction by the victory of what is true”(322). In Disgrace irony
creates a nuanced awareness of the impasses of interracial relations in South Africa. This
realistic appraisal of the post-apartheid situation does not deny possibilities of
reconciliation; instead, it envisions a more ethical inter-racial cordiality—one that
accounts for the deep history and opens discourses to the other. Coetzee’s deft use of
secondary irony implies that literature functions in complex political situations by
making us more aware of ground realities.
********************
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Coetzee’s ethical representation of the other, which underscores the impossibility
of capturing the other through language deliberately fractures the realistic surface of the
novel. His refusal to close the structural irony reveals the paradoxes of racial relations in
contemporary South Africa and draws attention to the fact that rhetorical irony cannot
resolve historical schisms. By representing the other as an absent presence and by
refusing to close the novel’s structural irony Coetzee uses realism and irony discursively.
By describing Coetzee’s use of irony and realism as discursive I mean that he shows that
realism is one among many existing discourses. This ambiguity indicates Coetzee’s
complicity in the context he ironizes. In Disgrace Coetzee thus acknowledges that
literature, particularly literature written by a white author, cannot solve racial hostility
through a realistic portrayal of non-whites. In order to reverse the racial discursive order
that perpetuates misrepresentation of non-whites, white authors need to adopt more
complex strategies. Disgrace implies that while literature does not offer simple solutions
that can be translated into legislative policies, it does, however, draw attention to the
problems of its milieu, question prevalent codes and expectations of its times, and expose
the existential contradictions that are the groundwork of interpersonal relations in any
context. In doing so, Disgrace redefines advocacy as a way of acknowledging the
singularity of the other that respects the distance between the self and the other. In
literature, this kind of advocacy often means acknowledging the failure to represent the
other and highlighting the absence of the historical other in a text. However, literature’s
advocacy tends to be surreptitious and precarious, without any guarantee of repercussions
in the public sphere. In short, literature provides scope for individual intervention in the
discourse. Disgrace draws attention to the importance of reading in understanding the
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relation between the self and the other and the self and history. Acknowledgement of the
limitations of a relationship with the other is the ground of the interaction, rather than the
beginning or end of reconciliation.
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Chapter 3
Making Friends with Ghosts: Magic Realism and the Demands
of History in Andre Brink’s Post-Apartheid Novels
The TRC’s hearings and J.M. Coetzee’s Disgrace reiterate, in their different
ways, the critical role of history in reconciliation. While Coetzee’s analysis of the effects
of post-racial politics in Disgrace warns us of the consequences of forgetting the past, the
TRC hearings remind us that history is a polyphonous discourse. Counter-histories,
which began trickling into South Africa with the lifting of state censorship, in the dying
years of the regime, became a veritable flood in the early post-apartheid years because of
the TRC hearings. These counter-histories challenge the apartheid version of history. The
common theme among these widely divergent representations of apartheid are recurring
patterns of violence across the racial divide as white and black violence was mirrored by
black-on-black violence, white-on-white violence, and gendered violence. These multiple
accounts of the past that surfaced after the end of apartheid raise questions about the
representation of the past. How does one represent the past as a panoply of perspectives,
some of which are radically opposed to each other? What is the responsibility of those
who are witness to these alternate histories? The answers to these questions are crucial
because in order to create a realistic vision of the future it is important to create a
reasonably sound map to the present.
Emergence of suppressed histories creates the temptation to either fill the gaps in
dominant history with the counter-histories, or privilege counter histories as the new
authentic history. Substituting dominant history with counter-histories has been described
by Keith Jenkins as a move from history in the upper case to history in the lower

111
case. lxviii Both tendencies repeat the totalizing desire of white historiography. In order to
revise history it is necessary to move beyond dominant white historiography and the
concomitant temptation to create a black historiography. Instead of regarding counter
perspectives as corrective of existing history, it is necessary to see history as a
synchronous and complex web of narratives. The best way to map this synchronicity is to
relinquish the desire to fill in the gaps of official history. In essence, it means recognizing
the different versions of history as narratives that arise from the demands of specific
contexts.
One way to escape the totalizing gestures of apartheid history and its counter
histories is to move beyond the desire to find a true essence of the past in historical
records. It means reading history as a text, instead of a mirror to the past. This movement
has been described by Jenkins as a movement from narrative history to postmodern
history. The way to bypass the fallacies of authenticity is to “ideologize” attempts to
reconstruct “the past on its own terms” and engage in postmodern critiques of history in
the lowercase and history in the uppercase” (Jenkins 13). lxix The difference between the
two histories is that one considers language to be a transparent medium for facts, while
the latter considers language to be an opaque medium marked by the discursive position
of the historian. The premises of postmodern historiography make it similar to fiction. lxx
In this chapter, I examine the way Andre Brink, the Afrikaner anti-apartheid activist and
novelist, has grappled with the connection between fiction and history in his novels. He
regards language as the common point and the point of departure between the two
discourses. He observes that since all “human experiences are embodied through
language,” it is the point where “story and history meet and mingle, where private
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experience (expressed in language) intersects the public, the social or the political (also
expressed in language)” (Brink, Reinventing 142). Brink’s observation implies that by
presenting primary experience, whether it is personal experience or public experience,
through language, experience is turned into narrative. In short history needs to be a
reflexive and recognizes itself as one among many ways of representing the past.
Brink’s preference for the self-reflexive nature of narrative makes him prefer
literature to other means of recording the past. He thus observes that the “TRC is intent
on effecting reconciliation through establishing … the whole truth … truth being equated
with facts,” while fiction “reaches well beyond facts” (Brink, Stories 30). Fiction,
according to Brink, “is concerned with the real, it presumes a process through which the
real is not merely represented but imagined. What is aimed at is not a reproduction but an
imagining” (Stories 30). Brink’s observation ties in with his belief that a “literary text is
a reinvention” (Mapmakers, 143). Thus Brink warns that “unless the enquiries of the
TRC are extended, complicated and intensified in the imaginings of literature society
cannot sufficiently come to terms with the past to face the future (Brink, “Stories” 30),
because “without the attempt to grasp, with creative imagination, the past and its
silences, South African society as a whole may get bogged down in mere immaterialities,
sterile rationalizations and the narrow mechanisms of retributions and amnesty” (Brink,
Interrogating 25). Brink’s focus on literature as an imagining of the creation of history
draws attention to the need to understand the conditions that give impetus to certain
versions of the past, rather than on the factual merits of the events described.
One of the modes that emerged to express the complex racial terrain of postapartheid South Africa is magic realism. In Brink’s post-apartheid novels we find a shift
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from the desire to recover the past to a desire to explore the discursive basis of different
historical perspectives.
Brink uses magic realism in his post-apartheid novels to dramatize history as a process of
reinventing of the past to suit present historical exigencies. Magic realism, which
juxtaposes realist and supernatural elements side by side, without privileging either,
enables Brink to present competing version of historical events: official history and
unofficial versions in the form of myths and stories. The juxtaposition of two seemingly
incompatible systems of representation locates truth in the tension between language and
silence. The fantastic stories circulating in the underbelly of official discourses disrupt
the monolithic official history to expose it as an invention that perpetuates the myth of a
pure white Christian identity threatened by interracial relations. In Brink’s post-apartheid
novels magic realism demonstrates the epistemological problems of seeking to connect to
the nation through counter-narratives. In the process of witnessing the imagination of
history the protagonists of the three novels I examine in this chapter—Kristien Muller in
Imaginings of Sand, Flip Lochner in Devil’s Valley and Ruben Oliver in Rights of Desire-have to forego their obsession with factual veracity in order to intuit the significance of
the stories: the opacity of language and inability of history to capture the authentic past.
Brink’s magic realism accomplishes two things: it draws attention to history as a
linguistic construct, rather than a mirror to facts; second, it collapses differences in time
and space to map the evolution of racial identities in South Africa as fractal patterns.
Viewing racial history as fractal underscores the reiteration of racist patterns in the postapartheid era. This chaotic map of Afrikaner history makes complex demands on the
individual confronted with this history and nixes dreams of easy redress.
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My position challenges previous analyses of Brink’s magic realism as an attempt
to set up an alternate cultural system. Brink has come under the critical scanner because
his use of the trope of miscegenation and haunting to challenge the apartheid discourse on
Afrikaner history, ultimately, represents racial reconciliation as a matter of unearthing the
atavistic roots connecting the Afrikaner with Africa. lxxi This, critics point out,
conveniently glosses over the violent aspects of settler colonialism and indigenous land
right claims. Dismissing the novels because of their allegiance to counterhistories,
however, misses the fact that Brink doesn’t establish a particular counter history. Instead
he focuses on the emergence of certain versions of the past at particular historical epochs.
The novels narrate the imagination of the past in historical accounts to suggest that
history is a process of defining and redefining identity (national and individual) under
different circumstances.
I use chaos theory to read Brink’s magic realist novels because they represent race
as a dynamic and fluid system that is a consequence and cause of complex social
processes. Race thus resembles chaotic, rather than linear, conceptions of history. Chaotic
systems are dynamical systems whose present states completely or almost completely
determine their future, but do not appear to do so (Lorenz 8). Since chaotic systems are a
kind of “dynamical system whose state changes over time. Systems such as these are
multi-faceted, complex, and interdependent, they constantly push and pull against
themselves to create sensuous irregularity and unpredictability that is a sign of our
physical environment”(Briggs 15). As a dynamical system, chaos is not characterized by
absence of information, but a glut of information. Consequently, the slightest change in
one factor can transform the entire system. According to Briggs, this includes “even our
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attempts to gather the information itself” (16). Objects in this dynamic system are defined
by sensitivity to initial conditions. Sensitivity to initial conditions means that the system
is not dependant on the conditions at the beginning, but the conditions at any point of
time. Because chaotic systems are dynamic, they are subject to feedback or information
that loops back into it. The folding and refolding of feedback magnifies changes and
results in convulsions. Unlike linear systems, which are progressive, incremental and,
therefore, predictable, chaotic system are fractal and volatile. Fractals map the way
“images fold and unfold, feeding back into themselves” (23). Fractals thus measure the
irregular contours of chaotic systems. Therefore fractals have been used to measure
weather, clouds and stock markets. According to John Ernest, chaos theory “offers a
useful approach to cultural processes that follow general patterns without leading to
absolute and unchanging results” (Ernest 63). Chaos theory helps us map the complex
social terrain created by race, an unpredictable system that infiltrates other discourses,
even as it is a product of the interaction of multiple discourses. Chaos as a metaphor for
race presents reconciliation as a process of setting up a counter-discourse of racial
interaction, rather than transcending race.
Representing the complexity of race and the intricate and entangled social world it
engenders requires a more sophisticated representation strategy than realistic narrative.
According to Brink such an opportunity is provided by literature, which is reflexive and
can indicate the processes involved in the creation of each perspective. In Brink’s fiction
there is a shift from desire to present the other side or history with a small “h,” as Jenkins
puts it, to mapping the processes involved in the creation of different histories. This shift
coincides with political change so that in the post-apartheid novels he becomes involved
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in mapping the complex social terrain created by South Africa’s racial history. Magic
realism, particularly epistemic magic realism, offers him the medium to map the chaotic
currents of race.
Magic Realism and Andre Brink
Magic realism as a narrative mode is effective not just in presenting the
polyvalent and synchronous discourse of history, but also in drawing attention to the
epistemological politics involved in representing the real. The possibilities of
epistemological critique inherent in a mode that marries the antipodal qualities of realism
and fantasy lie in the deep history of magic realism. Magic realism as a narrative mode is
associated with Latin America. Its origins, however, go back much farther to Europe,
where Novalis, or Frederich von Hardenberg as he was known, first used the word in a
cryptic diary entry. Novalis came up with two words: magical idealist and magical realist.
But he didn’t elaborate on the latter term at all. lxxii The term magic realism was next used
by Francis Roh in reference to post-expressionist art in the Weimar Republic. For Roh
magic realism was a characteristic of art which had moved beyond the 1920s
expressionist emphasis on subjectivity to focus on the ordinary. Roh’s definition of magic
realism veers away from the fantastic or marvelous to present the mystery inherent in
reality. lxxiii Roh’s definition differs from the way magic is understood in literature. In
literature magic refers to the irrational, fantastic or the supernatural. lxxiv
Because of its long and much traveled history, and the different contexts in which
it has been used, it is hard to come up with a stable definition of magic realism. It has
often been associated with marvelous literature and fantastic literature. In the attempt to
differentiate the mode from marvelous and fantastic literature, most theorists agree that
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magic realism involves the simultaneous coexistence of magical and realistic modes,
without any mode being privileged. Maggie Ann Bowers writes that it relies upon a
“matter of fact, realist tone … when presenting magical happenings” (34). She further
explains that magic realism fuses the “two opposing aspects of the oxymoron (the
magical and the realist) together to form one perspective” (Bowers 34). In their
introduction to an anthology on magic realism, Wendy Farris and Lois Parkinson-Zamora
observe that “in the magical realist texts … the supernatural is not a simple or obvious
matter but it is an ordinary matter, an everyday occurrence—admitted, accepted and
integrated into the rationality and materiality of literary realism.” (3). Christopher
Warnes says it is a “mode of narration that naturalizes or normalizes the supernatural…
the real and fantastic, natural and supernatural are coherently represented in a state of
equivalence” (3). The juxtaposition of two radically different systems in a single text has
been used to achieve two very different goals at different times in its history.
While theorists agree that the intrusion of the fantastic in the ordinary without
privileging either has a corrective function, they are split on how magic realism corrects
the past. Zamora and Parkinson write, “it creates the space for interactions of diversity”
(3) by drawing upon “cultural systems that are no less ‘real’ than those upon which
traditional literary realism draws—often non-Western cultural systems which privilege
mystery over empiricism, empathy over technology and tradition over innovation” (3).
For Bowers, “its attack on dominant culture and its authoritarian version of the truth
actually provides a more comprehensive mode or referentiality” (71). The first position
perceives magic realism as creating space for previously silenced cultures. The latter
position hints at epistemological critique. The first is identified with Alejo Carpentier and
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his association of the mode with the “baroque” American landscape. Carpentier aligns the
intrusion of magical elements as a signifier of other modes of apprehending reality. The
second mode is identified with Borges, who uses magic realism as a mode of
defamiliarization that presents all representations as ideologically located. lxxv Despite
differing on the mode of correction, both positions acknowledge magic realism’s power
to deepen the idea of realism by challenging the Western Enlightenment rationality that
gave rise to realism.
The controversy deepens further as these two goals of magic realism are
geographically politicized. For example, Durix claims that the magical realism that uses
magical elements as a signifier of another culture is associated with postcolonial cultures,
while magic realism as a mode of epistemological critique is associated with European
magic realism. Jean Weinberger claims that there are two types of magic realism, “a
scholarly type that constructs a speculative universe and is the province of the
Europeans” and a “mythic or folkloric type mainly found in South America” (qtd in
Farris165). Durix claims that in European literature the fantastic “serves to protest against
the tyranny of ‘fact’,” while in postcolonial literatures it has a “social function” (81). He
goes on to claim that in Africa a “return to the world of ancient deities and heroes does
not constitute a reversal of codes; it is an attempt to reclaim alternative rules which may
complement those in use in present times” (81). For Durix magic realism in the
postcolonial context serves to incorporate “old values in the modern man’s perception”
(81). Farris and Zamora echo Durix in their claim that it helps “reestablish contact with
traditions temporarily eclipsed by mimetic constraints of 19th and 20th century realism”
(2). The claim that the anthropological and ethnographic function of magical realism is
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associated with postcolonial nations and that its ability for discursive and epistemological
critique is associated with post-structuralism in Europe replays the binary its form denies.
Such clear divisions are not supported by historical evidence. Christopher Warnes
identifies two trends in magic realism: ontological or faith-based magic realism and
irreverent or epistemological magic realism. The former associates discourse with being,
while the latter treats it with epistemological skepticism. In the former the “supernatural
event or present may stand synecdochically or metonymically for an alternative way of
conceiving reality usually derived from a non-western belief system” (14). For the latter a
supernatural event or presence “which is not rationalized or explained away, … stands in
place of an idea or a set of ideas … about the way language constructs reality or about the
incapacities of binaristic thinking”(15). The former uses magic realism to reveal its
alliance to a set of cultural values to which the text gives access; the latter kind of magic
realism “defamiliarizes a discourse without giving access to any particular world view as
the best” (16). The first is anthropological in its approach and the latter is literary in its
approach, according to Warnes. In this analysis, Warnes’ divisions correspond to Durix’s
system of European and postcolonial magic realism. Yet Warnes shows that in Nazi
Germany the anthropological magic realism had been used to create the Aryan myth by
Spengler and others. Similarly, Salman Rushdie and Borges use magic realism in the
discursive sense to raise questions about the politics of representation. Warnes shows
that in the hands of expert postcolonial authors such as Marquez, Carpentier, Rushdie,
etc, the mode has become a way of critiquing realism. While Rushdie uses the discursive
mode and Carpentier uses the cultural mode, it is true that others like Marquez combine
both the modes in their fiction like Autumn of the Patriarch. This is not to say that the
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epistemological magic realism doesn’t espouse values. In Satanic Verses and Midnight’s
Children Rushdie exposes nationalist historiography as a discourse in order to argue for
Indian identity as hybrid and complex. Magic realism has, thus, not always been
liberating and the faith-based or ontological mode has been used for reactionary purposes
by Europeans as well as non-Europeans.
The postcolonial affinity for magic realism can be attributed to the complex
demands of its contexts. Realism is a vexed issue in the postcolonial context. Durix
identifies three main problems with the use of western realism in postcolonial context.
First, the search for authentic reality by counter movements repeats the totalizing
tendencies of colonialism in the hybrid postcolonial ethos by creating a fixed indigenous
identity. Second, the act of repossessing reality was a linguistic enterprise since the
postcolonial writers were writing in a language that was often not their own as well as
trying to overwrite the modes imposed by colonialism. This means that a language loaded
with all the associations of the colonizer was used to represent a reality that was different
from that represented in western realism. Third, since their books had a large readership
in Europe, their audience was often not just the indigenous population, but Europeans as
well. This poses a few problems: for the western audience the reality of the postcolonial
context may appear fantastic. At the same time, presenting the indigenous life in a nonindigenous tongue has a distancing effect. Perhaps the most vexing issue as far as realism
is concerned is that neither the colonial realism, nor the anti-colonial desire to return to
the origins does justice to the reality of the postcolonial context.
The postcolonial context itself is deeply hybridized through cross-fertilization
between European modes of representation and existence, and indigenous representation
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and modes of life. Magic realism captures the hybridity of the postcolonial context in the
very ambivalence of its mode and embeds it in the narrative form. Farris and Zamora
observe that magic realism’s “in-betweenness” and “all-at-onceness encourages
resistance to monologic political and cultural structures, a feature that has made this
mode particularly useful to writers of postcolonial cultures and increasingly to women”
(6). This vision enables the postcolonial writer to reach the old modes of life and deepen
the understanding of realism. Alternately, it enables the writer to critique the desire for an
authentic past as well as reliance on western modes by demonstrating such modes and
desires to be discourses with ideological underpinnings. The ability to undermine
European realism without privileging another discourse makes magic realism mirror
postcolonial ambivalence. It signals the author’s complicity in the context he or she
critiques and the language he or she uses.
In post-apartheid South Africa the postcolonial ambivalence is complicated by the
fact that there is a need to recover the silent voices of history without engaging in
presenting the recovered voices as the true past. There is need to expand the notions of
history beyond facts and empirical evidence to include non-traditional, non-rational
modes such as stories, myths, legends and folklore. Not surprisingly, magic realism has
been adopted by many authors, particularly white authors such as Mike Nicols and Andre
Brink. Brink’s magic realism engages in epistemic criticism. Through magic realism
Brink juxtaposes patriarchal Afrikaner history with various counter-histories to highlight
the omissions of official accounts. In Imaginings in the Sand, for example, the
protagonist’s family history, recovered though her grandmother’s stories, is treated with
lighthearted humor against the heavy weight of the official Afrikaner version. In Rights of
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Desire and Devil’s Valley the search for answers from the past and the desire to record
the true history of the past is gently ironized. The novels draw attention to the ideological
subtext behind historical accounts and embed the opacity of language in their form.
At the same time, Brink perceives magic realism as a mode that is uniquely South
African, a mode that enables the Afrikaner writer to touch the heart of South Africa. In
“Interrogating Silence” Brink writes that openness to other perspectives would enable the
Afrikaner to connect with the magic of Africa. This magic, of course, differs from black
magic and witchcraft associated with Africans. Magic, Brink points out, is a part of
Africa, where there is “free interaction between the worlds of the living and the dead, a
rich oneiric substratum, and also … historical commitment” (Brink, Interrogating 25). By
adopting magic realism, which combines the European and African modes in its form,
Brink represents in his narrative strategy the hybridity of Afrikaner identity. lxxvi Brink’s
emphasis on magic realism as a narrative mode interlinks the past, present and the future
to underscore the need to acknowledge the post-apartheid moment as melancholic.
Brink’s epistemic magic realism considers the seemingly inconsequential
narratives, the ones that official history ignored, to present a racial picture of South
Africa that defies the binary divisions of apartheid ideology and the belief in linear
progression from racism to post-racial discourse in the post-apartheid era. These
inconsequential details and deviations ignored by official history at the familial and
national level do not establish an authentic past as much as expose the ideological and
social forces at work in the creation of different accounts. Brink thus presents the racial
system in South Africa as a disorderly and dynamic system where past racial structures
continue into the present.
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The Place of Magic Realism in Brink’s Canon
The first Afrikaans writer to be banned under the strict apartheid censorship laws,
Brink, along with a group of like-minded Afrikaans writers called the Die Seistigers,
rebelled against the conventions of Afrikaans literature from the beginning of his career.
With The Ambassadors, his first novel to be translated into English, Brink issued a direct
challenge to the romantic-colonialist tradition of Afrikaner literature. Brink broke down
taboos on the content of Afrikaner literature (particularly taboos on sex as a subject of
literature) imposed by the repressive Calvinist Afrikaner nationalism to criticize social
structures and encourage technical and aesthetic experimentation. Sue Kossew points out
that “writing back” to Afrikanerdom involves “recognizing the restrictive
imperialist/nationalist structure imposed on all the people of South Africa by the
Afrikaner Nationalist government and its cultural, linguistic, political and social
ideologies” because “attempts to subvert them or write back to them from within were
couched in modernist terms emphasizing the writer’s right to experimentation with form
(Pen 6). Brink’s writing back was an attempt to redeem Afrikaans from being colonized.
Commenting on the evolution of Afrikaans, Brink notes that this language was created as
part of a political struggle for the emancipation of Afrikaners from Dutch and English
oppression by appropriating the indigenous, partly creolized, language spoken mainly by
the Coloreds. During the apartheid, in order to separate Afrikaner identity from the nonwhites, the African roots of Afrikaans were denied. Afrikaans was thus colonized by
apartheid regime. Therefore, according to Brink, “writing back” means a “dual struggle—
against the hegemony of the apartheid state and for a new acceptance of its African
origins” (qtd in Kossew Pen 6). “Writing back” to recover the messy and complex origins
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of Afrikaner identity and literature was a political enterprise that influenced Brink’s early
experimentation and his later sense of the writer’s political responsibility in a repressive
state. In 1973, with Looking into Darkness, his first novel to be banned, Brink began to
self-consciously address political issues in his work, instead of trying to exempt art from
politics. Brink’s overt political stance in his apartheid fiction contrasts with Coetzee’s
refusal to offer political closure through literature.
In his essays, Brink repeatedly presents an alternative history of the Afrikaners
based on forgotten or erased figures who reveal Afrikaner identity to be hybrid and
formed in collaboration with Africans to resist Dutch and British colonials. He presents
the Afrikaner as a dissident. The myth of terra nullis and stories of racial purity, on which
Afrikaner history is based, suppress the presence of indigenous population as well as
events and perspectives that challenge official accounts of the past. Brink’s novels seek to
recuperate this forgotten history of the Afrikaners. In his post-apartheid fiction he
dramatizes the process of writing history to present the Afrikaner’s relation to the land as
an imaginative kinship, rather than autochthony. His post-apartheid novels show that
when the official history of the Afrikaners is considered from the point of view of
women, Coloreds or Africans, as in Imaginings of Sand, Devil’s Valley or Rights of
Desire, connections with the racial other, gendered other, or between the past and present
events emerge that were invisible in official accounts.
While preoccupation with recovering the entangled roots of Afrikaner history
remains a concern in post-apartheid fiction, there is a shift in focus as well as in
approach. In his apartheid era political novels Brink rewrites history by imagining
historical events from alternative perspectives. For example, in A Chain of Voices Brink’s
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research about a failed slave revolt led him to try and decipher the slaves’ voices from the
official legal court documents and resulted in his imaginative narrative about the revolt.
Similarly, in the First Song of Adamastor he rewrites the Lusiads, the first European text
to refer to South Africa, by presenting the landing of the Dutch in the Cape of Good Hope
from the perspective of the Hottentots. However, in his post-apartheid novels Brink
moves from writing counter-histories of the past to narratives that foreground the
discursive nature of history. In Imaginings of Sand, Kristein learns that the value of
Ouma’s fantastic accounts of nine generation of women in their family lies not in the
veracity of the accounts, but with the conditions that governed their production and
circulation. Baffled by contradictory accounts of the same event, Flip Lochner, in Devil’s
Valley, learns that the contradictory versions are testimony to the circumstances of their
production. In Rights of Desire Ruben’s comparison of the court documents on the
conviction and execution of the Colored slave Antjie of Bengal with the accounts of her
ghost, who haunts his house, shows how legal, cultural and social ideologies work
together to allow certain narratives and suppress others. Through imaginative recreation
of the emergence of official historical accounts, Brink’s post-apartheid novels dramatize
history as a fluid and discursive construct. Brink’s post-apartheid novels call for a move
beyond the desire for narrow factual veracity as the basis of historical authenticity to a
critical examination of the conditions involved in recording history.
Brink effectively uses magic realism to mock the quest for an authentic past and
underscores the impossibility of accessing the past. At the same time, the easy traffic
between the natural and human worlds, spirits and humans, the past and the present
reveals the history of racial identity in South Africa to be messy and fluid. The chaotic
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currents of racial classification in South Africa reject simplistic gestures of reconciliation
to present it as a process of negotiating a relation with the past in the present.
Magic Realism and History in Brink’s Post-apartheid novels
The three novels analyze South Africa’s racial politics at different points in the
post-apartheid era. Imaginings of Sand is set in the eve of the first democratic elections in
South Africa, a moment of transition charged with conflicting emotions. It is a time
marked by the Afrikaner fear of a non-white government and consequent Black reprisals,
the Colored despair of change, and the African desire for revenge coupled with hope.
Kristien Muller, the protagonist, returns from self-imposed exile, to South Africa, a week
before the elections, to a country beset by terror and fear, rather than hope. Her
grandmother Ouma Kristina’s house, the Bird House, a symbol of Afrikaner power and
wealth, is burnt by African miscreants. Her sister Anna stocks up on essentials in
anticipation of African attacks, while her brother-in-law Casper and his friends form a
patrol to protect the neighborhood. In reality, in order to vent their rage and frustration
they look for excuses to attack African or non-whites. The Colored servants Trui and
Jonathan fear that, just as they were disregarded during apartheid for not being
completely white, in the new era they will be forgotten because they are not pure
Africans. The only hope amidst this fear and distrust is the ANC leader Thando Mukolo’s
assurance that “we can’t imagine the future by pretending to forget the past” (Brink,
Imagining 264). In Devil’s Valley we find that South Africa has abandoned Thando’s
philosophy for post-racial politics. Flip Lochner, along with most people, regards the
Devil’s Valley as a relic from the past in a new South Africa. According to him the
inhabitants of the valley sequester themselves from the outside world and adhere to the
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racial mores of the nineteenth century. In the mean time the rest of South Africa has
learned “to get along with others” and done penance for its racist ways by electing a
“black president”(Brink, Devil’s 105). The reluctance of the inhabitants from the Devil’s
Valley who have settled outside to talk about their roots for fear of ridicule, however,
indicates a nation anxious to avoid its past. In this post-racial milieu, far from being an
anomaly in South Africa, the Devil’s Valley, located deep in the ravines of Drakensburg
Mountains, is a repository of the history and practices that the post-apartheid nation is
anxious to avoid. Rights of Desire, set a decade into the post-apartheid era, presents an
equally depressing picture. It presents a nation where rationalization policies privilege
Africans over Colored and Afrikaners. As a result, Ruben is forced to resign as university
librarian to make way for more Africans hires, just two years before retirement, while his
Colored servant Magrieta finds that government housing is reserved for Africans. Not
surprisingly, these measures have bred ethnocentrism, hostility, corruption and violence.
The novels depict the post-apartheid era as a time of violence and disappointment, where
continuation of past structures and liberal responses to the challenges of reconciliation
has ossified existing racial divisions. The despondence, despite efforts to create racial
equality, is because of the dependence on preferential programs and post-racial politics,
all of which fail to tackle the historical problems at the root of racial animosity in South
Africa. Preferential treatment programs are problematic because they see equality as a
matter of “opportunity to achieve scarce social rewards,” rather than “equalizing
opportunities to develop individual powers and talents” (Goldberg, Culture 231). Unless
the potential of the disenfranchised races are nurtured preferential programs will increase
competition for limited resources, instead of leading to better relations.

128
The protagonists of the novels are marked by a sense of alienation from their
milieu. In Imaginings Of Sand Kristien left South Africa, disgusted with apartheid
politics, vowing never to return. Ruben Oliver in Rights of Desire has spent his life trying
to make himself immune from all the racial politics. During the apartheid, eager to
dissociate himself from his in-laws, wealthy vineyard owners from the upper echelons of
Afrikaner society, he bought a house for himself in the suburbs and immersed himself in
books and music. When post-apartheid rationalization forces him into retirement he seeks
refuge from the deteriorating and violent racial relations in his books, resisting his
family’s efforts to persuade him to emigrate. Flip, in Devil’s Valley, is a fifty-year-old
jaded journalist who has failed to live up to his earlier potential. Kristien’s exile, Flip and
Ruben’s sense of redundancy and irrelevance relate to the Afrikaner struggle to
rediscover their relevance in a nation where they occupy an ambivalent position. The
struggle to find their home in South Africa is a continuation of a longer struggle of the
Afrikaners to make South Africa home. The Afrikaners historically regard themselves as
twice exiled because they were neither European nor African. This sense of exile is
exacerbated in the post-apartheid era by loss of privilege and political power and
preferential treatment programs.
Despite their self-imposed exile or withdrawal from issues that beset South
Africa, Kristien, Ruben and Flip suffer from deep guilt. Kristien’s decision to move away
to London meant that she relinquished her role as her grandmother’s protégé, the keeper
of the family’s secrets and fantasies, and the opportunity to learn the real significance of
the family’s fantastic stories. In Rights of Desire Ruben’s inability to recognize and help
his friend Johnny Macfarlane, who was beaten by thugs and left on the road, builds guilt.
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This guilt escalates after his encounters with his beautiful and free-spirited tenant Tessa,
who forces him to confront his complicity with South Africa’s racial history. Flip, in
Devil’s Valley, is filled with guilt for betraying the non-white cause during apartheid by
not reporting the violence and injustice against them. At the beginning of his career, in a
phase of “misplaced romanticism” about his role in the political events, he sought to
expose the complicity of the police with the racist apartheid state (Brink Devil’s Valley
16). However under an unsympathetic editor he was forced to submit to the state
censorship rules and rescind his stories on state abuses. His silence made him complicit
with apartheid state’s censorship laws. Not surprisingly, Flip describes his life as one
where “compromise is the name of the game, until you swallow your last lump of self
respect like vomit from a bad hangover” (Brink, Devil’s Valley 15).
Guilt creates a concomitant desire to make amends in all three of the protagonists.
When Kristien learns of her grandmother Ouma Kristina’s desire to see her before her
impending death she immediately flies to South Africa “to return to older kinds of
knowing, to withdraw again to that desert where Ouma and her spirits have roamed and
where they are now in the danger of extinction” (15). She imagines that visiting Ouma’s
deathbed and recording her stories will compensate for her willful neglect of her role as
keeper of secrets. In Devil’s Valley, Flip believes that by writing a book based on his
research on the inhabitants of the Devil’s Valley, where the old colonial racist ways
continue, he will atone for his complicity with apartheid. In the course of his research, as
he gets involved with the people of the valley, he believes that saving Emma from them
will atone for his past betrayals. In Rights of Desire Ruben’s recognition of his
culpability in Johnny’s death creates a desire to make good his negligence and leads him
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to focus on making life better for his trusted housekeeper Magrieta. All the three
protagonists believe that the past can be amended by a single gesture. Kristien believes
that she can record the stories and leave for London. Flip believes that a week of
fieldwork in the valley will give him enough material to write a book that will atone for
his complicit silence during the apartheid. Ruben believes that helping Magrieta find a
house will be penance for his neglect of his wife Riana and his complicity with apartheid
through his silence.
However, through their encounters with fantastic events the three protagonists
recognize the complex connections between present wrongs and South Africa’s deep
racial history that make simplistic notion of reparations as a means of reversing the past
impossible. In Imaginings of Sand the inerasable vivid erotic painting by Ouma’s mother
Rachael —who was raped by the servant Salie to avenge his daughter’s rape—
symbolizes the violent history of rape and betrayal that binds their Colored servant Trui
to their family. The spirits of the dead women hovering around the house as birds suggest
the constant presence of the past in the present. Wilhelmina, one of their ancestors, is a
spectral witness to the narration of her life story. In the Devil’s Valley the past and the
present are blurred as ghosts inhabit the valley. The dead of the valley come together on
New Year and for church service. Flip observes that “the pews were crammed to
capacity; not only by the living but… by the dead of the community as well”(178). Flip is
greeted by the ghost of Lukas Seer, who had died in the 19th century. The Seer’s dead
descendants keep reappearing. Flip sees Lukas Little’s ghost when he is about to hand
over his ashes to Dalena. Ouma Lisbet Prune appears on her rooftop after she is dead. In
the valley dream and reality merge to blur differences past and present. Flip’s vision of

131
Mooi-Jaana, the woman with four breasts, swimming in the Devil’s Hole as he enters the
valley and Emma’s vision of his arrival in her dream about swimming in the Devil’s Hole
sets Emma, the much maligned object of lascivious male fantasy in the valley, as an
incarnation of the legendary Mooi-Jaana. In Rights of Desire the ghost of Antjie of
Bengal, a slave woman who was executed on the charge of murdering her mistress,
haunts the house. In the first paragraph Rueben informs us that “Two fixtures came with
the house: The ghost of Antjie of Bengal and the housekeeper Magrieta Daniels” (Brink,
Rights 3). Ruben’s presentation of the two characters suggests the continuation of the
injustices against the Coloreds in the present.
The connection between the past and the present is indicated by multiple
references to palimpsests. The interweaving of the past in the present is symbolized by
Gert Bush’s paintings in the Devil’s Valley. As Gert uses the same canvas repeatedly the
painting resembles a palimpsest. In Imaginings of Sand Thando reminds Kristein of the
presence of the past in his comment, “You have all your ghosts with you” (Brink,
Imaginings 267). The present as a palimpsest is also evident in Kristien’s description of
Ouma’s dying moments when she observes “I see her sinking slowly, flickering ghost
images of many faces passing through her as if she tries them on and merges with them;
see her falling from body to shadow to ever-changing names, cascading though time in a
present that never ends” (Brink Imaginings 323). No group is testimony to the
continuation of apartheid trends in the post-apartheid era as much as the Colored women
in the novels. Trui tells Kristen that things will remain the same for her because she will
“still be taking orders” (Brink, Imagining 72). In Rights of Desire the rationalization
policies have ignored the Colored population as they initiate programs for Africans only.
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The continuing violence in the non-white localities reveals that there has been little
change despite the end of apartheid. Kristien’s sister Anna, wife of one of the Afrikaner
leaders, claims, “even if the country does change, what difference can it make to me? I
live on a different level… its very basic. Man and woman. And that’s not going to
change” (Brink Imagining 313-314). Anna argues that the political change will not affect
the fact that she is “not even a woman any more,” but “somebody’s wife, somebody’s
sister and somebody’s mother” (Brink, Imaginings 314). Her despairing words suggest
that in some cases political change does little to end other inequalities.
The fantastic events have resulted in Brink’s brand of magic realism being aligned
with the post-colonial magic realism associated with Alejo Carpentier. For example
Melanie Joseph-Villain in “Magic Realism in Two Post-Apartheid Novels by Andre
Brink” writes that both Imaginings of Sand and The Devil’s Valley “go back to the origins
of the nation” through magic realism (30). Her comment refers to the fact that the
fantastic events such as ghosts, spirits of ancestors as birds, disrupt the linear space-time
continuum to connect the Afrikaners to the land. The Afrikaner connection to the land is
established through the figure of the non-white woman. Kristien’s family is connected to
South Africa through Kamma/Maria, the Hottentot who bartered herself to the Boers in
exchange of peace for her tribe and was renamed and civilized by her Boer husband
Adam Oosthuizen. In Devil’s Valley Billah, the Hottentot woman the Seer married and
raped over her husband’s grave, connects the Afrikaners of the Devil’s valley to the land.
Perhaps the most dramatic example of the connection between the past and the present is
Antjie’s story. Antjie is not a native South African like Billah in Devil’s Valley, or
Kamma/Maria in Imaginings of Sand. However, her execution, which demonstrates how
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law is directed by “structures of inequality which bound the Cape’s Colonial society
together,” connects her life to the racial history of the country (Brink, Rights 48).
The use of African and Colored women to connect the Afrikaner women to the
land recolonizes African history for Afrikaners according to Sue Kossew. Kossew
describes it as reinscription without the violence. lxxvii Moreover, Kossew reads the use of
non-white women in Imaginings of Sand as erasure of the Afrikaner woman’s complicity
in the racial history of South Africa. Kossew’s comment refers to Imaginings of Sand, but
it could also be applied to the two other novels as well. Moreover, according to the
critics, miscegenation as a strategic device to connect the Afrikaner with the land glosses
over the violence of settler occupation and the Colored history. The novels present
miscegenation as a mutual decision. Kamma/Maria decides to offer herself to the Boers
to preserve her tribe. Similarly, Antjie is a willing participant in Willem’s plans to kill his
wife because she loves him.
Even though magic realism offers alternate histories that reveal a different world
order, the status of these alternate histories as authentic accounts is questioned in the
novels. Brink cautions against uncritical acceptance of alternate histories presented by
women, Jews, Colored, etc., as truth through reference to narratology. In Imaginings of
Sand Ouma admits to possessing an “amazing memory” that “can remember things that
never happened” (4). Commenting on the different stories circulating about the fate of her
ancestor Benjamin, Ouma observes that “there are flaws in each of these suggestions, so
why opt for one? … The story doesn’t need him anymore, so we will drop him” (103).
Ouma’s observation implies that the difference between official accounts and stories is
non-existent since writing history is a matter of “prophesying the past” and turning event
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into narrative. In Devil’s Valley Gert disabuses Flip of the notion that the different
accounts lead to the truth. He points out, “I am not saying it is true, I am just telling you
what people say. … You’ll hear so many stories in this place you can never be sure what
really happened” ( Brink, Devil’s 157). In Rights of Desire Ruben notes that through
retelling Magrieta’s ancestress, who they both arbitrarily name “Maria of Tuticorin,”
became a contemporary of Antjie. He further notices that Magrieta seamlessly
incorporates Khoisan myths into her family stories. Ruben’s observations on the
imaginative nature of Magrieta’s story about her family indicate the fictional nature of
historical accounts. References to the unreliability of narratives present those counterhistories as constructs and one among many competing accounts.
The references to narratology suggest that the past is accessible through language
and mediated by individuals located in space and time. Since the attempt to present
events turns them into narratives, the actual events remain inaccessible. Consequently
every attempt at historiography is revisionary, according to R. Radhakrishnan. Even so,
contemporary attempts to revise history are motivated by dissatisfaction with the existing
accounts. Therefore, Radhakrishnan points out that the key questions when considering
revisionism are “why return, return to what, who returns and what are the differences
between return undertaken by different human subjects that occupy different human
locations and positionalities”(70). Radhakrishnan’s observation implies that revisionary
accounts do not access the true past as much as they reflect the ideological biases of the
historian.
Despite his mission to challenge the narrow and destructive Afrikaner identity
through alternative histories, in his post-apartheid novels, Brink uses magic realism to

135
expose all history, even alternative histories, as artifice. Magic realism juxtaposes two
different realities or versions of events to make revision of existing history “a matter of
rubbing history against the grain and telling another story, along its grain as it were”
(Radhakrishnan 75). This often results in a multiplicity of narratives that reveal the
lacunae in history, rather than the essential truth about an event. For example, Ouma’s
story of her trips with the Jewish trader’s nephew changes often. However, its existence
reveals a narrative that challenges the myth of a pure Afrikaner identity. In Devil’s Valley
Flip’s encounter with Smous’ story of the valley and Dalena’s story of the women in the
valley destabilize the Lermiets’s version of the valley as the last bastion of pure Afrikaner
values. Ouma Prune’s creation story, which incorporates Hottentot myths, when
contrasted with the narrative of the valley as terra nullis reveals a violent history of
dispossession and miscegenation that is glossed over. In Rights of Desire the
juxtaposition of court documents with the accounts from Antjie’s ghost makes Tessa
observe, “I guess all historians were men” (Brink Rights 51). Her comment reminds us
that Antjie was just an occasion for the discourse on race and power. The sheer
impossibility of fantastic events in the novel such as the woman with four breasts in
Devil’s Valley, or Antjie’s ghost in the Rights of Desire, or a woman turning animals into
stones in Imaginings of Sand draws attention to their fictionality.
The juxtaposition of narratives, however, does not lead to a core event. We do not
discover if Trui is really related to Kristien, nor do we learn the true nature of the events
that led to Antjie’s arrest. Instead, the cacophony of stories point to a lacuna around
which narratives develop. The multiplicity of narratives juxtaposed against each other
mark the past as an “active absence or a series of absences in the body of dominant
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historiography” (Radhakrishnan 75). The dream of reclaiming the past is symbolized
through the impossibility of verifying the stories. In Devil’s Valley Flip’s goal was to
“write a little tract of history” (Brink 10) and iron out the wrinkles in the line between
Monsieur L’Hermite and Lukas Lermiet (12). As he explains, “if I want to write anything
that is worth its salt every fact must be checked” (Brink, Devil’s 264).But his efforts at
finding the facts is foiled at every step. First, his instruments for documentation fail him
as his camera falls off a cliff and his tape-recorder mysteriously stops functioning. In the
end, in frustration he rants, “All I have … in the search of facts, is an impossible tangle of
contradictory stories” (Brink, Devil’s 396). In Imaginings Of Sand, it is impossible to
verify the stories since they have been passed along orally. Moreover, the fire to Mount
Sinai destroys half the house, including Louisa’s diary. In Rights of Desire the court
documents do not provide the whole story about Antjie’s life and there is no way to
verify the accounts of Antjie’s ghost since they are mediated through Magrieta or Tessa.
The juxtaposition of different narratives without privileging any in the end
implies the impossibility of reaching the past, unless it is through narratives, whether it be
state narratives or individual stories. The significance of the stories, in the end, lies in the
contradictory function of asserting the presence of an event and the failure to present a
determinate picture of it. Instead of worrying about whether the outlandish stories of
Ouma and the people of the Devil’s Valley ever happened, it is more important to
consider why the stories came about. Brink claims that in his post-apartheid novels he is
aiming for something more complex than presenting multiple perspectives. He is moving
towards an intimation that “something may actually have happened, but that we can never
be sure of it or gain access to it, and that the best we can do is fabricate metaphors—that
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is tell stories in which, not history but imaginings of history are invented” (Brink,
“Stories” 42). Brink’s comment reveals that it is important to understand the impulse
behind the production of narratives of the past. He further elaborates,
what matters are not the specifics of the invention (a woman changed into
a tree) but the fact that they are resorted to at a given moment in an
individual life, or at a specific historical juncture. … in other words the
question is not what ‘sense’ metaphorical, political or otherwise the stories
may have taken individually or in series, but what sense … the telling of
these stories by this person at this juncture could possibly make (Stories
40).
He reiterates in an interview that he is interested in the “mythology of history or the
relationship between the two terms, history and story” (Higgins13). In a similar vein
Radhakrishnan asserts, pace Fanon, that history “performs the metafunction … of
‘preparing the ground,’ that is preparing a temporality that is already in emergence” (79).
Brink’s perspective is seconded by Emma, who functions as the author’s mouthpiece in
Devil’s Valley, when she points out that just because there are no verifiable facts doesn’t
mean that nothing happened. Trying to explain the true worth of Ouma’s fantastic stories
to her more prosaic elder sister Anna, Kristen struggles to find a way to explain that
Ouma’s stories suggest “that the very fabric of our fictions betrays the predicament of our
culture” (Brink, Imagining 130).
In the novels magic realism doesn’t present the atavistic roots of Afrikaners as
much as it presents the exigencies of different historical accounts, which cumulatively
point to the past as an absent presence. It matters little whether Ouma went to Paris or

138
Egypt in a magic carpet, or if Louisa really met with the famous opera singers of Europe.
The stories suggest the fortitude and resilience of these powerful women living in a racist
order, which survived by imposing repressive roles on them. The surfacing of these
stories on the eve of a new order enables Kristien to find her place in her country and
recognize the need for structural changes in society. Similarly, it matters little whether
Katrina turns into a white goat in Devil’s Valley, or if an African servant raped her. What
maters is the raison d’être of the stories. For the Smous, the story of Katarina turning into
a goat reveals her love for her Jewish husband. For the Lermiets the story of the brothers
wooing Katarina by bringing her gifts of goats establishes the superiority of the founder’s
family. Instead of regarding stories of the valley as terra nullis as fiction, it is more
fruitful to see how the myth reveals the complicity of Christianity in racial differentiation.
In Rights of Desire the different versions of Antjie’s story reveal the agendas of the
different groups. The depiction of Antjie as a murderer in court is brought about by the
pressures of cultural ideologies that made it impossible to accuse the master for the same
crime as the slave. When the court convicts and sentences Antjie to death without
convicting or punishing Wilhelm, who was equally culpable, it imagines a version of the
past. The African and Colored slaves’ depiction of her as a faithless blood traitor testifies
to their vulnerability. Her own account of it reveals her hurt at being rejected by
Wilhelm. All three versions reveal more about the pressures of their creations, rather than
the actual events. Together they point to the messy nature of racial relations in South
Africa and the interconnections between the political and ethical discourses in defining
racial identity.
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Brink’s novels, which dramatize the impossibility of accessing the true past, can
be read as metaphors for history as an endlessly receding phenomenon. Since we do not
gain access to the true events, no new identity or new truth is asserted. Instead we are
exposed to the messy currents of the linear official history. Ouma Kristina point out that
“our story is different, it doesn’t run a straight line” (74). She again reiterates the nonlinearity when she points out that women’s history is “much more complicated and more
fluid than mere linearity”(Brink, Imaginings 246). In Devil’s Valley Ouma Lisbet Prune
presents the official history of Devil’s Valley as a linear narrative, where
“Lukas Seer begat Lukas Nimrod, and Lukas Nimrod begat Lukas Up-Above and
Lukas Up-Above begat Lukas Strong, and Lukas Strong begat Lukas Bigballs,
and Lukas Bigballs begat Lukas Devil, and Lukas Devil begat Lukas Death and
Lukas Death begat Lukas Small” (Brink, Devil’s 117-118).
She points out that this represents only one of the lines since Lukas Seer had 17 children,
9 sons and 8 daughters. Ouma Kristina and Ouma Prune’s comment proves that the linear
chronological progression of patriarchal history is a construction that has little to with a
far more complicated reality. Ouma Kristina and Ouma Prune’s narratives in Imaginings
of Sand and Devil’s Valley show that when we consider the complex inter-racial relations
it presents a messy picture of South Africa’s racial history. Thus the easy converse
between the material and spirit world, between humans and animals that is the result of
the novels’ use of magic realism, destabilizes divisions between the past and the present,
the real and the unreal, fact and fiction, to expose South Africa’s complex racial history.
Brink’s magical realism presents the phenomenon of race in South Africa as fluid,
unstable and porous. The stories of rape and violence, of relations that cross the initial
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boundaries between African and European, black and white, African and Coloured,
master slave suggest that there are no essential, deterministic racial qualities. In
Imaginings of Sand the stories of desire that cross the traditional divisions between
Europeans and indigenous tribes compromise clear biological divisions between them..
Kamma/Maria and Adam Oosthuizen’s oldest daughter Lottie takes after the European
features of her father. She is adopted by a Christian Boer family who bring her up like a
Christian. Her marriage to Bart, who wanted a Christian wife willing to go with him to
his farm, dilutes the racial purity. Lottie and Kamma/Maria’s life shows how economic
exigencies, religion and desires make Afrikaner identity a hybrid identity that debunks
claims of racial purity.
Devil’s Valley reveals the intersection between biological differences and
Christianity. The Seer’s ghost tells Flip that he rechristened his Hottentot wife Billah
because it was impossible for him to “sin with a woman’s body if she doesn’t have a
name from the Bible” (Brink Devil’s Valley 319). He justifies it as following the example
of “Abraham, Issac and Jacob,” who had to make do “with what they could get” (320).
The christening of Billah meant that she and her children were “all one family” with the
Seer. Thus when Lukas Nimrod married Billah’s daughter it did not create a problem
(Brink, Devil’s 321). The Seer’s story indicates how Christianity was incorporated in the
racial discourse. Religion as a basis of differentiation meant that the Smous, despite their
crucial role in the valley, were regarded as inferior to the Lermiets.
Rights of Desire exposes how race is determined by legal and cultural issues,
rather than just somatic characteristics. In the novel Antjie’s execution exposes race as a
complex network of multiple discourses. I have pointed out earlier that the absence of
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Antjie’s voice in the court documents related to her execution suggest that she is the
occasion for a polemical discourse on racial differences, where the law sides with cultural
mores. The court documents are also important in revealing the role of the law in the
construction of racial identity. Willem’s affair with Antjie threatened the divisions
between master and slave and the ideological roots of European moral superiority in
colonial South Africa. These divisions were further destabilized when Willelm used
Antjie as an accomplice in his wife, the wealthy Boer, Sassara’s murder. When the
murder is discovered and Antjie’s involvement exposed with the help of the slaves the
court finds her guilty and executes her. Yet Willelm, the actual murderer, is not even
called to the dock. Subsequent analysis of the documents by historians reveal that he was
let off scott free because if he was arrested, in the eyes of the law, he would have the
same status as Antjie, the slave: they would both be criminals. This event would destroy
the carefully crafted discourse of European superiority and unsettle the difference
between the Europeans and non-whites in the settler society. Thus by following cultural
pressures law creates a narrative that reasserts the boundaries between slaves and masters
in the settler society.
As these early acts of miscegenation muddy biological markers of race, the
policing of race through other measures like cultural affiliations, religion, and ideology
become stricter. The shifting definitions of racial identity in the novels reveal the
“ongoing and mutually modifying tension between race as embodiment and race as
systemic principle” (Ernest 65). In Chaotic Justice John Ernest points out that “as the
concept of race as embodiment becomes less stable or more ambiguous or porous, the
systemic controls for race become more pronounced and more complex” (65). During
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Kamma/Maria’s time, despite clear divisions between Europeans and native tribes, there
was mixing between races; during Wilhelmina’s time there is reluctance to compromise
with the non-whites. Thus when the Boer women under Wilhelmina manage to sign a
peace treaty with the Ndebele women, the men refused to abide by it and slaughtered the
Ndebele tribe. The minute delineation of racial identity leads to a separation, not just
from Africans, but from other Europeans as well. Wilhelmina and other Boer women try
to stall a political compromise between the British and the Boers because it went against
Boer identity. In Devil’s Valley the Seer’s sexual licentiousness with the Hottentots
results in policing of the boundaries. Attempts by the state to assimilate them are foiled
repeatedly. Even within the Afrikaners there is a hierarchy. Flip, who came from the
interiors, was regarded as inferior by his wealthier Afrikaner peers at the university.
Despite his scholarly brilliance he was ousted by Twinkle-toes Van Tonder, whose
family connections helped him rise as a historian. We find these finer divisions in Rights
of Desire, where Ruben is rejected by his wife’s wealthy family because he is a poor
Afrikaner from the interiors. The Coloreds' fear of the Blacks continue into the postapartheid era, where Magrieta refuses to serve Tessa’s African boyfriend and refers to the
poor Africans Tessa takes lunch to as “bergies” and “skollies”.
Brink’s use of magic realism reveals that racial identity is the product of complex
processes and its consequences inflect and modulate the direction of these processes at
multiple levels. Racial identity is thus defined as constantly “in the process of becoming”
(Milovanovic). In essence race is a dynamic system that involves the “processes and
consequences” of cultures that differentiate between individuals legally and ideologically
(Ernest 37). These novels show that grouping individuals according to categories result in
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the formation of slightly newer identities and formations because these classifications are
internalized. For example, the Africans and Coloreds in South Africa have internalized
their identities and created a complex dynamic within the non-white community. These
new cultural dynamics in turn result in improvisation and metamorphosis of the systems
of domination and control. This rift within the non-whites, along with ethnic lines, was
exploited by the NP to destroy possibilities of a unified Black opposition. In the postapartheid era these divisions affect political and social attitudes and the distribution of
resources, thereby affecting the possibilities of reconciliation. In short, race is not just
about phenotype or culture. It “encompasses complex processes by which individuals are
positioned, both socially and geographically, sometimes delimiting and sometimes
extending privileges, options and mobility and ideological flexibility”(Ernest 37). The
complex and entangled nature of race and racial identity that emerges from Brink’s
epistemic and ideological critique of narrative historiography through magic realism
indicates that, while it is impossible to predict the future of race, it is also impossible to
transcend race. As a system race is a network of politics, religion, cultural affiliations and
other forces. It is definitive, yet slippery. Brink’s epistemic magic realism provides a map
of the complex and dynamic processes involved in the creation, functioning and
perpetuation of racial identity.
Brink’s novels suggest that in the chaotic currents of race the position of
individuals in the complex intersection of discourses is critical to their identity. The
sensitivity to initial conditions is most evident in Imaginings of Sand. Ouma and Lizzie,
the servant, are siblings because Lizzie was the consequence of Johann Wepener raping
the servant Salie’s daughter Lida, while Ouma was the result of Salie raping Wepener’s
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daughter Rachel in retaliation. Even though this dual rape means that the Wepeners are as
Colored as Lizzie and her descendants, their economic position determines their racial
identity. Since Lizzie is the child of the servants she is identified as Colored, while Ouma
is racially classified as white. We see the same sensitivity to initial conditions play out in
Devil’s Valley. Though Twinkle-Toes Van Tonder and Flip are Afrikaners, Flip’s origin
in a poor Afrikaner family from the interior puts him at a disadvantage to Twinkle-Toes.
Despite Flip’s scholarly excellence, the upper-class powerful family connections help
Twinkle-Toes get the prime jobs and assignments. Not surprisingly, at fifty, TwinkleToes has established his reputation as a historian, while Flip, the brilliant student,
languishes as a struggling journalist.
Central to the conception of race in all three novels is the notion of feedback. The
glut of information that loops back into itself to create self-same patterns means that
small local incidents have enormous impact. The intricate divisions of race have been
built over time through private and local incidents that feed into each other, continuously
resituating the differences between the various races. A case in point is Antjie in Rights
of Desire or the Seer in Devil’s Valley. In Devil’s Valley we see how the myth of terra
nullis and Christianity as a marker of difference emerges gradually through small actions.
The Seer’s rechristening of the Hottentot Billah to satisfy his god-fearing soul
incorporates Christianity in the racial discourse. Christening Billah whitewashes all her
descendants according to the Seer’s ghost. The use of Christianity to whitewash racial
difference plays out in the myth of terra nullis. When challenged about her claim that the
Lermiets populated the uninhabited valley Ouma Prune explains that heathen Bushmen
and Hottentots did not count since they were not saved by Christ and consequently
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equivalent to “vermin” (Brink, Devil’s 106). Regarding non-Christians as bestial, because
they were unsaved, enabled Boers to present the valley as uninhabited by humans.
Ouma’s story reminds us that when Christianity is used for racial division it becomes
racialized. In Rights of Desire Antjie’s personal history becomes instrumental in creating
racial divisions that ossify through time to result in rigid racial identities like Magrieta’s
reluctance to serve Tessa’s African lover Zolani or her derogatory attitude to Africans.
Antjie’s trial and its tragic outcome reveal how a personal relationship can play a role in
public discourses on racial identity. The disproportionate effect of small changes mean
that maps of racial systems, like maps of chaotic systems, reveal changes in
configurations and contingencies, and shifts in the role of the various elements across
time.
The iterative loops of racial patterns in South Africa are fractal, rather than
Euclidean. Fractals help to map the feedback loops, and trace the shape of the strange
attractors in the chaotic system. In The Fractal Geometry of Nature Benoit Mandelbrot
points out “Clouds are not spheres, coastlines are not circles” (1). Fractals map irregular
natural systems that “exhibit … an altogether different level of complexity” (1). Fractals
are irregular because they involve “chance,” and “the degree of their irregularity and/or
fragmentation is identical on all scales” (Mandelbrot 1). Fractals as a way of measuring
the scale of irregularities have been extended to include movement of stock markets and
other social systems. Homogeneity in scaling does not mean that the past and the present
are unchanged. Rather, fractals map the ways the past morphs into the present, so that the
present is always an iteration of earlier patterns. As a result chaotic systems reveal clearly
identifiable similarity of patterns across scale. Fractals enable us to trace the way in
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which innovations in past patterns of dominance control new historical conditions. For
example, Willelm’s exploitation of Antjie was complicated by the fact that Antjie was in
love with him. This puts her at odds with Cupido, who was attracted to her, but was
forced to aid and abet his master’s sexual peccadilloes with Antjie because he was a
slave. Antjie’s sexual attraction made her betray her own kind. In the present this pattern
repeats itself in Margarita’s life, where her daughter rejects her for taking help from her
employers. In fact, Magrieta is closer to her employer Ruben and his late wife Riana than
her own children.
Imaginings on Sand reveals how the gradual definition of racial identity is
premised on the policing of women’ sexualities and the efforts by women to resist the
patriarchal roles imposed on them. Kamma/Maria, who is given a Christian name and
rejected by her people for consorting with a Boer, expresses her sorrow through her
songs. Her daughter Lottie makes marks in the sand since she has no shadow. The same
erasure of identity besieges Wilhelmina, who, despite her immense capabilities, is forced
to play second fiddle to her incompetent husband. Wilhelmina’s life of wandering behind
her ailing husband repeats itself in Louisa’s life as she is forced to abandon her musical
ambitions to follow her husband, a government officer, to small town postings. Louisa’s
futile rebellion through voting against her husband is foiled when her husband is rejected
by a landslide. If he had lost by a single vote her rebellion would have been recorded,
instead of being lost amidst a multitude of similar rejections. Her rebellion, like Lottie’s
marks in the sand, left no lasting impression. Acts of violence such as Samuel strangling
her husband with her hair repeats itself in Anne’s protest against her loss of identity in the
form of her final carnage. Kamma/Maria’s marginal status echoes in the life of another
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Colored Character Trui. Like Kamma who was rejected by her tribe after she bartered
herself to Adam for peace and was never trusted by Adam, Trui fears retribution from the
Blacks and is reprimanded by her son for working for the whites. The achronological
sequence of Ouma’s stories, which begins with her mother Rachael, jumps back into the
far past to Kamma/Maria before leaping forward to Petronella, alternates with Kristien’s
attempts to cope with the escalating tensions in her family to underscore how past
patterns reiterate themselves each time.
In Devil’s Valley, even though Flip is oblivious to the consequences of fractal
dimensions of race, the reader can see how it makes escape impossible. Talita Lightfoot,
the ethereal dancer who was used to entice the government’s men into the church,
disappears from historical accounts. Henta, the young light-footed girl who roams the
woods with her cohorts, but has no memory, is the embodiment of Talita in the present.
Mooi-Jana’s tragic story (she is a beautiful girl who is killed by her father Lukas Strong
to save his racial pride after she rescues him from the British army by sleeping with the
soldiers) repeats itself in Emma. Emma’s biological father Lukas Death, who does not
acknowledge his paternity, shoots her to save his pride when she tries to escape with Flip,
an outsider. The stories of Talita and Henta, Mooi-Jaana and Emma are not identical, but
across time they show a repetition of the patterns of patriarchal exploitation of women.
Fractals suggest that chaos is a descriptive system, rather than a prescriptive or
prophetic system and this has repercussions on our understanding of racial reconciliation.
Fractals reveal the repetition of patterns across scale: the smallest units reveal the same
patterns as the largest units. Consequently racial patterns exist at the microcosmic as well
as the macrocosmic level. While it may be possible to trace the fractal scales of the
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strange attractor called race in South Africa it is impossible to pin down its cause, or
predict its future movements. Briggs points out that “the order of chaos imposes a
definite limit on our ability. With the use of computers scientists can see chaos, can
understand its laws, but ultimately cannot predict or exert control over it” (Briggs 27).
Despite its inability to predict the future, the attractors of race need to be tracked because
they present us with a map to the complex racial divisions of the present. Without this
map it is impossible to decide on future action. Chaos implies that racial categories are
not set in stone, but have been formed gradually over time, through small, seemingly
insignificant acts that result in shifts in the discursive system of race. This means that
transcending race reduces the complex processes involved in racial configurations at a
given epoch.
The fractal dimensions of race in South Africa affect our understanding of
reconciliation. Race in South Africa is a “dissipative structure”. Dissipative structures are
“dynamic systems that are simultaneously disintegrating and emerging” and that “are
offered as relatively stable societal structures that remain sensitive and responsive to their
environment” (Baker, qtd in Milovanovic 6). Dissipative structures are relatively stable,
yet in flux. They thus offer possibilities of change even as they remains constrained by
the past. The dissipative structures of race force us to account for racial complexity and
reimagine progress as infinite possibility within a social world bounded by
the effects of a racialized past, a progress that implies most fundamentally
the ongoing attempt to accurately describe how manifestations of racial
history position individuals, create highly variable concepts of identity and
organize variable standards of social justice. (Ernest 67-68)
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Ernest’s analysis reminds us that the chaos of race requires a change in our understanding
of reconciliation. Instead of transcending racial differences, or racial history, the fractal
dimensions of race force us to envision reconciliation as a process of mapping the past to
create a positive dynamic by changing the balance of discourses. In this vision of
reconciliation one cannot ignore the impact to the ethical dimension in changing the
existing dynamic and creating more positive patterns of interaction. Dragan Milovanovic,
in his analysis of the relation of chaos theory and social justice, observes that chaotic
structures present change as a perennial state of being. Extending Milanovic’s reading of
social justice in chaotic systems as an endless process, it is possible to see that
reconciliation in South Africa becomes a process without telos. Preferential treatment
programs fail to achieve reconciliation because they do not address the complexity and
dynamism of race when they treat reconciliation as a single gesture that revokes the past.
This does not mean that preferential treatment programs are irrelevant. It implies the need
for programs that account for the complexity of race in their approach. Race as an
unstable dynamic system means that reconciliation is a process without closure.
Reconciliation as an endless process, in the end, transforms the characters’
notions of redress and ultimately their relation to South Africa. In Imaginings of Sand and
Rights of Desire, the fantastic events that bring home the complexity of South Africa’s
racial history force Kristien and Ruben to revise their idea of making amends. As Kristien
listens to the stories that reveal the chaotic nature of racial relations in South Africa she
abandons her naïve hope that she can collect Ouma’s stories and leave for London, or the
belief that giving Bird House to Trui will reverse the injustices against her family. As she
sees the frustrations and fears of Afrikaner women reiterate themselves in her sister
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Anna’s carnage, Kristien decides to stay back and “work with others, to bring about a
world … in which it will no longer be inevitable to be only a victim” (Brink, Imagining
348). Kristien’s final decision is testimony to her recognition of the need for structural
changes in society to change the hostile racial dynamic. In Rights of Desire Ruben’s
recognition of his complicity with apartheid leads to a rejection of simplistic attempts to
undo history. Therefore, when Tessa, traumatized by the attempted gang-rape by a group
of Black men, begs Ruben to make love to her he refuses, despite temptations. The
attempted rape on Tessa was a display of the power and frustration of the Africans that
has deep roots in South Africa’s colonial history and is more than a criminal act. Making
love to her will not reverse the racial history that informs the act. The fact that Antjie’s
ghost roams the house even after he has buried her reiterates reconciliation as a constant
process. He admits that Antjie’s ghost reminds him that “there is a world outside …
which requires me and strangely concerns me” (Brink, Rights 306). Ruben and Kristien’s
acceptance of their responsibilities in the new era signal their recognition that personal
rejection of and protest against apartheid neither cancels their complicity with South
Africa’s racial past, nor absolves them of their responsibility in the reconciliation process.
In Devil’s Valley Flip’s failure to understand the implications of his complicity
with South Africa’s racial history makes the novel the most pessimistic of the three. Even
though he realizes that stories are not about “this one’s crime and that one’s sin,” but
about “the involvement of a whole community,” Flip does not give up his dream of
escaping from the valley. However, his attempt to leave the valley behind is foiled by the
ghost of Lukas Seer blocking his way. Flip’s failure to escape to the new South Africa
implies that escaping from the past, to a post-racial utopia, is a pipe dream.
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Brink’s magic realism suggests that the ethical response to the conundrum of
history is to abandon the search for the authentic past for a critical exploration of the
ideological basis of accounts of the past. In short, ideological critique needs to replace the
battle for dominance over discourse. Ideological critique of history ultimately exposes the
various attractors in the chaotic system of race. Identifying the different attractors of the
chaotic system of race may not help us predict the movement of the system. It does,
however, force us to revise our tendency to seek equilibrium. Race as a chaotic system
rings an effective death knell to the dreams of a simple solution to racism, of
reconciliation as an end goal. But mapping out and recognizing the “labyrinthine”
trajectory of race, its ability to reinvent itself across time as the dynamic between its
various attractors fluctuate, mark the first step towards a realistic relation with the other,
one that acknowledges and respects the role of history (Ernest 67). Brink’s emphasis on
ethical action raises questions about the role of forgiveness in reconciliation. Can one
hope for forgiveness in this system within which one is historically implicated, despite
personal politics? Even if forgiveness is forthcoming from the racial other, can individual
or collective forgiveness erase historical transgressions? In the following chapter I shall
compare Nadine Gordimer’s first post-apartheid novel with Antjie Krog’s memoir to
understand the role of forgiveness in South Africa’s reconciliation process.
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Chapter 4
Between Fact and Fiction: Withheld Autobiography as an
Ethical Response to the Other.
Thus far, I have argued that literature offers a way to negotiate the complex
historical and interpersonal dynamics, negotiations that are essential if reconciliation is to
move beyond sloganeering. That same body of literature suggests how difficult it is to
address the role of the personal, particularly for white authors in the “new” South Africa.
Indirect narrative strategies such as irony and magic realism help white authors negotiate
between complicity and agency, and guilt and advocacy to gesture to the power
imbalances created by South Africa’s racial history. Literature thus offers a counterdiscourse to the watchwords of reconciliation: collaboration and identification. But how
does the process of marking the limits of advocacy, of relinquishing active agency, play
out in that most self-centered of genres, the autobiography? For white authors
autobiography is especially challenging because a focus on the white self can seem like
navel gazing, compared to the tangible and acute problems of the non-whites.
Yet the post-apartheid era is marked by a proliferation of white autobiographies.
Beginning with Rian Malan’s My Traitor’s Heart in the eighties, white autobiographies
include J. M. Coetzee’s memoir trilogy Boyhood, Youth, and Summertime, Gillian
Slovo’s Every Secret Thing: My Family My Country and Andre Brink’s A Fork in the
Road. These texts are essentially engaged, to some degree, in “negotiating the meaning of
Whiteness for the purpose of re-gaining a place in the “national portrait gallery” (da
Silva, Redemption 93). The general narrative trajectory of these texts involves the
protagonist’s encounter with the brutality and injustice of the apartheid, consequent
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recognition of their culpability in the country’s racial history, followed by efforts to
exonerate themselves by creating a new identity. In the process, the protagonists move
from ignorance to knowledge about their times and from a secure identity to
estrangement from themselves. These narratives are, thus, marked by the white author’s
awareness of the conundrum of “African Whiteness” as at once of Africa and uncannily
non-African (da Silva Redemption 92)

lxxviii

White complicity with South Africa’s racist past along with the desire for
inclusion into the new nation complicates the formation of a new identity. According to
David Huddart, in postcolonial autobiography, the “de-definition” of the individual from
colonial identities is followed by efforts to connect to a larger network. He defines this
movement as a move from Said’s filiation network to affiliation network, from nature to
culture. lxxix For white South Africans, reterritorialization into wider networks needs
validation by the non-white other. Forgiveness will affirm the new white self and initiate
them into the new nation space. lxxx White autobiographies are, thus, a performance of
complicity and contrition in the hope of absolution and exoneration by the racial other.
Despite being a postcolonial nation, white South Africa’s affiliation with the larger
networks such as the nation is affected by their complicity with the nation’s racist history.
Complicity inhibits connection with the non-white other because it makes complete
dissociation from white racial identity impossible. This in turn hinders identification with
the racial other.
Complicity also hinders the scope of forgiveness. The ultimate purpose of these
white narratives--performance of contrition in the hope of forgiveness by the racial other-is controversial because their authors conceive of forgiveness as the condition for

154
achievement of reconciliation. Reconciliation is, thus, read as an event that will heal the
insurmountable historical differences. In reality, reconciliation is a dynamic process of
creating new patterns of interaction with the other that account for different experiences
of history. Complicity with the country’s racism implies that individual forgiveness does
not cancel out the inequalities in society. If forgiveness by the other does not cancel the
effects of South Africa’s long history of racism or create a new identity, how does one
forge a relationship with the other that transcends the liberal association of forgiveness
with reconciliation?
Racial politics makes autobiography a dubious genre choice for white South
Africans because the country’s racial history complicates the formation of the
autobiographical subject and the relation between addresser and addressee. According to
da Silva,
Faced with the rapidly changing political conditions that once framed the I
White self in Africa as a ‘stable’ locus of privilege and power, self-writing
forms allow White writers in Southern Africa to reclaim some of the
influence they once held over the telling of a national story and the
making of cultural memory. Through a ‘public rehearsal of memory’,
these narratives confound the historical and the personal by resituating the
personal story above the collective one, at times obfuscating the
relationship between knowledge, power and privilege by divesting
whiteness of the ideological weight it holds still in the history of Southern
Africa. (White Autobiography 472)
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Da Silva’s analysis points to the fact that white autobiographies are problematic not just
because autobiographies assert a universal coherent self that does not exist in real life, but
because, despite their intentions, they ultimately assert white power and camouflage
existing imbalances and inequalities.
Given the contradictory demands of reconciliation and autobiography in South
Africa, white authors can negotiate the complex demands of forgiveness and complicity
by attending to Spivak’s injunction that postcolonial autobiography involves withholding
autobiography. The term was first used in Spivak’s analysis of Assia Djebar’s novel
Fantasia, where the narrator connects to the neglected Algerian freedom fighter Zohra by
sharing a story about two eighteenth-century prostitutes, instead of her life story. Based
on this example Spivak claims that withheld autobiography establishes a connection of
“responsibility,” rather than “interpellation,” with the audience. Spivak’s withheld
autobiography does not mean debilitating silence. Instead, it projects a critical attitude
towards autobiography by focusing on the way power structures inflect the
autobiographer-listener relation. lxxxi She reads autobiography as a “trying myself out, as
ephemeral teller to you” (Spivak, Circumfession 11). Unlike traditional autobiography,
where the first-person narrator imposes his narrative on the listener, withheld
autobiography adapts the addresser’s narrative to the demands of the addressee. Withheld
autobiography is a site where the negotiations of social power relations influence not only
the formation of the autobiographical subject, but also the autobiographical address.
Because it shows the social processes involved in the creation of the autobiographical
subject as well as in the dynamic between the addresser and addressee Spivak describes it
as “a form of politics”. In withheld autobiography the egoistical discourses of
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autobiography are opened for the other, who guides and sets the terms of the exchange.
Spivak’s withheld autobiography thus is different from Sidonie Smith’s definition of
autobiography as an “exclusionary genre,” which misreads others narratives to create a
coherent self (Smith, Decolonizing xviii). Smith’s idea focuses on social processes
involved in the creation of the autobiographical subject, while withheld autobiography
considers social, ideological and power structures involved in the dynamics between the
addresser and addressee of self writing. Withheld autobiography allows the addresser to
signal his or her complicity in power structures and resist reinscribing the hierarchy in the
communication pattern of autobiography. This becomes significant in South Africa where
the usual power imbalance between the addresser and addressee in an autobiography is
complicated by race.
Withheld autobiography is useful in reading white South African narratives of
guilt because the protagonists are witness to the witness of trauma. As witness to the
witness of trauma, “the listener has to be a witness to the trauma witness and witness to
himself” (Laub 51). This means that the “the listener has to feel the victim’s victories,
defeats, silences, know them from within so that they can assume the form of testimony”
(Laub 51). At the same time, the listener has to be aware that s/he “does not become the
victim” (Laub 15). In addition, the listener must not “hinder or obstruct the listening with
foregone conclusions and preconceived dismissals, should not be an obstacle or a
foreclosure to new, diverging, unexpected information” (61). In white South African
narratives of guilt and expiation, the act of being witness to the traumatic sufferings of
the racial other is further complicated by the fact that witnessing takes place in a narrative
about the growth of the white self. The demands of being a witness are complicated by
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the autobiographer’s need for witnesses to vindicate the new self. By adopting withheld
autobiography the white autobiographer abdicates active narrative agency and opens
him/herself to discovering newer connections and the limits to the relationship with the
other, without compromising their role as witnesses.
In this chapter I examine the possibilities offered by withheld autobiography in
South Africa by examining the narratives of guilt and redemption in Nadine Gordimer’s
None to Accompany Me and Antjie Krog’s Country of My Skull. While Krog’s memoir is
a collage of personal narrative, victims’ testimony, poetry, and newspaper reportage,
Gordimer’s text is a novel about a British South African lawyer Vera Stark’s change in
identity after her encounter with the plight of her non-white clients in the post-apartheid
era. In both these works the white identity crisis is brought about by being witness to the
testimony of the racial other. In Krog’s memoir the narrator is caught between the
impossibility of finding a witness for her narrative and the demands of being witness to
the other; in None to Accompany Me the demands of being witness and the demand for a
witness to vindicate the new self is split between the protagonist Vera and the omniscient
narrator. By comparing the two texts I argue that narratives of white guilt and expiation
by South African white writers are performances of contrition that need to withhold
autobiography to signal the power imbalance between the different racial groups.
Withheld autobiography by these white women, I argue, creates the conditions for
traumatic testimony in both the texts. In the following sections I shall show how
Gordimer’s novel and Krog’s memoir negotiate their complicity with South Africa’s
racial history to create a narrative of the white self that is not dependant on forgiveness of
the other for validation.
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Nadine Gordimer: Limits of Realism
Nadine Gordimer’s relentless efforts to represent the horrors of apartheid through
her fiction and the openly political stance of her apartheid novels earned her the
reputation of the conscience of South Africa. While her first two novels advocate a liberal
stance against the apartheid, her third novel, The Bourgeoisie World, reveals a movement
away from liberalism. In Burgher’s Daughter she criticizes the Black Consciousness
movement. The very political stance of her apartheid fiction has meant that, as the
political pressures on literature eased in the post-apartheid era, her fiction was seen as
retreating into private issues. Her oeuvre has, therefore, been read as a progression from
the overtly political statements of her apartheid novels to the “more spiritual dimension”
of her post-apartheid novels (Coetzee Essays 250) lxxxii However, in her essay “Living in
the Interregnum,” Gordimer denies a political agenda to her work. She claims that she
tries to ensure that her essential gesture as author is not overshadowed by the necessary
gesture of her art in the politically charged atmosphere of the apartheid
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This does

not mean that “her writing is politically reactionary,” rather it argues against “taking up
prior political positions” because it “mars the truthfulness of writing” (Clingman 11).
Clingman helps us understand why Gordimer regards her fiction as more truthful than
any other writing. In her fictional works Gordimer, the cardholding member of the ANC,
writes without being circumscribed by the pressures of her political leanings. Her art,
according to Clingman, even in its most overtly political form, is loyal to her vision,
rather than to the Manichean politics of South Africa.
The categorization of Gordimer’s oeuvre into apartheid era political novels and
post-apartheid era personal novels does not account for the fact that Gordimer’s novels
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have displayed a “dialectic interplay in which the exploration of history and character, of
external and internal worlds, becomes entirely indivisible” (Clingman 9). This dialectic
interplay is evident in My Son’s Story, where political events transform the home as the
narrator’s mother is discovered to be a terrorist. In her post-apartheid novel The Pick-up
the dialectic between politics and the personal plays out in the way globalization and
immigration policies direct the relation between Julie and Abdu, an illegal immigrant.
The constant oscillation between the private and the public, the personal and the political,
has been identified by Stephen Clingman in The Novels of Nadine Gordimer: History
from the Inside as Gordimer’s attempt to present reality as it “happens to be” (Gordimer
qtd in Clingman 11).
Gordimer differs from her contemporaries such as Coetzee and Brink in her faith
in realism as the best mode of revealing the truth about the apartheid. If Coetzee’s formal
experimentation marks one end of the spectrum for protest literature, then Gordimer’s
realism marks the opposite end. She explains “My novels are not anti-apartheid because
of my personal abhorrence of the apartheid, but because the society that is the very stuff
of my work reveals itself …If you write honestly about life in South Africa apartheid
damns itself” (Clingman 12). Clingman describes Gordimer’s assumption that the writer
is a mirror to society and that writing is an unmediated act as “naïve realism”. The author
as a transcendental figure describing the injustices of the system was a strategic measure
adopted during apartheid. In the post-apartheid era, with the surfacing of stories that
challenge association of Black and white with good and evil respectively, the author’s
assumption of a transcendental position is ethically questionable.
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Gordimer’s naïve realism becomes problematic in the post-apartheid era, where
binary divisions between good and bad and white and Black are no longer valid. The
surfacing of the horrors of apartheid in the post-apartheid era has forced white South
Africans, particularly those who identified themselves as opponents of apartheid, to
reassess their relation to the nation’s racial history. As a consequence, the author as a
transcendental entity morphed into the author as a historical figure living in a complex
political and social terrain. Under the circumstances, writing is not just political
pamphleteering, but an ethical act. In None to Accompany Me the naïve realism of the
omniscient narrator interferes with the model of ethical listening established by the
protagonist Vera Stark. Even though None to Accompany Me is not an autobiography in
the traditional sense, in order to witness the sufferings of the non-white characters, Vera’s
mode of interaction follows Spivak’s model of withheld autobiography. The structure of
withheld autobiography helps Vera avoid the pitfalls of egoistical notions of advocacy
that resemble traditional autobiography. However, the omniscient narrator’s
transcendental role in the text disrupts Vera’s witnessing.
The novel is set right after the end of apartheid. The unbanning of ANC and PAC
and other political parties has allowed the exiled leaders to return. It has allowed Vera
and Ben Stark to unite with their old exiled friends Didymus and Sibongile Maqoma.
With the end of apartheid, non-whites move in the city in the quest for middle class
respectability, forcing whites flee in the face of onslaught. As a result, many middle class
apartments in exclusively white areas are taken over by non-whites, who move in,
ignoring the lease agreements and changing the nature of the exclusive white strongholds.
The sense of joy and optimism is marred by the fact that the end of apartheid has not
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reduced violence or racism. In fact, despite the return of exile and freedom of movement,
for many people things have remained unchanged.
The continuation of racial animosity and violence is embodied in the incidents at
Phambli Park and Odendaal Lands. Phambli Park is a township occupied mainly by the
Coloreds. For the Colored people of Phambli Park who are “neither white and living far
from the wrath that overflows from the black hostels … nor black and fleeing into the
velds from a burning shack” the post-apartheid era does not change things (Gordimer
None 82). Their lives are shaken by the violence between Blacks from the hostel and the
displaced Black squatters settled in their boundaries. For the residents of Phambli Park
the “upgraded” legal township is nothing more than corrugated roofs and dirt roads where
they dream of building proper homes. If the state of the residents of the legal upgraded
township is pitiable, the squatters are worse off. After one of them is murdered in an
altercation with Blacks from the hostel, most have taken refuge in a hospital. While
Phambli Park reveals how life remains unchanged for many non-white South Africans,
the Odendaal case shows how racist practices adapt themselves to the new discourses of
land rights. Tertius ODendaal’s family lands are taken over by displaced squatters.
Unable to evict them and eager to cash in on the opportunity, he applies to the
government for permission to establish a township so that he can charge the squatters
exorbitant rent. Odendaal’s plans for a township and Phambli Park present the postapartheid moment as filled with ambiguity as structural inequalities and identity
categories from apartheid continue into the present.
The ambiguities of the post-apartheid moment challenge Manichean divisions
between Black and white. Zeph Rapulana seems to be separated from Odendaal and Vera
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Stark by his Black identity until we realize that his “Afrikaans was Odendaal’s,” while
Vera, the English South African, speaks “badly scented Afrikaans like the English
townspeople” (25). For every Zeph or Oupa, for whom the end of apartheid opens up
opportunities for education and career, there is Oupa’s wife, who remains with her two
children in the shelter for wives of men working in the city. For every Sibongile, whose
return from exile opens opportunities for a political career, there are the poor women at
Phambli Park for whom life continues to be as violent and hopeless as before. Didymus
reveals how the violence and inhumanity in the liberation camps abroad match apartheid
in their brutality. The easy difference between the racist state and its non-white victims
becomes more complicated in the post-apartheid period. For example, we find that land
claims need to be investigated because the non-whites are not above making false claims
on the land. In the novel the post-apartheid South Africa is a space where differences are
blurred. Consequently, mere chronicling of events does not account for the complex
issues at stake.
The complex terrain of race, gender and class identities that are the consequences
of apartheid increases the need for advocacy in the new dispensation. The ethics of
advocacy, according to Sanders, is “the task of giving the domain of the words over to the
other” (55). But the other, particularly the traumatized racial other, can inhabit the
discourses and control the domain of words in the presence of an appropriate witness. Of
all the characters Vera is the only one who seems capable of being witness to the trauma
of the victims because she joined the organization “not out of white guilt,” but “out of a
need to take up, to balance on her two feet the time and place to which by birth, she
understood she had no choice but to belong” (Gordimer, None 20). In her work she does
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not “patronize these applicants struggling to establish themselves in English” and she
doesn’t try to “ingratiate herself chummily, as many whites feel obliged to do” (Gordimer
None 14). Her empathy and respect for the people she represents distinguish her from her
colleagues and help her in her investigations of land rights claims, where she encounters
the traumatic experiences of the victims of land displacement.
Vera’s skills are put to the test as she finds her sense of identity shattered by her
encounter with the horrors of the apartheid. Vera considered herself an opponent of the
apartheid. She took pleasure in defying apartheid and allowing her friends Sibongile and
Didymus to come to her house. After apartheid is lifted, when Sibongile and Didymus
returned to South Africa, she used her resources to find them their home and an exclusive
school for their daughter Mpho. Yet her sense of alliance with the non-whites, who form
her circle of friends, is shaken after her encounters with Zeph and Oupa. She realizes her
difference from her non-white friends and clients when she misinterprets Zeph’s words:
“Meneer Odendaal, don’t be afraid. We won’t harm you” (Gordimer, None 25). She
initially reads those words as signs of generosity and forgiveness. However, pondering
over the phrase, days later, she realizes that what she read as “tolerance and forgiveness”
were actually a “threat” (Gordimer, None 32). Her failure to understand the meaning of
Zeph’s words drives home to her the difference between her experience and that of the
squatters. The failure of prescribed standards and acceptable meanings becomes clearer in
her interactions with Oupa. Watching Oupa excitedly tell her about his plans to enjoy the
city life and his apartment, Vera recognizes that “in one way he was like any other young
man in training for a professional career; a stage when … the youngster has as yet no
responsibilities” (Gordimer None 53). In another way, he was also a man burdened with
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family, a man for whom apartheid ensured that school was traded for Robben Island and
for whom “growing up had not been followed in recognized chronology” (Gordimer,
None 53). This meant that his ability to explore the town unfettered, like other young
men, was hampered by his financial responsibilities to his family in the village. But, his
aspirations for a better life were not shared by his wife and children, who still live in the
shelter for women whose husbands' work in the city. Not surprisingly, he connects with
Sibongile and Didymus’s young daughter Mpho, who has lived in London all her life,
more than he does with his wife. Vera realizes that applying the normal rules of fidelity
in marriage to Oupa, a man whose life has not followed the normal trajectory, does not
result in a fair assessment. The inability to understand the inner codes of their language
despite a shared agenda, and the failure of the prescriptive codes of her urban English
South African existence to adequately understand the young non-white men make Vera
rethink her relation to history.
The irrelevance of established codes when interacting with the racial other,
ultimately, makes Vera realize the benefits of withheld autobiography in relating to Oupa
and Zeph. When Oupa expresses to Vera his admiration of those who dared to defy the
whites and threaten their power, even through illegal acts like robbery Vera remained
silent. Describing Vera’s response the omniscient narrator notes,
Mrs. Stark was comfortably silent, … she made no remark on what he had just
innocently confirmed: ... the unacknowledged self that came into being in prison
still existed within him, a pride in defiant community with anyone, everyone, who
had the daring to defy the power of white men …; silent because this was a self
that, by nature of what she was, could not exist among her selves. (16).
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While the truth about the extent of Black defiance in prisons may be debatable, Oupa’s
support for acts of defiance against the whites is his attempt to narrate and order his
experiences of apartheid, experiences that cost him his childhood and had him experience
prison in his adolescence. By remaining silent about the way this defiance of the whites
also resulted in exploitation and violence against their own group, Vera’s creates a safe
space for Oupa to tell his story, to allow his life and its many facets to come to the fore.
By withholding her judgment about the appropriateness of Oupa’s confession to her, or
the darker side of Black bravado Vera underlines their different experience of history.
The need to withhold autobiography comes to the fore when Vera agrees to help
Oupa prepare for the party at his new apartment. While driving with Oupa to see his new
apartment at one twenty one Delville Wood, Vera realizes that Oupa’s city pad was the
site of her clandestine rendezvous with the Hitler baby, Otto Abarbanel. However when
Oupa mentions the place all she discloses is an “odd smile” (Gordimer None 54). She
asserts her voice only when Oupa asks her to show him how to operate the stove. Even
then, she does not explain the reason behind her familiarity with the oven, letting him
assume that as a woman she is naturally at home in the kitchen. Vera’s decision to remain
silent about her earlier association with Oupa’s apartment can be read as shame about her
betrayal of marriage. But her refusal has another significance. For Oupa, whose
childhood and adolescence were spent fighting apartheid and imprisoned in Robben
Island, this site of her marital infidelity is the first step towards fulfilling his dream of a
career and a life of travel. If she shared her connection with the apartment she would
spoil his pride in his new digs. Vera’s silence that creates a safe place for Oupa makes
him regard her as a mother figure.
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Vera’s withholding of autobiography may inhibit her desire to narrate her story,
but it allows unexpected connection to emerge. With Zeph Vera’s ability to defer her
legal expertise to his knowledge of the realities of the squatters’ lives leads her to develop
closer ties. Their professional camaraderie results in the development of unexpected
empathy and friendship. When she reads about the Odendaal shooting she rushes to check
if he is safe. Her unexpected concern, which moves him into “grasping her arm” “and her
automatic response of “placing of her hand for a moment, over his knuckles,” was a
“repetition of the compact to begin a love affair with her Hitler Baby, Otto, years ago”
(Gordimer None 120). But, unlike the gesture with which Otto marked the beginning of
her affair, this gesture “was not sexual” (Gordimer None 121). Vera and Zeph’s
instinctive tactile gestures prompted by Vera’s concern for his wellbeing signals their
recognition of their human bond. It marks “the beginning of some new capability” in
Vera, “something … that she was only now ready for” (Gordimer None 122). This new
relation with Zeph that defies all the prescribed boundaries of racial interaction brings a
“reassurance … she no longer found elsewhere with anyone” (Gordimer, None 123).
Despite being based on a mutual ability to relate to their shared humanity, Vera’s
friendship with Zeph remains respectful of the differences between Vera, “a middle-class
city woman” and an English South African, and Zeph, a rural leader. Even when she sells
her house and becomes Zeph’s tenant they remain respectful of their differences. Respect
for their differences enables them to develop a camaraderie where Zeph can approach her
for her expert advice and she can seek his opinion on political issues. The common point
between Vera’s relation with Oupa and Zeph is that these relations have developed based
on the need of the two non-white characters.
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But the ultimate test for autobiographies of the postcolonial condition is their
ability to be open to the subaltern. In her analysis of Assia Djebar’s novel Fantasia, a
withheld autobiography, Spivak notes that “to achieve autobiography in the double bind
of the practice of the conqueror’s writing is to learn to be taken seriously by the gendered
subaltern… who has not mastered the practice”(Spivak, “Circumfession” 10). While
Oupa is disempowered compared to Vera and, even, other non-whites like Didymus and
Sibongile, he is not a subaltern, according to Spivak’s definition of the subaltern as
gendered. In fact, in the case of the true subaltern in the novel, Oupa’s wife/widow, we
find that that Vera is unable to withhold autobiography and establish a relation of
responsibility. Oupa’s wife/widow’s life remains unchanged despite the political changes.
She continues to live with her two young children in a shelter for wives of men employed
in the city, dependant on her husband, whose dreams do not include her. At Oupa’s
funeral Vera finds herself unable to find a way to connect with Oupa’s widow because
she is uncomfortable offering condolences by praising Oupa as a husband when she
knows that he was unfaithful and eager to escape the shackles of family and explore the
world.
Vera’s failure to withhold autobiography is compensated by Zeph Rapulana, who
accompanies her to the funeral. Listening to Zeph offer the usual condolences to Oupa’s
widow, Vera feels that Zeph’s representation of Oupa as a dutiful father and husband
does not correspond to the actual Oupa, who “did not think only of his family,” but
“yearned for a girl who has seen things and possessed knowledge he would never have,”
who “did not die peacefully, his body, in the attempts made to keep it alive, suffered
tortures his interrogators in prison had never thought of” (216). However Zeph’s
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representation of the late Oupa as a loving father and husband is another act of withheld
autobiography. In the car Zeph tells Vera that Oupa had confessed to him that “He was
going to disappear, and travel the world, he was going to Cuba, England and China,
especially Cuba. (217). Clearly Zeph was not ignorant of the fact that Oupa “did not want
to go back” (Gordimer, None 217). By keeping his personal narrative involving Oupa out
of the picture and presenting a narrative about Oupa that his widow can identify with
Zeph is sensitive to the needs of the widow in a way that honest depiction of Oupa’s
desire to forget his family would not be. Zeph’s silence reveals his awareness of the
differences in power between Oupa and his wife, and between himself and Oupa’s
widow. The contrast between Oupa’s widow’s mute silence and Zeph’s deliberate silence
about his personal experience with Oupa underlines the complex power structures
underlying their brief interaction.
The consequences of Vera withholding autobiography in the novel are very
different from Zeph withholding autobiography in Oupa’s funeral. Oupa takes the
opportunity to use the space created by Vera’s silence to insert his story, while his wife
remains silent. The different responses of Oupa and his wife point to the power difference
between African men and woman in post-apartheid South Africa. The African man,
despite his sufferings and brutalization under the apartheid, is able to try and build his life
in the new dispensation. Oupa is able to move in the city, find a job, dream of mobility
and improvement. Zeph Rapulana, the suave and shrewd autodidact who is well versed in
legal and political matters, becomes the spokesperson of his disenfranchised people and
is given a high position in the emerging Black government. The African men have the
power of language to correspond with the Afrikaners and the English South Africans.
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This contrasts with Oupa’s widow, who is dependant on her husband for survival, and
cramped in two rooms, at the shelter for wives. With her husband dead and children to
consider, Oupa’s widow has little scope or luxury of verbalizing, let alone writing, her
story of suffering and grief.
Oupa’s widow’s silence (she is also the only character without a name and is
identified by her relation to her husband Oupa) is not relieved by the omniscient
narrator’s insight to her mind. The omniscient narrator’s silence is unusual because he
provides us with insights into minds of characters. Vera remains silent about her
association with Oupa’s new apartment at One Twenty One Delville Woods. However,
the narrator reveals Vera’s thoughts. The narrator also gives us insights into Sibongile’s
mind as she tries to deal with her growing estrangement from Didymus that was the result
of her rising political star just as his was on the wane. After she rejects Didymus’s sexual
advances the narrator informs us that “the pain of repentance, so useless for this little
spite, is actual between her ribs” (Gordimer None 135). The narrator’s silence about the
most impoverished and most vulnerable character of the story suggests the limits to his
omniscience. It marks the silencing that cannot be voiced. The silence of the widow and
the narrator’s decision to refrain from impersonating her voice marks her position of
power and dramatizes how access to power affects the conditions for autobiography.
While Gordimer is careful about giving voice to the one subaltern character in the
novel, she shows little restraint in revealing the thoughts of other characters through the
narrator. The omniscient narrator is just as easily able to give us insights into the minds
of non-white characters such as Sibongile and Didymus as he is into the minds of white
characters. The omniscient narrator is not just a source of information of the state of mind
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of the different characters, but also a moral guide. For example, describing Sibongile’s
decision to unburden herself to Vera when their temporary hotel residence proved
unbearable the narrator writes “It was Vera Stark to whom she suddenly felt she could
unburden herself… and, by implication of a grant of intimacy, place responsibility on her
(Gordimer None 46). The narrator’s analysis of the motivations behind Sibongile
“suddenly” wanting to unburden herself to her white friend Vera reveals Sibongile’s
manipulative nature. As the moral center the narrator can be read as the author’s
representative in the novel. However, the omniscient narrator’s ability to read the minds
of characters across racial and gender boundaries in a novel set in post-apartheid South
Africa dilutes her narrative authority. In South Africa, where the history of racial
differentiation and exploitation makes it impossible for racial groups to identify with each
other, the ability of the narrator to transcend racial differences suggests that he is above
race and above gender. However, in South Africa no one remains beyond race. By
creating a novel whose narrator transcends race divisions Gordimer erases her racial
identity and its privileges and subscribes to the post-racial politics her protagonist Vera
rejects.
Country of My Skull and Authorial Credibility
Gordimer’s novel shows that the faithful representation of reality does not
necessarily fulfill the conditions for ethical relation with the other because it can end up
in reinforcing existing racial paradigms. In contrast, Krog’s memoir reveals how
autobiography, a genre closely associated with reality, has to use fragmented narration,
collage, and, even, invent an affair in order to negotiate the difference in experience of
history between the white autobiographer and her non-white addressees. In Krog’s first
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English work Country of My Skull the narrator’s role as witness to witness of trauma
compels a withholding of autobiography. One of the most cited works on the TRC,
Krog’s Country of My Skull: Guilt, Sorrow and the Limits of Forgiveness in the New
South Africa is a memoir about her experiences reporting the TRC hearings for SABC. It
charts her confrontation with the horrors of apartheid that tests her identity as a dissident
and transforms her sense of self and relation to her community. According to Michael
Heyns Krog’s memoir is “a personal rite of passage from the relatively secure world of
the liberal Afrikaner to a frightening sense of complicity with the perpetrators and the
horrors recounted at the hearings” (44). This metamorphosis leads to a search for a new
relation with the country through efforts to establish a new relation with the racial other.
Krog’s new identity is the result of being witness of witness to the trauma suffered by the
victims of apartheid, during the TRC hearings. Her narrative of transformation and
metamorphosis thus has to make space for her role as witness to witness of trauma.
As witness to the testimony of the other she has to be self-effacing as well as
aware of the difference between herself and the other. Krog achieves this through
incorporation of testimony, and poetry, into her memoir. The use of multiple genres
creates a patchwork, where the different realities undercut each other to offer many
alternative versions. Her book is like a collage—“it cuts, cites and decontextualizes
through decoupage as a means of expression, at the same time it reassembles,
recontextualizes and aggregates through assemblage” (Rostan 146). Describing this
collage, Antjie writes, “I am not reporting or keeping minutes, I’m telling. …I cut and
paste the upper layer, in order to get the second layer told, which is actually the story I
want to tell.” (Krog, 225). Her statement declares that her purpose is not to search for

172
historical veracity, as much as it is to understand the underlying forces informing South
Africa’s racial history. As part of a collage her voice is one among many in the
polyphony of voices.
Given the focus on the autobiographer’s white angst caused by encountering the
horrors of apartheid through Black testimonies, it is not surprising that the book aroused
strong reactions. Smith and Schaffer point out that some witnesses “recoiled from her
profiling of their pain; others failed to recognize themselves through the perceptions of
the writer; still others resented what seemed to them as an appropriation of their pain to
her project of reconciliation”(Smith, Human Rights 78). For example, ex-ANC combatant
Yazir Henri notes that “the disembodiment of my testimony has made the struggle to
reclaim my voice, memory, and agency, harder. The dispossession of my voice, through a
continuous recycling of my, by now, unmoored testimony, was compounded by the
superimposition of other voices and narratives onto my own” (qtd. in Smith, Human
Rights 78). In his highly critical reading of the Krog narrative, Mark Libin goes so far as
to suggest that Krog “foregrounds her emotional response … her guilt and sorrow, as
well as self-loathing … [in a way that] ultimately overflows, engulfs and finally
overwhelms the testimony of witnesses she endeavors to record” (123). The negative
reaction of the people whose testimonies have appeared in Krog’s narrative suggests that
she failed to be a responsible witness.
While the criticism of Krog’s memoir raises valid points about using excerpts
from the victims’ testimonies in a narrative of white angst, it, however, fails to account
for the constraints placed on the autobiographer by the ethical demands of being witness
to the witness of trauma. Only Gillian Whitlock considers the text in terms of Krog’s role
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as a listener. In “Consuming Passions: Reconciliation in Women’s Intellectual Memoir,”
Whitlock argues for reading the text as “a performance of listening and acknowledgement
that calls for different professional practice among the intelligentsia” (Whitlock
“Women” 13). She writes: “Witnessing these public testimonies of trauma and loss
through memoir has been one way of engaging with these testimonies. … it sets out a
way of listening and attending, and it emerges as a deliberately staged discursive
framework for cross-cultural communication in a community beset by the aftermath of
trauma.” (13). According to Whitlock, Krog’s narrative style presents reconciliation as “a
discursive field that both requires and organizes the interaction of testimony and memoir”
(13). Whitlock’s perspective is important in reading Krog because she moves beyond
looking at the text purely in terms of a memoir to focus on the narrator’s role as listener.
In this section I read Krog’s memoir as a demonstration of being witness to a witness of
trauma and the hazards of witnessing trauma. Krog’s role of being a witness motivates
the text’s unusual form and destabilizes the centrality of her voice in the memoir.
The most controversial part of her collage is the transcript from the hearings of
the victims of the TRC. These transcripts account for a quarter of the text. Always
unedited, the excerpts from the hearings are, at times, framed by commentary from the
narrator, sometimes stand alone, or are arranged as a series of uninterrupted excerpts. For
example, the chapter “Stretched Thinner and Thinner over Pitches of Grief” consists of a
collage of excerpts from transcripts that are barely distinguishable from each other. The
transcripts are also not identified by name. Chapter four, “The Narrative of Betrayal Has
to be Reinvented Every Time,” in contrast, consists of only two excerpts from the TRC
testimonies: Basil Snayer’s and Yassir Henry’s, without any analysis or synthesis. This
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inconsistent method of using excerpts has bewildered critics. Sarah Ruden points out “the
stories are not true stories because they have no background or beginnings or endings,
which we hold consciously or unconsciously as marks of real experience” (Ruden 169).
Krog has also been accused of devaluing the testimonies by presenting them without any
recognizable narrative structure. For example, commenting on Krog’s incorporation of
unedited excerpts from the shepherd Lekotse’s testimony Ruden points out that
“Lokotse’s story would be more ‘real’” if the scenes were rearranged in the order in
which they happened”(172). This demand for editorial control is also voiced by Laura
Moss who points out that Krog’s excerpt from Nomonde Calata’s testimony presents
Calata as a pitiable victim; whereas, the entire testimony, which extends beyond the cry,
presents her as a pragmatic person.
Ruden and Moss’s criticism of Krog’s memoir does not account for the multiple
roles Krog has to negotiate as a reporter of the TRC hearings and a white South African
woman. Editing the transcripts to present a smooth narrative would be unethical on a
number of counts. First, it would be presumptuous for a white South African woman to
edit the words of the victims from whom she is separated by her racial privileges would
be presumptuous. By editing and rearranging the testimonies to make them appear
aesthetically pleasing she would be speaking for the other by cancelling the difference
between herself and the other. It would presume that she, a white Afrikaner woman who
has benefitted from apartheid, is able to understand the other. Second, it would violate
her responsibilities as a witness to witness of trauma. As journalist and audience of the
TRC hearings she is witness of the second and third level, according to Laub’s
categories. lxxxiv As a witness of traumatic witnessing she is part of a process where
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knowledge is not a “factual given,” but an “advent” (Laub 62). The silences, digressions
and displacements in time that characterize these testimonies are symptoms of events that
are not registered, even though they have happened. Thus, to edit out the pauses, the
struggle with words, would be to disrespect the victims.

lxxxv

The testimonies of Nomonde Calata and the shepherd Lekotse are cases in point.
In Lekotse’s transcript there is a break in the sense of time. He begins “On that day/ it
was at Night” when describing the events of the night when the police forced themselves
into the house. But his rambling narrative is repetitive, digressive and chronologically
disruptive. Describing the way the police broke down the door, he digresses into the
present to talk of how the door was repaired by his children before returning to the events
of the night. These digressive ramblings contain inconsistencies. In the transcript Lekotse
claims he hurt his shoulder. When the commissioner points out that his statement claims
he hurt his ribs he retorts “are you not aware that/ the shoulder is related/ to the ribs/ sir?”
(281). The shepherd’s digressions about his damaged door and disobedient children, that
disrupt the smooth chronology of the account, can be confusing. However his digressions
are a symptom of the trauma caused by his realization that the police are not there to
protect him, an illiterate shepherd who had never broken the law. Editing Lekotse’s
testimony to make it concise would erase the shepherd’s trauma and make Krog fail in
her responsibility as the second-level of witness.
The excerpts from Nomonde Calata’s transcripts have also been criticized because
decontextualized quotations from her testimony transform her into a symbolic figure.
Moss, in particular, feels that Krog’s text “oscillates between commenting on the
symbolism of Nomonde Calata’s emotional testimony and the symbolism of the death of
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her husband in the national narrative of reconciliation” (Moss 95). The absence of
comments on the role of the Craddock Four in the resistance movement destroys the
specificity of Calata’s story, according to Moss. She further notes that the excerpts excise
the ordinariness of Calata’s life in the present and her very pragmatic approach to
reconciliation. It represents Calata as just a victim, when the whole testimony reveals
that she is also a savvy woman. On the flip side, presenting the entire transcript of Calata
would also minimize her trauma, embodied by her heartbreaking cry as she fails to find
words to express her shock at learning of her husband’s death. Unlike Lekotse’s
testimony, which is uninterrupted by comments, Calata’s testimony is presented as
excerpts quoted by Krog and Professor Kondlo as they discuss ways to represent the
significance of her testimony in a cartoon. Her testimony intrudes into their discussion as
they replay sections of the recording of her testimony. The high point of this recording is
her wordless cry as language failed to express her grief and shock that forces the hearing
to adjourn. When she returns her voice is “tired” and “resigned” (57). Krog and Kondlo’s
conversation focuses on the moment of breakdown in language because her cry is
testimony to her trauma at having her life violated and her husband murdered by the
protectors of law and order. The nature of trauma according to Laub is that the survivors
are often very successful in real life. But at the core of their success is a sense of fragility.
Calata’s cry brings out that fragility in her life underneath her show of self-sufficiency
and pragmatism. To seek to overshadow this by focusing on her pragmatism minimizes
her trauma. It elides the emptiness that marked her life after the horrific incident of police
raids and her husband’s death.
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Krog’s use of Calata’s testimony also underscores the difference between memoir
and testimony. Calata’s testimony alternates with conversations between Professor
Kondlo and Krog as they figure out a way to present the full significance of a Black
woman testifying in a British Town Hall, in South Africa. The conversation between the
professor and the journalist presents a sharp contrast to Calata’s testimony. lxxxvi While
Krog and Kondlo move freely, discussing the ramifications and significance of Calata’s
testimony, in contrast, is halting, broken by sobs, tears, and pauses. The contrast between
the eloquence of the two witnesses who analyze her testimony and Calata struggle to
articulate her experience with the police raid and her husband’s brutal death jarrs the
reader and highlights the difference between testimony and autobiography. Calata’s
breakdown in eloquence when recollecting the way she discovered her husband’s murder
indicates that she is reliving the events, struggling to register them as events that have
happened and is, therefore, unable to analyze them like her audience. The contrast in
eloquence signals the differences between Nomonde Calata’s position and that of her
mainly white audience.
The difference in the experience of history that is signaled by the contrast
between the victim’s rough halting testimonies and Krog’s smooth memoir is evident in
Krog’s references to the transformation of the testimonies into sound bytes. In the news
bulletins for the radio the complex stories that emerge from the hearings are converted
into snappy news stories. Krog points out that she has to reduce the entire story of
Phindile Mfeti’s mysterious disappearance after he went out to have his jeans shortened,
and his wife‘s request to the commission for a token of her husband for burial to a fortysecond sound byte. In order to create sensational news stories out of these testimonies of
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loss and trauma Krog has to “pick out a sequence …remove some pauses” and edit
everything down to a “twenty second sound byte,” before “feeding it to Johannesburg”
(45). For example, Krog knows that “when Tutu starts with ‘ah-ah-ahm’ he is
“struggling” to present difficult truths in a “neutral harmless way” (306). But Tutu’s “ahahms have to be cut out for the broadcast,” even though deleting these stutters edits away
their significance (306). Just as the radio’s inability to convey Dirk Coetzee’s signs of
PTSD makes him appear to be an unrepentant killer, so also editing pauses and stutters in
speech creates a different narrative of events. The use of adjectives like “sexy” and the
preference for stories that provoke tears reveals the way the media sensationalizes stories.
The juxtaposition of the transformation of the testimonies into sound bytes for the radio
alongside Krog’s own incorporation of the testimonies serves to separate Krog’s use of
the testimonies from the way media sensationalizes the traumatic experiences of the
victims.
The difference in eloquence between the victims’ testimonies and Krog’s memoir
places the ethical demand of being witness to witnessing on the audience. The raw
unedited transcripts, which come without comments or explanations or preface, mean that
the reader is forced to engage with the transcripts. In the process of reading the reader
becomes witness to the process of witnessing itself. For example, the chapters which
consist only of unedited transcripts force the reader to witness the trauma of the victims
through reading. However, since the excerpts from Calata’s transcript are interwoven in
the discussion between Professor Kondlo and Krog, the reader is not only witness to
Calata’s soul wrenching grief, but to the Professor and Krog’s act of witnessing Calata’s
trauma as well. The absence of commentary on the transcripts mean that the difference in
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the level of eloquence between Krog’s memoir and the transcripts confronts the reader
with the differences in experience of history that separates Antjie Krog the Afrikaner
poet /journalist from the victims.
As a result of Krog witnessing the victims’ trauma, her growing sense revulsion
against her community is complicated by a sense of complicity with them. On one hand
she laments the absence of a leader among the Afrikaners who, unlike De Klerk, is
willing to “take responsibility”. On the other hand, she also recognizes that the
perpetrators are as “‘familiar’ as my brothers, cousins and school friends” (121). As a
result she feels that “between us all distances are erased” because she and the perpetrators
share a common culture, “and part of that culture over decades hatched the abominations
for which they are responsible” (121). In addition, she has “more in common with the
Vlakpass 5” because by confessing their crimes they are accepting responsibility; just like
millions of other Afrikaners have sought to come to terms with their collective guilt. Yet
her complicity doesn’t mean identification, as she is critical of her community. Her
irreverent attitude to leaders like President Botha suggests her discomfort with her
complicity. After her interview with Botha she describes him as “not senile, or old, or
suffering from effects of a stroke,” but “a fool” (355). Krog’s critical awareness of her
complicity is different from her mother’s sense of reverential identification. Her mother’s
essay on the death of Prime Minister Verwoerd expresses a deep reverence. Watching the
plane carrying Verwoerd’s body fly over her, Krog’s mother writes, “the life of the man I
only saw and admired from afar has touched my life” (125). The contrast between Krog’s
mother’s essay and Krog’s memoir reveals the difference between the two women’s
relation to their racial group. By writing their personal narratives both the women
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transgress the boundaries of patriarchal discourses. However, her mother’s essay
subscribes to the racist and patriarchal doctrines of the apartheid. Krog, however,
questions the doctrine even as she is forced to acknowledge her historical complicity with
South Africa’s racial history.
One of the consequences of Krog’s being a witness of witness to trauma is a
destabilization of her identity. As a protestor against apartheid she believed in the
goodness of Blacks and villainy of the whites. But with the end of apartheid as Black
violence and desire for revenge spills out from the townships and threatens her parents’
farm she begins to have mixed feelings. As she listens to the hearings she recognizes that
apartheid included Black on Black violence. Krog’s experiences at the hearings alienate
her from her family. The distance between Krog and her family is brought about in an
incident when she returns home from hearing. She writes,
I walk into my home one evening. My family are excitedly watching
cricket on television. They seem like a happy close knit group. I stand in
the dark kitchen a long time. Everything has become unconnected and
unfamiliar. I realize that I don’t know where the light switch is. (Krog 63)
Krog’s description reveals how her experiences have alienated her from her family. Their
ability to understand her efforts to come to terms with her culpability in South Africa’s
racial history is, therefore, limited. In this sense, she is more at home in the job where she
is with other journalists who are sharing the experience of witnessing the trauma of the
victims. Krog’s defense mechanism against apartheid is to have an extra-marital affair
with a colleague.
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The most interesting aspect of Krog’s affair in her memoir is that in the first
South African edition of the text she confesses that the affair was an invention, while in
the US editions there is no such confession. In the South African edition, she claims it is
a rhetorical strategy when her friend Patrick asks “And the affair that you describe in
here. Is it true?” (Krog 1998, 171). She writes, “I had to bring a relationship into the story
so that I could verbalize certain personal reactions to the hearings. I had to create a new
character that could not only bring in new information, but also express the psychological
underpinning of the commission” (Krog 1998, 171). However, in the US edition there is
no such confession. Laura Moss points out that in the US edition Krog’s affair betrays the
documentary nature of the text and drawing attention to it as a perspective of an
individual and not an authoritative account of the past as it seems to have been regarded.
Kim Rostan claims that the move from a monogamous relation, her marriage, to the open
polygamous relation of an extra-marital affair in the end symbolizes the need for an open
discourse after the closed and secretive discourse of the apartheid. She writes, the
“private interests of the silent marital relationship in these passages may be a figurative
obstacle to embodied community-building and reconciliation. The infidelity … may be
read with some imagination as a mediation on the complex demands of extending
personal loyalty and passion to a community beyond one’s most immediate relationships”
(Rostan 157). However, Rostan’s analysis does not consider the effect of Krog’s
admission that the affair was a lie on the readers. The fiction of an extramarital affair
immediately blurs the difference between truth and fiction in her book. If she can lie
about an affair she could have lied about her transformation as well. Krog’s invented
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lover makes us question the narrator’s sincerity in the final poem, a prayer to the other, to
be included in the new body politic with skepticism.
The imagination of an extra-marital affair also creates the space for Krog to
express her transformation. One of the effects of being witness to the way apartheid
corrupts and brutalizes human beings is that Krog manifests the physical effects of
trauma. Her hair falls off during the hearings and she feels disconnected. This kind of
physical manifestation of sickness is not unusual for witnesses of trauma. Since she feels
alienated from her family and community, the invention of characters allows the narrator
to “disclose a self that reacts affectively to the hearings, and acts the reactions out”
(Sanders 161). While the invention of a lover enables Krog to explain things to people
who have not experienced the apartheid or the TRC, ultimately the love becomes a source
of succor. lxxxvii Krog’s invention of the lover resembles Laub’s analysis of the Colonel
Menachem’s use of his mother’s picture as he hid from the Nazi’s as a child. lxxxviii For
the Colonel this picture provided him sustenance while he lived under the terrible
conditions of the Holocaust. Laub identifies this picture as the imagined audience, the
addressee, for the boy. In a similar way, as Krog grapples with the victims’ witness of
their trauma, she invents a lover to compensate for the absence of a real one; she invents
an addressee to cover the absence of a real one to witness her own transformation.
Ultimately, in the South African edition Krog’s admission of her affair and need to create
an audience is a comment on the absence of such an audience for white South Africans.
As a white woman she is cut off from the Blacks who give testimony. As an Afrikaner
journalist reporting on the TRC hearings she is estranged from her family who do not
share her experiences of being witness to the witness of trauma. The journey from
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alienation to a sense of larger community that marks postcolonial autobiography is denied
to her because, as an Afrikaner woman in post-apartheid South Africa, she cannot
presume on a unity between herself and the racial others. Consequently her story about
her transformation does not result in political legitimacy. lxxxix
While critics have analyzed the psychological effects of the affair and the
discovery of its fictional nature, its rhetorical function in the text has gone unexamined.
The narrator’s memoir, already decentered by the incorporation of unedited testimonies,
is further put under the scanner by her extra-marital affair. The unedited testimonies that
disrupt her memoir are the result of Krog’s refusal to exercise her editorial control over
the testimonies. Her refusal gives the victims of apartheid their voice, even in her
memoir. Thus the incorporation of testimonies can be read as acts of withheld
autobiography that negotiate the tricky position of being witness to witness of trauma.
Krog’s invented affair, which questions her memoir, presents the excerpts of the
testimonies as the only trustworthy and unquestionable sections of her text. Thus, Krog’s
fictional affair turns the entire text into a withheld autobiography that lets the victims
hold center stage.
Krog’s awareness of the slim chances of her new identity being accepted by the
racial other is expressed through her poem. The poem is a paean to the TRC, which
enabled this transformation in herself, and a plea to an unnamed “you” to include the
narrator into the new South Africa. The poem addresses two separate versions of “you.”
The first “you” is mentioned in the first line “because of you / this country no longer lies/
between us but within” (Krog 364). The “you” who made it possible to turn the country
from one that divides its population to one that bridges the divisions is different from the
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“you” addressed in the end: “You whom I have wronged, please/ take me/ with you”
(Krog 365). The first “you” refers to the TRC, whom she praises in the paragraph before.
After observing that “with all its mistakes, its arrogance, and its racism” the TRC “has
been … brave … in the winds of deceit, rancor and hate” and “kept alive the idea of
common humanity, Krog writes, “I want this hand of mine to write it. For us all; all
voices, all victims” before embarking on the poem (Krog 364). However the "you" that is
addressed at the end is not the TRC because the latter cannot carry the author with it.
Instead, it is addressed to the other, the racial other, who can bestow the forgiveness she
seeks and include her in the new order. The poem makes it clear that the one who
transforms Antjie’s relation to the country is not the one who can bestow forgiveness.
This difference, along with the fact that the poem ends in an appeal for inclusion, rather
than an assurance of inclusion, mean that reconciliation continues beyond the TRC. The
difference between the two versions of “you” accounts for the instability in her new
insight and identity given the precariousness of reconciliation.
At the end of the text, the narrator’s plea to be taken with the “you” is a secession
of power. By removing certitude about the narrator’s place in his country the text gives
way to the addressee. Smith points out that in autobiographical writing the position of
power is with the audience. She writes that “as arbiter the ‘silent’ partner in the
autobiographical contract assumes certain privileges of power … because … the site of
confession or self-exposure dramatically reverses power’s conventional dynamics: the
one who remains silent and who listens exerts power over the one who speaks” (Smith
Women 49). By highlighting the presence of the silent witness to her narrative, to her
impassioned appeal for forgiveness, Krog acknowledges the importance and power of the
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racial other in her life. She is, thus, able to be hospitable to the other, in the words of
Sanders, even though the text is about her development and her relation to the land.
The precariousness of South African reconciliation becomes evident in the
epilogue, which was added to the second South African edition and the first US edition.
In contrast to the rest of the book, the epilogue focuses on the politics after the final
report was released, including the parliamentary debates on reconciliation, and Mbeki’s
speech vilifying the whites. If the first edition ended with a paean cum plea, the second
edition’s poem is pessimistic. She writes
voices slung
in anger
over the solid cold length of our past
how long does it take for a voice to reach another
in this country help bleeding between us (372).
The poem makes it clear that the “country of my skull” has become the country
“bleeding” between us. It makes it clear that once the TRC’s mediating activity is
removed, political manipulation turns reconciliation into a witch hunt. The rest of the
epilogue tracks the failure of the state to promote reconciliation. The gerrymandering of
politicians coexists alongside the negotiations and compromises ordinary people make in
their daily practices in order to survive. The negotiation across race, class, and gender for
Krog is the space where reconciliation takes place.
Forgiveness and Withheld Autobiography
In both the texts we find that the protagonist’s recognition that they are complicit
in South Africa’s racial history results in a desire for forgiveness, absolution and
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redemption. But confession, forgiveness and absolution belong to a different order: a
religious order. Forgiveness in the religious sense cancels history and remakes the sinner.
The ultimate source of forgiveness, in religion, is God, a transcendental figure, existing
beyond the realm of human experience. In short, forgiveness can be granted by someone
who is located outside human history. In the secular world of South Africa the
perpetrators and victims are locked in a history that inflects them irrespective of their
personal position and action. Even though racism and the racial history of South Africa
resemble Original Sin, tainting racial groups irrespective of their personal actions, the
religious concept of forgiveness does not apply to the secular and fallen world of South
Africa because the ones who can grant forgiveness are as much marked by race as the
ones who demand forgiveness. In South Africa, structural factors that gave rise to racism
shadow the “new” order. Therefore, forgiveness in the religious sense is not only
impossible, but presumptuous to demand from the racial other.
Even in this historical order, forgiveness remains possible only when the
conditions that created inequalities disappear, or when there is compensation. Mrs.
Kondile tells Krog in Country of My Skull: “It is easy for Mandela and Tutu to forgive …
they lead vindicated lives. In my life … not a single thing has changed since my son was
burnt by barbarians. … Therefore I cannot forgive (Krog 142). Mrs. Kondile’s statement
suggests that in the secular world forgiveness from the victims can be realistically
anticipated only if there is an improvement in the historical conditions. In addition,
forgiveness by an individual does not cancel out the effects of a racial system that has
habitually privileged one group at the cost of denying the other its humanity. Since
forgiveness is unrealistic and does not change the racist foundations of South African
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society and culture, autobiographies of guilt and expiation are naïve. They repeat the
racist patterns, where the racial other is once again reduced to being an object in the
discourse of the other. Krog and Gordimer’s works suggest that a representation of the
social processes that govern the interaction between races is more ethical than
conventional autobiography. Their use of withheld autobiography as a pragmatic strategy
of representation accounts for the historical processes at work in the autobiographical
address. Instead of speaking for the other or interpellating the other in the narrative,
withheld autobiography represents racial complicity and the limits between the self and
the other in post-apartheid South Africa. Withheld autobiography thus enables the white
narrator/autobiographer to move from charting a new self to charting the processes that
constrain the formation of racial subjects in South Africa.
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Epilogue
Orania, a small town on the banks of the Orange River in South Africa, shot into
the limelight last summer. With South Africa hosting the World Cup Soccer 2010, this
little town stood out for being immune to the soccer fever that gripped the entire nation.
Orania remained unaffected because, as an exclusive Afrikaner town, it follows rugby,
the Afrikaner sport de rigueur, rather than soccer, the sport of the Africans. In South
Africa, where the majority of the population is non-white, Orania stands out as a town
that is 100% white. Formed in the early 1990s, when 13 Afrikaner families moved into an
abandoned worker’s camp near the Orange River after Mandela’s release from prison, it
is modeled after American utopian settlements like New Harmony and Brooks Farm
according to its founder Carol Boshoff III. Orania identifies itself as the last bastion of
Afrikaner values in an English-language-dominated global order and an affirmativeaction-dominated national order. xc Accordingly, non-white visitors are not welcome and
cannot work, attend church, or stay overnight. xci
Even as Orania has been read as a sign of reconciliation derailed, South Africa
continues to capture the global imagination as a symbol of racial reconciliation. In the
recent years there has been a spate of Hollywood films on South Africa’s reconciliation
efforts. These films include District 9(2009), Disgrace (2009), In My Country (2004), a
remake of Antjie Krog’s Country of My Skull, Goodbye Bafana (2007), and Red Dust
(2004). These films are the latest in a long tradition of films, beginning with D. W
Griffiths’ The Zulu’s Heart, that reveal Hollywood’s fascination with South Africa. xcii
These new films about South Africa differ from earlier black-white buddy movies based
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on South Africa because they focus on post-apartheid stories and represent South Africa
as a symbol of successful reconciliation. For example, Invictus focuses on Nelson
Mandela’s strategic use of the Rugby World Cup of 1995 to foster racial bonding. The
film is replete with images of racial hostility giving way to racial amity. But the most
moving image occurs at the end of the film when the Afrikaner policemen dance with an
African rag-picker outside the stadium as South Africa lifts the rugby trophy. This image
of the different racial groups coming together to celebrate a victory presents
reconciliation as a fait accompli.
To the world, post-apartheid South Africa is a conundrum. On one hand, the TRC
has become a model for subsequent truth commissions. Films like Invictus uphold a
nation erupting in joy as a symbol of the triumph of reconciliation. On the other hand,
stories of exclusive white enclaves such as Orania and rising corruption have been read as
signs of derailed reconciliation. These extreme representations of South Africa as a
symbol of the success or failure of reconciliation misread the true significance of South
Africa. All these representations regard reconciliation as a finite process, an event that
transforms history. However, when we turn to literature as means of understanding the
limits and possibilities of reconciliation, we can see that the real value of South Africa’s
reconciliation efforts is far more complex and intangible than its role as model for future
truth commissions.
To be sure, the complex literary response to South African history reminds us that
reconciliation efforts offer a mixed message, which perhaps helps explain the reluctance
of post-colonial theorists to embrace reconciliation as a desirable realm of possibility. In
the twenty-first century, when war and reprisals have replaced dialogue and negotiation
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as modes of interaction with the other, post-apartheid South Africa makes a strong case
for the theorization of reconciliation as a strategy for defraying hostility in post-conflict
societies. South Africa’s reconciliation efforts may have been the result of political
compromise, yet it shows how negotiation can help post-conflict societies move beyond
the politics of blame or the politics of confrontation and hostility. As a postcolonial
nation, South Africa also presents reconciliation as a strategy for dealing with the effects
of colonialism in postcolonial theory. But despite the dominance of reconciliation in
postcolonial nations, postcolonial theory remains skeptical of reconciliation because it is
associated with compromise and status quo. Reconciliation efforts in settler colonies such
as Canada and Australia, however, have maintained status quo and hardly changed life
for the aboriginals. xciii However, the notion of critical reconciliation that emerges through
the literary texts lets the victims direct reconciliation process. Krog’s memoir is a perfect
example of how narrative strategy can ensure that even a narcissistic genre like memoir
does not use the non-white sufferings as a pretext for a public account of the new white
subjectivity.
The events leading to the formation of South Africa’s TRC reminds us that
reconciliation needs to be based on reality, a reality where political change and actual
social transformation are often at odds, instead of idealistic concepts of perfect accord.
The continuation of white supremacy and the creation of a new powerful Black elite in
the post-apartheid era remind us that the defeat of one dominant group is, usually,
followed by the rise of another. The rise of a few members of a disenfranchised
community is, therefore, not a sign of the end of inequality or a radical transformation of
the racist social infrastructure. Election of non-white candidates does not cancel out
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history or the lived reality of the oppressed group, unless there are corresponding changes
in the social structures. This has particular relevance for contemporary USA, where the
election of the first African American President is heralded as the beginning of the postracial age. In fact, post-apartheid South Africa indicates that, as a long and complicated
process of negotiating differences through the flux of history, reconciliation efforts, at
their best, often follow a direction contrary to political trends.
South Africa’s reconciliation model is very different from the apologyforgiveness model followed by most settler nations, and this is what makes the literary
responses to South African history so important. In South Africa, Archbishop Tutu’s use
of a religious rhetoric in the TRC notwithstanding, official reconciliation efforts have
steered clear of associating reconciliation with discourses of apology and forgiveness.
The TRC has been careful to avoid demanding forgiveness from the victims or apology
from the perpetrators during the hearings. Instead, the TRC focused on discovering the
true nature of apartheid that emerged from the polyvalent narratives about apartheid. Like
the TRC, the different novels examined in this dissertation are skeptical of apology and
forgiveness as ways to reconciliation. The failure of forgiveness to guarantee
reconciliation is perhaps most dramatic in Krog’s Country of My Skull. The silence that
greets the autobiographer’s apology and plea for reconciliation indicates that apology and
forgiveness are autonomous processes. If Krog reveals that apology and forgiveness are
autonomous processes, then Coetzee reveals the difference between repentance and its
performance in apology. At the university hearing Lurie refuses to apologize for raping a
student because he does not regret his actions. Yet, later in the novel he impulsively
decides to visit his victim Melanie’s parents and prostrates himself before Melanie’s
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father to apologize. However, Lurie’s inability explains how he plans to act on his
repentance underscores the gap between repentance and its performance in apology.
In this complicated process, law as a means of negotiating between the past and
the present proves inimical. The main problem with law is that its claims to adhere to
universal principles create ahistorical equivalences. Moreover, in the enforcement of law
the universal principles are used to serve specific interests. Perhaps the strongest
indictment against law is in J. M Coetzee’s Disgrace. In Disgrace, Lurie’s daughter Lucy
refuses to report being gang-raped by Africans to the police because the law will punish
her rapist and treat racism as pathology, thereby ignoring the need for social change. Law
as the means of redress is equally mocked in Nadine Gordimer’s None to Accompany Me.
Vera, the lawyer and advocate for the land rights cases, is the strongest critic of law. Ever
pragmatic about the limitation of the law to correct wrongs, she regards law as nothing
more than damage control.
The rejection of law and forgiveness by the white authors is, in the end, a
rejection of reconciliation as a miraculous event that wipes the slate clean. Since racial
reconciliation involves changing the founding premises of a racist society to create a
positive dynamic between hostile groups, and structural changes in society take time,
one-time gestures are not enough. Both Gordimer and Brink argue for reconciliation as a
process that moves beyond escapism and grand gestures to engage with the historical
forces that shape experiences. In Gordimer’s None to Accompany Me, Sibongile, the
returned exile who becomes a successful politician, is disappointed that the end of
apartheid has not improved the living conditions of the non-whites. , However, Vera, the
lawyer who defends the land rights claims of the non-whites doesn’t expect miraculous
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changes. While Vera’s work for the Legal Foundation can be read as nothing more than a
matter of stalling the government’s dictates, her relations with non-white colleagues
suggest how reconciliation can be achieved without recourse to law. Her relationship
with Oupa and Zeph demonstrate how respect for differences can be the basis of
rewarding friendships that bypass patterns of hostility as well as relations of
condescension. Such relationships, it should be emphasized, are to be understood not as
the means towards the resolution of conflict, but rather as an ongoing process of
negotiating the conflict—that is, resolution as method, not as product. Reconciliation,
Gordimer’s novel implies, is not about escaping from the past or forgetting the past, but
of tackling the past so that the individual is not mired in it.
Like Gordimer, Brink provides examples of reconciliation that mock at the
expectation that history can be erased through individual action. In all the three novels
analyzed in this dissertation the protagonists discover that there is no escape from the past
and that token gestures cannot erase the history of abuse. Kristein in Imaginings of Sand
realizes that recording the unofficial history of her family to restore their Colored
servants to the rightful place within the family does not undo the past. She therefore
decides to remain in South Africa and help realize a new future. In Rights of Desire
Antjie’s ghost, who haunts Ruben’s house even after he has buried her bones, symbolizes
the inadequacy of symbolic gestures even as it signals their importance. Antjie’s
continuing presence forces Ruben to realize that escaping from the reality of post-racial
post-apartheid South Africa in music and books or by bribing officials to secure better
housing for his old Colored servant does not change the past. He thus vows to engage
with the problems of post-apartheid South Africa. While Ruben and Kristein recognize
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reconciliation as a process, Flip, the protagonist of The Devils’ Valley, is unable to
understand the limitations of grand gestures in effecting reconciliation. One of the
ironies of the novel is that Flip still believes that helping Emma, the much maligned
orphaned daughter of the village belle, to escape from the Valley will atone for his
complicity with the past. His inability to recognize his own complicity in racism leads to
Emma’s death. Yet he continues undeterred, held up by the belief that he will be able to
escape. However, the narrative dashes this naïve hope because when he reaches the
entrance to the valley he discovers that his path is blocked by the ghost of Lukas Seer.
In Coetzee and Krog’s texts the narratives underscore the impossibility of
building common grounds, while their narrative strategies enact and embody possible
ways of connecting with the other. By exposing the difficulty of forgiveness through law
and through the performance of apology Coetzee shows the impossibility of identifying
the other. Yet, Coetzee’s refusal to offset the protagonist David Lurie’s racist views with
positive representations of the non-white characters draws attention to the differences
between Coetzee, an Afrikaner author, and the non-white characters. At the same time,
his use of irony mocks at Lurie’s views, decentering him as the narrative authority. Like
Coetzee, Krog’s autobiography reveals the impossibility of forgiveness. At the same time
her fragmented narrative style, which foregrounds the victim’s voice, shows how
reconciliation can function in the absence of forgiveness.
In the novels discussed in this dissertation, the open-endedness and complexity of
narratives enable authors to critique the limits of reconciliation and enact the possibilities
of establishing relations of responsibility without drowning the voice of the other.
Literature’s reflexive ability to understand the complex web of forces at work in a
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historical context enable it to imagine possibilities that escape more empirically grounded
discourses. Even though post-apartheid literature is guarded in its optimism and presents
a future that is immensely difficult to realize, its visions of hope are based on a deep
understanding of the messy reality of South Africa’s racial history. This is not to say that
fiction is always reflexive—for many of the realistic novels of the apartheid reveal how
literature can become instruments of propaganda. However, the white authors I analyze
move beyond propaganda to contradict simplistic notions of collaboration and harmony
that the political change encourages. They demonstrate that South Africa needs its
novelists, poets and even autobiographers if its reconciliation is to move from
grandstanding and political posturing to sustainable action. xciv
South Africa’s contribution to discourses on post-conflict strategies for peace
includes not only a model for future truth commissions, but also a nuanced understanding
of reconciliation. South Africa’s conception of reconciliation emerges through political
documents and literary representations. Representations of inter-racial interactions in
South African white writing argue for reconciliation as a critical and dynamic process of
negotiating the differences in the experience of history and opening discourses to the
racial other. Since reconciliation is a dynamic process that is sensitive to its historical
context, post-apartheid South African does not offer a formula for reconciliation that can
be applied elsewhere. South Africa’s contribution to the question of reconciliation is that
it forces us to recognize reconciliation as a fragmented, uncomfortable and complicated
process. This, rather than moments of complete amity between the racial groups, is its
vision of reconciliation, state and popular culture notwithstanding.
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Notes:
i

See Ndebele 41-59. See Brink “Interrogating Silence” 14-28.
The Nationalist Party was led by the Afrikaners and came to power in 1948. They initiated apartheid
iii
I do not mean that the apartheid created ethnic divisions within the Black community. Apartheid used
already deeply entrenched ethnic identities to prevent the formation of a unified African opposition. Ethnic
divisions have always existed in South Africa because it was inhabited by numerous tribes. But these ethnic
identities were reinforced during apartheid. For more on the pre-apartheid ethnic identities see Beinart 4.
iv
Till the Afrikaner dominated National Party came to power, the Afrikaners chafed under the British rule.
The National Party came in to power after defeating the South African National Party, a British majority
party.
v
See Beinart 3-4.
vi
South Africa’s racial question was initially between the Boers and the British, where the Boers felt that
they were being oppressed by the British, who were more powerful and controlled the mining areas. The
indigenous population was dismissed as the other question. The victory of the NP in 1948 was regarded as
the victory against the British dominated party and the opportunity for the Afrikaners to establish their
volk. It was to realize this dream of Afrikaner nationalism that the apartheid policies were devised and
instituted.
vii
My identification of South Africa’s reconciliation as a dynamic and non-teleological process of marking
difference does not, however, regard South Africa along the lines of Western discourses about Africa that
Achile Mbembe identifies in On the Postcolony. Mbembe claims that western discourses on Africa presents
Africa as “the mixture of the half-created and incomplete”(3). However even though I regard reconciliation
as a process without end, I see the lack of an endpoint as intrinsic to the nature of reconciliation, rather than
a sign of inadequacy or inferiority of the place.
viii
For more on the relation of the settler to the mother country also see Lawson, and Prentice.
ix
We can see the truth of the statement behind Coombes’s analysis when we consider the three settler
countries—Australia, South Africa and Canada. These 3 settler colonies differ from each other in their
relation to the indigenous population. In the case of Australia and Canada indigenous people, the settler
white population is the majority while the indigenous people who were decimated, segregated are the
minority. Moreover in the case of Canada the federal government was responsible for the assimilation of
the indigenous people to the mainstream culture. In Australia for instance the individual state governments
are responsible for the indigenous people. In South Africa, even though the whites were a minority, they
held the political power and practiced segregation of the most extreme kind.ix This identity directed the
nature of the reconciliation efforts between the settlers and their descendants in the 21st century.
x
My articulation of reconciliation draws on two recent works on reconciliation and forgiveness. The first is
Julie McGonegal’s Imagining Justice: The Politics of Postcolonial Forgiveness and Reconciliation.
Arguing for the need for reconciliatory politics, McGoneal’s project formulates reconciliation by
combining Fanon and Gandhi. She argues that reconciliation is “involves something more than mere
departure from violence, it involves an entire yet ongoing and perpetually unfinished project of
transforming the brutal conditions that are a legacy of colonialism” (33). McGonegal’s project, which
covers settler societies in Australia, Canada and South Africa focuses on how reconciliation affects the
politics of forgiveness and justice. However, reconciliation itself is a complex project that extends beyond
questions of possibilities of forgiveness. While McGonegal’s conception of postcolonial reconciliation is
close to my conception of literature, Shane Graham’s South African Literature After the Truth Commission:
Mapping the Loss argues for the need to move beyond institutional measures of reconciliation like the TRC
to socio-spatial transformation of the landscape of South Africa. Based on space theories of David Harvey
and Henry Lefebvre, Graham argues for the way trauma and memory changes the landscape of South
Africa. However Graham does not enter into a discussion on the way ethical relations are affected by the
truth and reconciliation discourse.
xi
See WSJ.
xii
Comaroff’s views correspond with that of David Goldberg who comments that “as modernity commits
itself progressively to idealized principles of liberty, equality and fraternity … there is a multiplication of
racial identities and the set of exclusions they prompt, rationalize, enable and sustain” (7) Here Goldberg
ii
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points to the phenomenon where difference and divisions seem to multiply making the common ground
seem utopian. See Racist Culture.
xiii
Comaroff perceives the increasing use of legislation to gain rights and the commodification of history as
the result of neoliberalism in South Africa. Under neoliberalism the liberating postmodern “skepticism
towards metanarratives” that creates space for local, specific histories and narratives becomes
commodified.
xiv
For more on post-racist states see Goldberg, Racial State, 248.
xv
Goldberg defines assimilation as “blending into the mainstream …renouncing … one’s
subjectivity”(Racist Culture 219). Integration however allowed “cultural groups … effective control of
their autonomous cultural determinations and expressions at social margins, while maintaining a
supposedly separate, and thus neutral set of common values to mediate their relations at the centre”(219).
Incorporation in contrast refers to the “dual transformations that take place both in the dominant values and
in those of the insurgent group as the latter insist on more complete incorporations into the body politic and
the former grudgingly gives way(220).
xvi
I want to clarify that the multiple languages the divide the communities does not mean that Afrikaans is
solely spoken by the Afrikaners and Coloreds. Afrikaans would also be spoken by the many of the
Africans, especially those who worked for Afrikaners. However, the Africans living in the Bantustans
would be familiar with their tribal languages, and not English or Afrikaans. Despite this cross-racial
sharing of tongues I make this statement because there is no one language that is shared by the majority of
the population.
xvii
The experience of the impossible is analogous to Robert Young’s “quest for the singular, the contingent
event, which by definition refuses all conceptualization” that relates “to the project of constructing a form
of knowledge that respects the other without absorbing it to the same (Young, White Mythologies, 41).
xviii
For postcolonialism as a process see McClintock “Angel of Progress”, and Quayson 3.
xix
By “ironic project” Seshadri means that postcolonialism must “rehearse continually the conditions for
the production of its own discourse or be doomed to fall into a form of cultural anthropology” (66).
xx
Gates refers to African American literature in his comment. Despite the reference to a specific literature,
his comments remain relevant for South Africa because South Africa’s deep racial history means that
literature cannot transcend race.
xxi
See Keen 167.
xxii
See CNN, Telegraph.
xxiii
The term “ubuntu” is a word from the tribal languages which means humanism. For a more detailed
analysis of the meaning of the word see The Truth and Reconciliation Commission Final Report Vol1, 125128.
xxiv
See Mamdani.
xxv
Saidiya Hartman and Stephen Best claim that justice is fugitive when historical wrongs are concerned.
Yet they claim that measures of redressal have to be made as a way of marking the impossibility of
attaining justice and closure from the past. See Best and Hartman.
xxvi
My comparison of reconciliation as process to democracy to come is similar to Julie McGonagal’s
claims. See McGonagal 7-8. However, Gonagal’s argument relates justice and forgiveness and their “yet-to
realized”state to the “post” in postcolonialism. I extend her argument to suggest that it also relates to the
“yet-to-be realized state of post-apartheid South Africa.
xxvii
Democracy to come according to Derrida refers to the fact that democracy is indeterminate, taking
different forms in different hsotorical contexts. It also refers to the fact that sometimes to maintain
democracy the state has to suspend democratic apparatus like at times of war etc. See Rogues .
xxviii
See Barber. Barber’s essay reveals the different debates centered round the new state of South Africa
that emerged at the end of apartheid and resulted in reconfiguring the old identities in South Africa.
xxix
Analysis of narrative aspect of truth commissions has focused on its ability to challenge the monolithic
apartheid history with a multi-layered history. Albie Sachs claims narrative truth creates a “dialogic
history” where “multiple perspectives, experiences and interpretations of events of the different
participants” are allowed expression (Sachs 97). One function of narratives is to convey a nuanced and
multi-layered narrative. Apartheid, thus, mutates from a racist Afrikaner regime that spawned white and
black violence to a reification of British and Dutch colonial policies, marked by white/black as well as
black/black violence.
xxx
Skorupski, 93.
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xxxi

John Austin defines performative utterance as an utterance which performs an action. Austin argues that
since performative utterances create the values through performance, they are beyond truth evaluation. John
Searle, however, identifies a two-way connection between performative utterances and concepts:
“performative utterances create conventions in a particular situation, but they are governed by the broad
conventions as well”.
xxxii
For more on the relation between operative acts and performative utterance see John Scorupski 150151.
xxxiii
My distinction between acting and performing is based on the concept outlined in Judith Butler,
“Performance Acts and Gender Constitution”. See Butler 900-911.
xxxiv
Theatricality is based on Greg Denning’s notion of theatre as “space set for spectatoring” that involves
the notion of viewing a space as closed around with convention that the audience and actors enter into the
conspiracy of their own illusions”(105). According to Denning “the brilliance of theatre is that it represents
experience and offers us conventionalities by which representation can be interpreted.”(127). See Denning.
In the hearings of course these conventions had to be created by the TRC through the hearings.
xxxv
For more on the Benzien hearings and the ambiguities it presented see Graham 23-31.
xxxvi
Mamdani calls, the elision of everyday injustices of apartheid. It also gave rise to fears that it turned
non-victims into spectators, obscuring their lives. However, these criticism do not take into account the fact
that mass media create community through temporal simultaneity. Moreover, by watching the hearings the
greater public outside the hearings are made to bear witness to the stories.
xxxvii
The definition of symbol is based on Charles Samuelson Pierce’s differentiation between index, icon
and symbol.
xxxviii
See Sanders 149.
xxxix
Rosemary Jolly points out that the violence of realistic representation of the other during the apartheid
was that it was exclusive of other groups who were seen through the binary logic of racial discourse.
Moreover, it excluded the singularity of the other because its attempts to realistically portray the extent of
horrors could be “pornographic in its effects and its concern to deconstruct the repetitive structures of
colonialism.”(Jolly 111). For more on the violence of representation in apartheid white writing see Jolly
Chapter 5.
xl
Authors and critics who harangued about the need to free South African literature from ideological
determinism and its realistic bias include among other Andre Brink, Njabulo Ndebele, and Albie Sachs. For
more on the debate see Sachs “Preparing Ourselves for Freedom”, Ndebele “The Rediscovery of the
Ordinary: Some New Writings in South Africa” and Brink “Interrogating Silence: New Possibilities Faced
by South African Literature”.
xli
Dorothy Driver questions this iron-clad distinction between apartheid and post-apartheid literature. See
Driver.
xlii
See Attridge J.M. Coetzee and the Ethics of Reading 1-12.
xliii
For more on Coetzee’s subversion of conventional literary genres see Penner J.M. Coetzee: Countries of
the Mind.
xliv
For a detailed discussion of how the different discourses marginalize the other see Jolly Colonization,
Violence and Narration in White South Africa Writing, Chapter 2.
xlv
Irony is conventionally regarded as a rhetorical concept. It has also been regarded as a marker of the
ironist’s crisis by psychoanalysis. The first perspective regards the confusion of the ironic address to a
linguistic legerdemain. The psychoanalytic perspective locates the dual meanings of irony as indicative of a
conflict in the speaker. However, the irreconcilable dual meaning of irony can also be indicative of
existential dilemma. Friedrich Schlegel was one of the first philosophers to regard irony as a philosophical
concept. However, Schlegel was unable to resolve the instability of meaning philosophical irony created in
the aesthetic field. As a solution to the instability in meaning created by philosophical irony in a text, Soren
Kierkegaard points out that the negative energies of irony cancel out the instability of meaning to establish
the primacy of the text. The difference between irony as an aesthetic category and irony as philosophy is
that the latter does not seek to resolve the contradictions since they are reflective of existential conditions.
For my chapter I use Schlegel and Kierkegaard to analyze the play of irony in Disgrace because they help
connect the novel’s ironic representation of the other to the contradictions created by the country’s racist
history. For irony as an aesthetic and rhetorical concept see Booth The Rhetoric of Irony. For irony and
psychoanalysis see Stringfellow. The Meaning of Irony: A Psychoanalytic Investigation. For irony as a
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philosophical concept see Kierkegaard The Concept of Irony and Schlegel “On Incomprehensibility”. For a
critique of philosophical irony see Roy “Hegel contra Schlegel; Kierkegaard contra De Man.”
xlvi
For more on the politics of international awards see Graham Huggan, Chapter 5, Sarah Brouilette
Chapter 4.
xlvii
The Immorality Act forbade sexual relations between different races. The Prohibition of Inter-Racial
Marriage Act, which came earlier, forbade inter-racial marriage.
xlviii
The apartheid was identified with Protestant Christian ethos of the Afrikaner community
xlix
Kaaps is a creolized dialect that borrows from Afrikaans and some local African language and is mainly
spoken by the Cape Coloured population of South Africa, who are mainly situated in Cape Town.
l
Zoe Wicomb essay on Disgrace offers numerous examples from the novel which indicates that Melanie is
Colored despite the lack of reference to her racial identity. See Wicomb.
li
In Racist Culture Goldberg uses the term non-racialism which he opposes with his concept of anti-racism.
In Racial State he uses the term racelessness
lii
Postimperial melancholia according to Gilroy is “associated with the neotraditional pathology of what, in
the British setting, Patrick White has identified as the morbidity of heritage”( Melancholia 101).
liii
It can be argued that in the colonial period the Afrikaners, or Boers as they were called then, were at
threatened by the power of the British Empire and were hardly in a position of glory. However, they were
still dominant over the indigenous tribes and the colonial period was identified with events like the Great
Trek, which were key to defining Afrikaner identity in South Africa.
liv
Lucy’s refusal to report the rape has been read as a sign of the fact that her rape was a result of racial
history that bound the different groups in a relation of perverted familiarity where each appeared to the
other as a manifestation of their racial history. I agree that this is one possible reading, but it does not
account for the fact that the present that Lucy refers to is a post racial present where racial crimes are
relegated to the private domain and when they are reported they are seen as individual acts rather than as
symptoms of a social malaise.
lv
Sanders’ definition of reparation as restoring and making is based on the two German terms used to
explain reparations: weidergutmachung and weiderherstellung. Sanders bases his definition on Melanie
Klein’s work (120-134).
lvi
I define space as not just an absolute physical phenomenon but fluid. It is based on David Harvey and
Doreen Massey’s notion of space as a network of relations that exhibit the power structures of the time.
lvii
The inadequacy of imagination to capture the other as a full bodied presence is revealed in the opera
sequence. This criticizes the Romantic movement of the 18th century which privileged the imaginative
faculty for its ability to create new forms out of intimations of reality. The criticism of imagination as a
creative force par excellence also criticizes Lurie who identifies with William Wordsworth. In the end the
opera is a criticism of the high European tradition that is associated with the colonial exploitation and its
appropriation of the other through representation.
lviii
Here the other doesn’t represent the absolute other form whom the self is estranged, but all that the
dominant culture has relegated to the sidelines and silenced to maintain its homogeneity. For more on
definition of the other see Attridge, Singularity of Literature.
lix
I am not suggesting that being unable to sympathize with his daughter’s rapists signals a lack of
humanity. However, what is disturbing in his behavior with Pollus is the use of racist rhetoric and physical
violence. The racist rhetoric and violence on the racial other has a long history in South Africa. If one
contrasts Lurie’s behavior with Pollux and Lucy’s behavior it is possible to see how one can respond to the
other without falling into the racist patterns of the past.
lx
The term focalization was used by Gerard Genette to refer to the difference between the narrator and
narrative perspective. It was expanded by Meike Bal in Narratology to refer to “the relation between the
vision and that which is being ‘seen’ perceived”(142).
lxi
For more on the connection between Lurie’s unreliability as a narrator and his failure as a paternal figure
see Marais.
lxii
The difference between representation as “speaking for” as in politics and representation as “ ‘representation’ as in art and philosophy” (256), according to Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, is that they refer
“to two different modes—proxy and portrait. Re-presentation as description leaves the intellectual
“transparent” (Critique 257). In contrast, representation as proxy in politics elaborately stages the
representation of a consciousness outside it. Representation as the act of being representative in the

200

political sense involves a strategic substitution of oneself as representative consciousness. The common
point between representation and re-presentation is that “beyond both are where the oppressed subjects
speak, act and know for themselves” (259). But representation as proxy is the ethical mode because it
draws attention to itself as a staging of the other, i.e. the distance between the self and the other. Spivak
makes this distinction to point out that while representation is always an imperfect version of the
heterogeneous original, it can maintain the distance between the self and the other, even as it tries to
recuperate the voice of the marginalized.
lxiii
For more on the two levels of irony see Schlegel and Kierkegaard.
lxiv
It is important to note that philosophical irony or secondary irony may seem to resemble Wayne Booth’s
notion of “unstable irony”, but they are different concepts. Booth’s notion of irony is a rhetorical concept
while Schlegel and Kierkegaard’s concept refers to an irreconcilable and impossible historical and
existential dilemma.
lxv
See Ayon Roy for a discussion on the aesthetic challenges posed by the relation between irony and the
ironist in PMLA Jan 2009 (107-109).
16
For more about Disgrace and counterfocalization. see Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak “Ethics and Politics in
Tagore, Coetzee and Certain Scenes of Teaching” and Mike Marais.
lxvi
For more about the connection between textual agency and irony see Roy.
lxvii
Looking at irony from the perspective of postmodern notions of subjectivity forces us to read irony less
as a power play and more as a result of the relation of individuals to discourses. In this sense postmodern
irony as theorized by Hutcheon differs from Kierkegaard or Schlegel who still regard it as power play.
lxviii
See Jenkins 5-6.
lxix
Jenkins defines upper case history as “way of looking at the past in terms which assigned to contingent
events and situations an objective significance by identifying their place and function within a general
schema of historical development usually constructed as appropriately progressive” (5). Jenkins defines
history in the lower case as “history construed in academic and ‘particularistic’ forms which, while
insisting … it was ‘proper’ history, modestly eschewed metanarrative claims that it was discovering in the
past meaningful trajectories, purposes and teleologies” (6).
lxx
For more on the relation between history and fiction see Hayden White, Frank Ankersmitt.
lxxi
See Kossew “Reinventing History, Reinventing the Novel: The Politics of Reading Andre Brink’s
Imaginings of Sand.”
lxxii
Christopher Warnes tracks the term “magical realism” back to Novalis. However this ancestry of the
term is not generally traced back to Novalis. Wendy Farris, Lois Parkinson Zamora, Seymour Menton all
trace the origin of the term back to Roh. In this case it is also noteworthy that Maggie Ann Bowers
distinguishes between Roh’s use of the term magic realism and the term “magical realism” as it is practiced
by Marquez, Rushdie etc today. She associates magic realism is “the concept of the ‘mystery [that] does not
descend to the represented world, but rather hides and palpates behind it’” with Roh and magical realism
“as understood in Rushdie’s words as the ‘commingling of the improbable and the mundane’”(3). Bowers
claims that “in magic realism ‘magic refers to the mystery of life; in marvelous and magical realism
‘magic’ refers to any extraordinary occurrence and particularly to anything spiritual or unaccountable by
rational science”(20). However other theorists have not made such distinction. In this essay I shall use
magic realism and magical realism to mean the same thing.
lxxiii
For more on Roh’s definition of magic realism see Roh 15-33.
lxxiv
For more on the distinction between magic realism as it is understood in art and magic realism as it is
practiced in literature see Lies That Tell The Truth: Magic Realism Seen Through Contemporary Fiction
From Britain by Anne Hegerfieldt. See Hegerfieldt 12-17.
lxxv
See Zamora.
lxxvi
See Carpentier.
lxxvii
See Kossew “Reinventing History, Reimagining the Novel: The Politics of Reading Andre Brink’s
Imaginings of Sand.”
lxxviii
Da Silva’s comment is in sync with J. M. Coetzee’s description of white South Africans as “no longer
European, but not yet African” (Coetzee, White Writing 11).
lxxix
See Huddart, Chapter 1.
lxxx
The desire to seek communion with the Africans and Coloureds, instead of a bond with the landscape,
marks a shift in literature from the colonial times. In White Writing: On the Culture of Letters in South
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Africa Coetzee points out that for the colonial poet literature addressed to Africa was a means of seeking “a
dialogue with Africa, a reciprocity with Africa, that will allow him an identity better than that of visitor,
stranger, transient” (8). The problem with South Africa’s racial history was that the European settlers loved
the land, instead of loving the people who lived on and worked the land. This desire for a bond with the
landscape changes in the 1960s, according to Coetzee, because “the ultimate fate of whites was going to
depend … on an accommodation with black South Africans than on an accommodation with the South
African landscape” (Coetzee, White Writing 8). In post-apartheid South Africa ethical relations with nonwhite South Africans were the need of the hour, instead of accommodation. But the silence that greeted the
colonial poet as he struggled to find a language to describe the alien African landscape repeats itself in the
post-apartheid autobiographical desire for a non-white listener.
lxxxi
See Spivak Postcolonial Critic
lxxxii
Ileana Dimitrui describes her post apartheid novels as a move from politics to the personal realm.
lxxxiii
In “The Essential Gesture” Gordimer writes that the essential gesture of an author is “individual”
(286). The essential gesture contrasts with the necessary gesture which remains “responsible to a given
social order” (278).
lxxxiv
Dori Laub identifies 3 stages of witnessing: “the level being witness to oneself within the experience;
the level of being witness to the testimonies of others; and the level of being a witness to the testimonies to
the process of witnessing itself” (75)
lxxxv
In this context Kim Rostan’s analysis of the unedited transcripts in Krog’s memoir is beneficial. In
“The Ethics of Infidelity in Country of My Skull” Kim Rostan points out that the testimonial citation
preserves the “testimonial eloquence as well as the silence” (Rostan 148). She reads the excerpts of
testimonies as dramatization of traces of events and emotions that remain beyond the bounds of the self.
According to her “the de-formation and decontextualization of testimony are not simply sound bites, but
traces of events that resist naming and knowing” (Rostan 150).
lxxxvi
Spivak identifies the difference between autobiography and testimony. Autobiography differs from
other life writings such as testimony, for example, because in an autobiography the “intention of the subject
is to objectify without loss of subjectship” (Spivak, Circumfession 7). In contrast, testimony is the “genre
of the subaltern giving witness to oppression, to a less oppressed other” (Spivak, Circumfession 7). In a
testimony “editorial control varies in degree but is never absent” and the editorial subject is “never decentered” (Spivak Circumfessions 7, 8). Spivak’s analysis implies that autobiographies signal a position of
privilege.
lxxxvii
In the essay “I. me, mine” Krog writes, “I remember writing Country of My Skull” and it seemed
pages and pages of horror, and grief and death. After some weeks I was in need for the opposite, for
softness, kindness, caring, loveliness and poetry. That brought the affair. I cling to that “I” in the affair to
get through the book” (103)
lxxxviii
See Laub 86-91.
lxxxix
Antjie claims that she uses her imagination “not to invent the story, but to invent the way in which to
tell the story” (106). See Krog “I, me mine”.
xc
See Milner
xci
See Bruillard.
xcii
Other films following Griffiths include In the Heat of the Night (1967), and The Willby Conspiracy
(1975), Cry Beloved Country and Dry White Season among others. See Johnson.
xciii
Gillian Whitlock points out in her essay “Active Remembrance: Testimony, Memoir and the Work of
Reconciliation” that “there is little evidence to date that the vast difference in the material circumstances of
indigenous and non-indigenous peoples in Australia and Canada has been lessened by the symbolic aspects
of reconciliation”(25). She notes that the reconciliation efforts in Canada and Australia have had little
effect on the fact that “the material and lived experience of First Nations and indigenous people in Canada
and Australia continue to be shaped by extraordinarily high rates of poverty, death, unemployment, youth
suicide substance and sexual abuse, domestic violence and family breakdown” (25).
xciv
The importance of literature in providing a counterdisocurse to the popular notions of reconciliation
rampant in South Africa discounts an instrumental view of literature. This becomes particularly important
because literature associated with troubled and violent contexts is seen as irrelevant after the period of
struggles over. I am forced to make this comment because of discussions of the role of Afrikaner literature
after the end of apartheid. I think this discussion is relevant not just in South Africa, but also in USA, where
African American literature is associated with a kind of activist role that has been regarded as redundant in
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the post Jim Crow era. See Chronicle of Higher Education article “Does African American Literature
exists”.
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